Consistency and change: Morocco under King Mohammed VI
In July, Morocco marked the 22nd year of King Mohammed VI’s rule and 10 years under the new constitution ushered in by a popular referendum in the aftermath of the 2011 protests. The past 22 years have transformed Morocco, the region, and the world in fundamental ways, yet the country’s politics have continually snapped back to a familiar equilibrium. During these past 22 years Morocco has gone through three distinct phases in managing these internal and external dynamics.
On Sept. 15, 2020, Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and then-U.S. President Donald Trump met on the South Lawn of the White House to sign the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations between the two Gulf Arab states and Israel. Morocco followed suit several months later, signing a similar agreement with Israel on Dec. 22, and a week and a half after that, on Jan. 6, 2021, Sudan and Israel also agreed to normalize relations. A year on, these accords have had a significant, if not yet fully realized, impact on the Middle East, affecting everything from geopolitics and economics to tourism and people-to-people (P2P) ties, and they also reflect the changing dynamics in the region and beyond, particularly with the U.S. and China.
One of the most consequential changes in the Middle East’s geopolitical map is happening at the water’s edge. Along the entire eastern rim of the Mediterranean basin, global and regional actors are engaging in a spate of port capacity expansions, new private port construction, and the sell-off of major state-owned ports that will determine who sits atop the region’s global trade flows for decades to come. The international competition to rebuild Beirut’s port is one key puzzle piece in this larger process that is reconfiguring the Levant’s maritime commercial architecture and, as a consequence, the geopolitical contours of the Middle East.
The possibility that the Lebanese government could opt for China to reconstruct Beirut’s port has raised alarm in Washington and European capitals given China’s already outsized commercial port presence in Egypt, Israel, and Greece. Increased Chinese involvement in Lebanon’s port operations could consolidate Beijing’s hold over the commercial connectivity architecture of the Levant. Re-orienting global commercial flows between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia according to Beijing’s priorities would make China’s Belt and Road Initiative a dominant organizing principle in the international relations of the Middle East. The most effective way to offset China’s ambition may be to facilitate Mediterranean rivals France and Turkey to jointly rebuild Beirut’s port.
Testimony | "Briefing on Human Rights and Freedom of Expression in Morocco"
The following testimony was presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission “Briefing on Human Rights and Freedom of Expression in Morocco” on August 12, 2021.
The Tunisian president’s political capital is finite
President Kais Saied’s July 25 decisions to suspend parliament and the government appear to have been largely popular, despite sharp criticism from those denouncing them as a coup, unconstitutional, or a dangerous overstep of his authority. The mass celebrations in the streets that broke out immediately after his televised announcement — in spite of a nighttime curfew — are evidence of the popularity of his moves. Some polling since then, which although unclear in their methodology, also seem to indicate that large majorities approve of Saied’s measures — for now.
A coup or not? What happened in Tunisia and what comes next?
The debate over what Saied did, while important because of the legal and political implications, obscures the way in which his actions are themselves an indication of how Tunisian democracy has not been working for Tunisians. And what Saied did is, in the short term, unlikely to yield the results Tunisia needs.
Intissar Fakir and Fadil Aliriza of MEI’s Program on North Africa and the Sahel discuss the context and consequences of Tunisian President Kais Saied’s political maneuvers earlier this week, which opponents were quick to label a “coup.”
لماذا يحتفل الكثير من التونسيين بقرار الرئيس سعيّد
سارع خصوم الرئيس التونسي قيس سعيّد والمعلقون الدوليون الأكثر دراية بمصر إلى إدانة ما وصفوه بـ “الانقلاب”. هنا، إلى جانب الحاجة إلى تقييم الوضع التونسي وفقًا لطبيعته الخاصة، قد يكون من المفيد تنحية التصنيفات القانونية وتلك المرتبطة بالعلوم السياسية جانبًا في الوقت الحالي والتفكر بدلًا من ذلك في سبب احتفال الكثيرين في تونس بقرارات الرئيس الأخيرة.
Why many Tunisians are celebrating President Saied’s decision
Tunisian President Kais Saied’s opponents and international commentators more familiar with Egypt have been quick to condemn what they are calling a “coup.” In addition to the need to assess the Tunisian situation on its own unique terms, it may be useful to set aside legalistic and political science taxonomy for the moment and consider instead why many in Tunisia have celebrated the president’s recent decisions.
Morocco finds on-ramp into EV manufacturing through electronic chip production for Tesla
STMicroelectronics, one of Europe’s leading semiconductor manufacturers, will very shortly inaugurate a new production line in Morocco to manufacture electronic chips for American electric car pioneer Tesla. The production line is the latest example of a larger trend among international firms to look to Morocco as an attractive location for “nearshoring.” Through Rabat’s smart infrastructure investments and careful management of its foreign partnerships, Morocco has already exploited this trend to emerge as Africa’s leading automaker. Now with an auto chip production line dedicated to electric vehicles (EVs), Morocco is positioning itself to become a center for EV production while turning itself into a strategic component of Western semiconductor supply chain resilience.
Is Morocco willing to jeopardize its relationship with Europe over the Western Sahara?
The scene was a familiar one, even if the scale was not. On May 17 and 18, thousands of migrants entered Ceuta, one of two Spanish enclaves in North Africa that border Morocco. The record flow of irregular migrants surpassed 12,000 people over the course of two days. The Spanish authorities quickly understood that this surge in migration was about more than the usual human desperation that has driven large numbers of people over fences and across water in an effort to enter Europe in recent years. Morocco, troubled over Madrid’s stance on its territorial claims over the Western Sahara, decided to retaliate.
The recent round of fighting between Israel and Hamas, and especially the events that preceded it in Jerusalem, were the first significant test of the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements signed in 2020. Saved by Hamas’ intervention, the four normalizing Arab governments were nevertheless forced to address the consequences of their agreement in the face of popular discontent with the situation at home as well as criticism from other Arab and Muslim states over their relative silence. How they respond to the evolving Israeli-Palestinian tension going forward will be critical not only in regard to their own relations with Israel but also in terms of the future path of Arab-Israeli normalization.
