On Nov. 30, the Islamic State announced that its leader, Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, had been killed in battle and that his successor, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurayshi, was now in place. Hours later, the United States military’s Central Command confirmed the death of Abu al-Hassan, adding that it had occurred in Daraa, in southern Syria, in mid-October at the hands of “the Free Syrian Army.”
أطلقت المجموعات المحلية في مدينة درعا البلد ، وهي مجموعات عسكرية كانت تتبع للجيش السوري الحر، و بقيت في المحافظة بعد توقيع أتفاقية المصالحة مع النظام السوري برعاية روسية في يوليو / تموز عام 2018، عملية عسكرية واسعة على مجموعات هفو _ الحرفوش في أحياء طريق السد والمخيم داخل درعا البلد.
On Oct. 31, local units previously affiliated with the FSA launched a large-scale military operation against the al-Hafo-Harfoush group in the southern Syrian city of Daraa al-Balad. The operation followed a suicide bombing targeting the house of Ghassan al-Akram Abazid, a former FSA leader, that left four dead and several others wounded, on Oct. 28, in Daraa al-Balad. The attack was only the latest in a string of similar operations in southern Syria conducted by the group over the past year targeting military factions affiliated with the opposition.
Sudan is geostrategically important to U.S. interests in both Africa and the Middle East. The country’s military rulers, Lt.-Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy Lt.-Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as “Hemedti”), are banking on that fact as they seek to press the Biden administration to focus its Sudan policy on stability, rather than supporting calls for democracy.
During the second week of October, unprecedented full-fledged military confrontations broke out in northern Syria between factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) subsequently intervening in support of some factions over others. Tukey’s weariness about the constantly deteriorating state of security in the north, resulting mainly from infighting among the SNA forces it backs, and its willingness to impose order on them, could explain its silence on HTS’s military aggression. For HTS, however, expanding its rule and settling scores with some SNA factions may be the main drivers behind its recent attacks.
Pragmatic jihadist or opportunistic warlord? HTS’s Jolani expands his rule in northern Syria
The jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria has dispatched its fighters from greater Idlib eastward, taking full control of Afrin city and at least 26 towns and villages to its southwest, most without a fight. This has placed many of its jihadist opponents back under HTS’s control. The dynamics of northwestern Syria are shifting, and the consequences look likely to be extremely significant.
Since seizing the capital of Sana’a in September 2014, the Houthis have been transforming the portions of Yemen under their control in line with a radical political and religious ideology. The Houthis’ war is complicated and may not be resolved quickly. But for now, the main obstacles to peace are ones that only Yemenis can resolve, which are rooted in rival concerns over the distribution of political power and equitable delivery of public services.
More than two decades on from 9/11, the threat posed by jihadist terrorism is greater than ever
As the world prepares to mark the 21-year anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, public perceptions and policy attention on the threat posed by terrorism are arguably at an all-time low. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the challenges and threats posed by terrorism are over. In fact, terrorist groups have grown in number, geographic scope, and technical and military sophistication over the past two decades.
On this week’s episode, host Alistair Taylor explores the ramifications of the CIA drone strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan on July 31. Joining the program are three MEI experts — Mick Mulroy, Javid Ahmad, and Douglas London — who bring with them a variety of perspectives, from intelligence to diplomacy.
Afghanistan adrift one year after the Taliban takeover
Even prior to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s death in a CIA drone strike on July 31, the last few months have mostly underscored the Taliban’s global isolation and the anguish of the Afghan people. A year on from the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, no foreign government has officially recognized the regime.
Strike on al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri is a major win for US counterterrorism
The death of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a U.S. drone strike outside Kabul over the weekend is a major counterterrorism achievement — and a much-needed triumph for the Biden administration, for whom anything to do with Afghanistan has become an issue of acute discomfort. Since late 2019, Zawahiri has been thought to have been based in eastern Afghanistan, and a number of U.S. officials have suggested that in public. That by itself would seem to indicate a certain level of awareness of his probable whereabouts, but his death in the capital Kabul is astounding.
