The ties that bind: The South Caucasus and the Middle East
As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.
Against the backdrop of a massive economic and financial crisis and a now three-month-old nationwide protest movement, Lebanon swore in a new government on Tuesday — a technocratic cabinet that is widely seen as a “shadow government” for Hezbollah and other entrenched political leaders. MEI’s Paul Salem, Randa Slim, and Bilal Saab join host Alistair Taylor to discuss what lies ahead.
Iran’s “harsh revenge”: Is blocking the Strait of Hormuz really a plausible option?
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force, on Jan. 3, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the U.S. of Iran’s “harsh revenge.” There has been much speculation around the timing, location, and the type (or form) of Iran’s promised revenge. Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou takes a closer look at the impact of the widely discussed strategy of blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
On Jan. 5, shortly after Qassem Soleimani was assassinated in Iraq by an American drone strike, Tehran announced that it would no longer remain committed to the enrichment restrictions laid out under the 2015 nuclear deal. Even though European diplomats have rushed to assuage Iranian concerns about the possible resumption of international sanctions, Tehran perceives this as an extension of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign and is very unlikely to back down or substantially change its defiant behavior — domestically promoted as a counterpolicy of “maximum resistance” — even if punitive UNSC resolutions against it are reinstated.
No amount of analytical nuance or ingenuity can challenge the conclusion that the newly formed government in Lebanon is Hezbollah’s creation. The only question left to answer is: why did Hezbollah do it?
Qassem Soleimani’s reign may be over, but his legacy in Syria will endure
The U.S. assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani came as a seismic shock to the Middle East, not least to the embattled political system in Damascus that has reaped the benefits of Iran’s military involvement across the region. While his death will be a severe blow, it will not necessarily translate into a decline in Iran’s influence or military presence in Syria. Soleimani’s army of militias and supporters will outlast him, possibly by decades.
Lebanese oligarchs approve technocratic shadow government
The new government is politically aligned with the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian axis in Lebanon, and is very unlikely to drum up international and regional support.
Following the recent escalation in U.S.-Iran tensions, the threat of Iranian cyberattacks is likely to intensify in the near to medium term. There are three possible fronts where Iran might look to carry out cyber operations: targeting the energy infrastructure of America’s Gulf allies; deploying malware against U.S. private sector companies; and launching disinformation campaigns that would aim to influence public opinion in both the Middle East and the U.S.
The sky is sliding: Why and how the Lebanese avoided catastrophe and aggravated challenges over time
Lebanon’s in trouble and the Lebanese may soon face the real reckoning that they’ve thus far avoided. Having bought time they’ve increasingly needed with money they’ve increasingly lacked, but somehow conjured, they’re running out of both. Its leaders must act, soon, to avoid a complete catastrophe. And, whether avoiding or coping with collapse, the Lebanese must well and truly consider how to shape a better future.
MEI experts Robert S. Ford, Fatima Abo Alasrar, and Emad Badi join host Alistair Taylor to survey what lies ahead for the Middle East in 2020, with particular attention to Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Algeria.
President Donald Trump’s decision to eliminate Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force, might have caught his European partners by surprise, but it shouldn’t have. Key European decision makers have had enough time to learn and understand that the U.S. president makes unilateral decisions, paying no attention to their views or national interests. Throughout the ongoing crisis, Trump has called on European allies to sacrifice the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the Iran nuclear deal is officially known, and exert more diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran — a call no one wants to heed. It is irrelevant which side is right; lack of transatlantic solidarity is a disservice to both American and European interests in the Middle East.
On Jan. 8, Turkey inaugurated the TurkStream natural gas pipeline from Russia, seemingly deepening Ankara’s ties with Moscow. However, a fuller analysis of Turkey’s current energy policies and consumption trends indicate a dramatic shift westward, away from Russia and Iran.
The killing of Qassem Soleimani: Was there a better way?
In the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, a U.S. Military MQ-9 drone fired multiple air-to-ground missiles and killed the commander of the elite Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani. The targeted killing of Soleimani was carried out as he left the Baghdad International Airport under overt military authorities. Given that the strike was carried out under this authority, it was publicized globally shortly after it was completed. There were other options available to target Soleimani, however.
As anger mounts, protestors take to the streets again in Iran
While these latest protests will likely also be repressed, the anger against Khamenei and his foot soldiers in the Revolutionary Guards will not go away.
In the aftermath of the latest round of U.S. and Iranian brinksmanship, hawks and liberals are interpreting developments as validating their positions. Hawks are claiming victory for “maximum pressure,” arguing how the U.S. strike against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani frightened the now weakened ruling clerics into submission. Liberals argue that Iran took the high road, demonstrating a willingness to respond to incentives and negotiate.
