Research & Commentary Results

In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force, on Jan. 3, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the U.S. of Iran’s “harsh revenge.” There has been much speculation around the timing, location, and the type (or form) of Iran’s promised revenge. Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou takes a closer look at the impact of the widely discussed strategy of blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

On Jan. 5, shortly after Qassem Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone strike, Tehran announced that it would no longer remain committed to the enrichment restrictions laid out under the 2015 nuclear deal. Even though European diplomats have rushed to assuage Iranian concerns about the possible resumption of international sanctions, Tehran perceives this as an extension of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign and is very unlikely to back down or substantially change its defiant behavior — domestically promoted as a counterpolicy of “maximum resistance” — even if punitive UNSC resolutions against it are reinstated. 

The U.S. assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani came as a seismic shock to the Middle East, not least to the embattled political system in Damascus that has reaped the benefits of Iran’s military involvement across the region. While his death will be a severe blow, it will not necessarily translate into a decline in Iran’s influence or military presence in Syria. Soleimani’s army of militias and supporters will outlast him, possibly by decades. 

Although Moscow continues to reap the benefits of its Syrian campaign, it is increasingly faced with diminishing returns. Despite its greater geopolitical involvement in the country, the Kremlin has so far failed to extract major economic dividends and may soon face increased competition from Tehran. With Syria’s future clouded in uncertainty and the unresolved issue of the Idlib region hanging like the sword of Damocles over any potential political settlement, Russia is now trying to bring the Libyan conflict into the equation as well.

In the aftermath of the Berlin conference, there is little sign that Hifter is backing off on his efforts to take Tripoli by force.

The Berlin Conference on Libya will be a crucial test of whether Europe can act on its ambitions.

18 years after CIA and U.S. special operations elements touched down in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, ongoing, incremental troop reductions reveal the smoke and mirrors manner in which the U.S. is withdrawing from the conflict in lieu of a negotiated settlement.

On Jan. 8, Turkey inaugurated the TurkStream natural gas pipeline from Russia, seemingly deepening Ankara’s ties with Moscow. However, a fuller analysis of Turkey’s current energy policies and consumption trends indicate a dramatic shift westward, away from Russia and Iran.

It is unclear how many civilians were killed in February and March 2019, when the U.S.-led coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pounded ISIS’s last enclave around the town of Baghouz. Presumably, the numbers reached into the thousands. Those who escaped found themselves in the desert, hundreds of kilometers away from lifesaving aid. The reasons for the failure of the humanitarian response were mainly political.

In the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, a U.S. Military MQ-9 drone fired multiple air-to-ground missiles and killed the commander of the elite Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani. The targeted killing of Soleimani was carried out as he left the Baghdad International Airport under overt military authorities. Given that the strike was carried out under this authority, it was publicized globally shortly after it was completed. There were other options available to target Soleimani, however.

In the aftermath of the latest round of U.S. and Iranian brinksmanship, hawks and liberals are interpreting developments as validating their positions. Hawks are claiming victory for “maximum pressure,” arguing how the U.S. strike against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani frightened the now weakened ruling clerics into submission. Liberals argue that Iran took the high road, demonstrating a willingness to respond to incentives and negotiate.

It is increasingly the case that the Russian-Turkish decisions on Idlib or Syria need to be understood as part of a broader Russian-Turkish partnership.

The Iranian pattern of ‘strategic patience’ has evidently transferred to its cyber activity, justifying vigilance, but not panic.

While they’re there, the United States should refocus the partnership toward making the Iraqi Army more self-sufficient. Here’s how.

Since regaining its independence nearly three decades ago, European aspirations have been a central part of Georgia’s political agenda and identity. But the reality is more complicated and Georgia is, in a meaningful sense, part of both greater Europe and the greater Middle East.