While these latest protests will likely also be repressed, the anger against Khamenei and his foot soldiers in the Revolutionary Guards will not go away.
The announcement of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said’s passing on Jan. 10 marked the end of an era. Now that the Arab world lost its longest-serving leader, none of the Gulf states has a ruler that was on the throne when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981. Most Omanis have never known another leader and this transition period, marked by three days of mourning, is an emotional time for those in the sultanate.
In the aftermath of the latest round of U.S. and Iranian brinksmanship, hawks and liberals are interpreting developments as validating their positions. Hawks are claiming victory for “maximum pressure,” arguing how the U.S. strike against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani frightened the now weakened ruling clerics into submission. Liberals argue that Iran took the high road, demonstrating a willingness to respond to incentives and negotiate.
The Iranian pattern of ‘strategic patience’ has evidently transferred to its cyber activity, justifying vigilance, but not panic.
MEI experts Randa Slim and Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the sharp escalation in US-Iran tensions following the killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. Gen. Soleimani, head of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, was killed in a US drone strike in Baghdad on Jan. 3, along with Iraqi paramilitary leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. After several days of waiting to see how Iran might respond, on Jan. 7 Tehran launched more than a dozen missiles at two bases in Iraq housing US forces. No casualties were reported, and in comments on Jan. 8 President Trump promised to impose new sanctions on Iran, but seemed to back away from further military action.
Trump has taken such a forward-leaning and aggressive position now that he has set himself, and the U.S., in a conflict trap that he might not be able to defuse.
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.
While yesterday’s vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives on a decision to remove U.S. forces is not legally binding, it creates dynamics inside the U.S. and Iraq that make a U.S. decision to remove its forces all but inevitable.
Delays in achieving a peace deal will have consequences throughout Yemen, especially if the Houthi’s power remains unchecked.
Tehran will do what it can to avenge Soleimani’s death, to save face at home and abroad, but it will not seek a direct military confrontation.
For almost 40 years, American national security officials have looked down the barrel of the gun of war with Iran. I sat in rooms in the White House and Pentagon several times as small groups of senior officials considered what such a war would look like, how it would end, and whether we would be better off for having fought it.
The answer was always the same: It would be highly destructive in several nations, it would end in a stalemate with the Iranian regime in place, and nothing positive would have been accomplished.
Seven MEI experts weigh in with their views on what the killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani means for the region
The killing of Qassem Soleimani is one of the biggest developments in the Middle East in decades — it far eclipses the deaths of Osama bin Laden or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in terms of strategic significance and implications.
Just when we thought we had a good understanding of President Donald Trump’s Middle East policy — which boils down to “get out of the region and avoid another endless war there” — he pulls off something dramatic like this.
We must keep in mind that Iran exercises what Barack Obama liked to call “strategic patience.” They pursue strategies and tactics that serve their interests, not emotions. Their interests remain to get Trump to ease off on crippling economic sanctions; to maintain or increase their influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; and to maintain regime security at home. The death of a senior military officer of theirs is significant but doesn’t change their institutional relations, their interests, or their overall strategy.