Iran’s IRGC has long kept Khamenei in power
Once he’s gone, it will have to find a new purpose.
Once he’s gone, it will have to find a new purpose.
It has now been almost 18 months since Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued 12 demands to Iran and imposed a “maximum pressure” campaign to compel Tehran to change behavior.
The increasing involvement of Iran in disinformation and attempted email hacking, in tandem with the revelation of Turla hijacking Iranian hacking infrastructure, risks muddying the waters even further with regard to attributing and countering election interference in 2020.
While the Iranians would have preferred it if the Turks had not invaded Syria, it does not change their most immediate policy objective, which is the survival of the Assad regime. As long as the Russians keep the Turks away from Assad’s forces, Tehran will, at least in the short term, be able to manage the consequences of Ankara’s actions.
In a move that surprised no one, on Oct. 19 the Afghan election commission said it was unable to announce the preliminary results of the Sept. 28 presidential election as planned, due to delays in processing biometric data. Held amid political uncertainty, terrorist violence, and general skepticism, the September election was the fourth presidential contest in Afghanistan since 2001, when the brutal Taliban regime was toppled in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the United States.
Deep political, familial, and religious ties have allowed Druze communities across the Levant to remain largely unified against external threats, but eight years of violence in Syria and a coordinated campaign by the regime and its allies now threaten to destabilize regional Druze politics and erode the sect’s political and military power. An Iranian-backed campaign by Hezbollah to incite inter-Druze violence in Lebanon has curtailed this unity, laying the groundwork for Hezbollah to expand into Syria’s Suwayda province with impunity.
With an estimated $1 trillion in natural resources and sitting astride an international crossroads of increasingly critical importance, Balochistan is becoming a stage on which the world’s powers are playing out their ambitions. China, the U.S., and India have all formulated Balochistan policies in the past few years, hoping to utilize the region to achieve wider international goals — and the three countries across which Balochistan is divided, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, have been eager to use it as a bargaining chip for their own purposes.
While the Turkish military offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria might, once again, bring Moscow and Tehran together tactically in support of Assad’s rule and Syrian sovereignty, the two powers have fundamentally different visions for the war-ravaged country’s future.
Washington has a hard long-term choice when it comes to Syria. The best chance for an optimal solution through a negotiated political deal was lost years ago. The U.S. now must choose a policy which will yield only a “least-bad” result.
On Sept. 16, the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war. In all three countries, the Ankara summit was hailed as a major success, as negotiations on the formation of a Syrian constitutional committee concluded and progress was made toward resolving other outstanding challenges, such as the future of northeastern Syria and the ongoing struggle for Idlib.
Lately, Iran has begun leveraging LinkedIn to hack espionage targets and has developed sophisticated disinformation campaigns to exacerbate distrust of its adversary governments.
If there is one Iranian military figure that can be considered an international celebrity of sorts, it is General Qassem Soleimani. He is the head of the Quds Force, the arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that operates outside of Iran’s borders. This week, he gave his first ever lengthy public interview, focusing on Iran’s role in the 2006 war between Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel.
On Sept. 14, the news that Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities had been attacked and damaged came as a shock. And yet, in the not too distant future, this attack will likely be regarded as a tactical mistake. Tehran has miscalculated the timing of such a spectacular attack and it’s unclear whether Iran will get another opportunity to strike such a surprise blow again.
After five years of indecisive war, there is a clear desire on the part of the international community to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end, and the recent UN-endorsed Houthi initiative seems predicated on the assumption that ending the fighting between Riyadh and the Houthis would achieve this. A closer look at the situation, however, suggests this assumption is flawed.
Although the Houthi militia claimed the attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia on September 14, experts doubt that the drones were launched from Yemen. Despite the Houthis’ affirmations and Iranian denials, investigations by the US and the Arab Coalition have demonstrated the weapons used were Iranian, and the location of the oil installations in northeastern Saudi Arabia makes them almost certainly out of range from Yemen.