For now, both Najaf and Tehran seemed to have a convergence of interests on preserving the post-2003 political order.
Eight years after the revolution, Tunisians seem to be swinging between disenchantment and anti-establishment backlash.
After a long-drawn-out series of negotiations, Turkey has successfully convinced more than 40 armed opposition groups in northern Syria to unite under a single umbrella, directly under the command of the Syrian Interim Government’s Ministry of Defense.
As ISIS’s territorial “state” was simultaneously rolled back and then defeated, an international consensus increasingly emerged that claimed Syria’s war was “winding down.” There is no doubt that the geographic scope and intensity of conflict is not what it was at the height of hostilities in 2014 and 2015, but it is certainly not finished either.
In its final report, the congressionally-mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) provided a bleak but wholly realistic assessment of the state of the crisis in Syria. When it comes to policy prescriptions, however, the SSG falls short. Despite clearly identifying the “means and ends” gap as one of two core problems with U.S. policy in Syria, the “recommendations” suggested by the SSG differ little, if at all, from those already in place.
The crux of today’s Libya problem in international foreign policy lies in an underappreciated UN misstep in the most important international treaty concerning Libya, the 2015 Skhirat Agreement, and the decision to vest sovereignty in the heads of independent and semi-independent sub-state institutions like the Central Bank of Libya. The negative implications of this decision must now be addressed and it is time to move onto something new, after Skhirat.
Largely overlooked in international policymaking toward Libya’s current conflict is the role of corruption as a key driver of violence, as opposed to merely its byproduct. The high-level debate on Libya at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in late September and the proposed follow-on international conference to be hosted by Germany in October or November are the perfect opportunities to correct this oversight.
Saudi Arabia surprised the global oil and gas industry earlier this month by reshuffling its top two energy positions. Long-serving technocrat Khalid al-Falih was ousted as chair of Saudi Aramco one day and as head of the Ministry of Energy the next.
One important dynamic that is not acknowledged enough is the intensifying competition between Russia and Iran to determine the future shape of Syria and their position in it. While the very real competitive dynamic between Moscow and Tehran will never transition to hostility, it is beginning to have a very real effect on the evolution of major aspects of the crisis — from active conflict theaters, to the structures of the state, control over resources, and the prospect of intra-state conflict on Syrian soil.
Things seem to be going from bad to worse for Lebanon’s economy. On Aug. 23 Fitch downgraded its credit rating to CCC, meaning both it and Moody’s now rate the country’s bonds as junk. Ten days later, on Sept. 2, Lebanon’s top officials and bankers declared the country was in a state of economic emergency and said emergency measures would be taken.
Economic development paradigms have shifted focus over past decades: from minimizing imports to encouraging exports as the path to prosperity. Individual countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have had little success under either paradigm — the result being stagnant economies and high unemployment, especially among young people. Perhaps now is the time for MENA countries to follow a different path and focus on harnessing the power of their collective domestic demand to foster economic development.
Three years after a major Islamic State (IS)-claimed attack in its capital Dhaka, defeating the group remains a work in progress for Bangladesh. The residual and regenerative capacity of the local pro-IS cells in Bangladesh is significant as evidenced by actual and thwarted attacks in the country during the first half of 2019. Amidst the threat emanating from Bangladeshi jihadist returnees from Syria, IS ideology continues to resonate and attracts new recruits in this part of South Asia. It remains to be seen how Bangladesh will respond to the re-surfacing of the IS, especially at a time when the region is witnessing inter-religious tensions.
Over the past few weeks, my colleagues at MEI have debated whether the U.S. should stay in Syria or leave. Here I’d make a different argument: that it doesn’t really matter. The president has already made the decision to leave, and while his aides may have been able to slow roll the troop drawdown, the reality is that Donald Trump has made it clear the U.S. will not disburse any additional resources. Even within the 2020 Democratic field, not a single candidate has advocated increasing resources.
Unlike most other goods, the inflation-adjusted prices of oil and oil derivatives actually became cheaper in the years after the Syrian uprising and the loss of most of the country’s oil fields. Iran stepped in to fill the gap by shipping oil by sea through the Suez Canal. In recent months, however, these shipments seem to have ground to a halt, crippling regime-controlled areas. This paper examines several competing explanations for the slowdown in Iranian oil shipments, explores a range of possible responses for the Assad regime, and takes a closer look at the implications for the regime, its allies, and regular Syrians.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a destabilizing element in an already volatile Middle East. The Palestinians are too weak to wrest their independence from Israel. But as long as their right to self-determination is denied, they are likely to engage in regular violence targeting Israel. Absent outside intervention, Israel is powerful enough that it can suppress Palestinian demands for freedom — but it is not able to completely pacify the Palestinians. Thus, the conflict continues, punctuated every few years by rounds of more significant violence.