Alex Vatanka joins host Alistair Taylor to discuss the future of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the branch of the Iranian military charged with safeguarding the Islamic Republic, and its proxy warfare strategy.
In a new policy briefing book, entitled The Biden Administration and the Middle East: Policy Recommendations for a Sustainable Way Forward, MEI scholars tackle a large number of country-specific and region-wide issue areas, laying out both the abiding U.S. interests and specific recommendations for Biden administration policies that can further U.S. interests amid a region in turmoil.
“طهران أعطت إشارات مشجعة حول بدء محادثات غير رسمية مع الولايات المتحدة بشأن برنامجها النووي يوم الجمعة”.
On Feb. 4, President Joe Biden announced the end of U.S. support for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition’s offensive military operations in Yemen. This decision fuelled optimism about a U.S. return to negotiations over the JCPOA with Iran. Instead of engaging with the United States, Iran has supported the Houthi-orchestrated Marib offensive and stepped up its diplomatic efforts in Yemen.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
For many decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been bitter rivals, but not over women. If there was a competition, it was only over whose government could impose more limitations on their female population.
Iran is an Islamic country where, according to official statistics, over 99% of the citizens are Muslim. Even though the state in Iran advocates for Islamic laws and regulations for all citizens, over 60% of Iranians identified themselves as non-Muslim according to a survey in June 2020 by the research institute “the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran” (GAMAAN). Only 32.2% of the 40.000 interviewed identified themselves as Shi‘a Muslim; 5% as Sunni Muslim; 22.2% as non-religious; 8.8% identified themselves as atheist; 7.1% as spiritual and 7.7% as Zoroastrian.
The understandings reached between Washington and Jerusalem half a century ago establish the critical context for the Biden administration’s current effort to restore the JCPOA, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fiercely opposed during its adoption by the U.N. Security Council in July 2015 and which he still bitterly contests today.
“على أقل تقدير، ينبغي على الإيرانيين أن يستمعوا لما تطلبه إدارة بايدن من طهران وما تقدمه في المقابل”.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The following article addresses the question of how the Middle East might develop in the coming decade. Long-term and detailed strategic predictions are a thankless task and are often doomed to failure. Therefore, this article refrains from attempts at prophecy but deals instead with “thinking about the future.” It opens with an analytical framework for scenario development, supplemented by “trends impact” and “horizon scanning.” The second section studies “the futures of the past,” in terms of what we might learn about the pitfalls of future projection and scenario-building from those outlining possible futures for 2020 from years past. Then, on the basis of the first two sections, four scenarios elaborate some distinctly different pathways that the Middle East might take to 2030. Finally, the article concludes with several key takeaways for Israeli decision makers.
Earlier in February, Iran’s minister of intelligence, Mahmoud Alavi, signaled that if the U.S. continues provoking the country, Tehran might lash out like a “cornered cat” and consider the nuclear option. Will Joe Biden’s late reentry into the JCPOA and the expected resulting increase in tensions influence Iran’s strategic logic on nuclear weapons? A look back at the history of Iran’s decision making on the issue suggests that shifts in military threat assessments are as important as technical developments when it comes to Tehran’s nuclear strategy.
Iran’s attempts to achieve cyber dominance both within the MENA region and around the world have been well documented, particularly its efforts to spread pro-Iranian messaging and “tell Iran’s story.” This strategy is shaped by the challenging international context facing Tehran, which is suffering economically under U.S. sanctions and largely constrained from purchasing weapons under a recently expired U.N. arms embargo.
There was little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. The new U.S. administration under President Joe Biden appears poised — based on staffing decisions and declared policies — to revert to a U.S. policy in the Middle East that more closely resembles that of Obama. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, who fought bitterly and publicly against Obama’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran nuclear issue, remains at the helm in Israel. The stage may be set for a sequel of the acrimonious relationship between Jerusalem and Washington.
On January 14, 2021, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted about Palestinian refugees, proclaiming “(less than) 200,000 Arabs displaced in 1948 are still alive and most others are not refugees by any rational criteria.” A month earlier, on December 11, a group of 22 Republican members of Congress sent a letter to President Trump requesting that he instruct the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to declassify a report on the approximate number of Palestinian refugees, with the intention of redefining and disenfranchising millions of Palestinian refugees of their refugee status. The intent behind the request is made evident by the letter, which states, “The issue of the so-called Palestinian ‘right of return’ of 5.3 million refugees to Israel as part of any ‘peace deal’ is an unrealistic demand, and we do not believe it accurately reflects the number of actual Palestinian refugees