Research & Commentary Results

On Sept. 16, the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war. In all three countries, the Ankara summit was hailed as a major success, as negotiations on the formation of a Syrian constitutional committee concluded and progress was made toward resolving other outstanding challenges, such as the future of northeastern Syria and the ongoing struggle for Idlib.

A question as to the value of a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA) misses the point. The question should not be whether an FTA would be in the interest of both parties since there is abundant evidence that it would. The question is what kind of FTA would best suit the needs, both short and long term, of the two parties: shallow integration or deep integration? This report argues that notwithstanding several hurdles, it is in the interest of both countries to move swiftly and decisively toward a deep FTA.

Lately, Iran has begun leveraging LinkedIn to hack espionage targets and has developed sophisticated disinformation campaigns to exacerbate distrust of its adversary governments.

A unilateral Turkish military operation will worsen the already toxic mood vis-à-vis Erdogan on the Hill and might prompt a new round of sanctions at a time when Trump was trying to convince the Congress to hold off on punishing Turkey.

After a long-drawn-out series of negotiations, Turkey has successfully convinced more than 40 armed opposition groups in northern Syria to unite under a single umbrella, directly under the command of the Syrian Interim Government’s Ministry of Defense.

If there is one Iranian military figure that can be considered an international celebrity of sorts, it is General Qassem Soleimani. He is the head of the Quds Force, the arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that operates outside of Iran’s borders. This week, he gave his first ever lengthy public interview, focusing on Iran’s role in the 2006 war between Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel.

On Sept. 14, the news that Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities had been attacked and damaged came as a shock. And yet, in the not too distant future, this attack will likely be regarded as a tactical mistake. Tehran has miscalculated the timing of such a spectacular attack and it’s unclear whether Iran will get another opportunity to strike such a surprise blow again.

After five years of indecisive war, there is a clear desire on the part of the international community to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end, and the recent UN-endorsed Houthi initiative seems predicated on the assumption that ending the fighting between Riyadh and the Houthis would achieve this. A closer look at the situation, however, suggests this assumption is flawed.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used his speech at the UN General Assembly to advocate for a plan that would see the return of over one million Syrian refugees from Turkey to a strip along the Turkish border in northeastern Syria. While Turkey should not have to indefinitely host its 3.6 million Syrian refugees, the plan proposed by Erdogan would entail large-scale deportations of refugees, demographic re-engineering, and the destabilization of northeastern Syria. A better path forward would be to facilitate the return of refugees from northeastern and eastern Syria to their homes by investing in reconstruction of the area and encouraging political reforms.

Although the Houthi militia claimed the attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia on September 14, experts doubt that the drones were launched from Yemen. Despite the Houthis’ affirmations and Iranian denials, investigations by the US and the Arab Coalition have demonstrated the weapons used were Iranian, and the location of the oil installations in northeastern Saudi Arabia makes them almost certainly out of range from Yemen.

The Sept. 14 attack on key Saudi oil facilities, which knocked out over half of the kingdom’s oil production, has signaled a significant change in approach toward regional and global security. It’s clear that things won’t be the same again. But what does it mean for Russia?

The attack reduced Saudi oil production by 5.7 million barrels per day (bpd), leading to a sharp rise in global oil prices of nearly 20%. Although this was a very important development from an energy and economic perspective, we should not underestimate the political and security ramifications either. The entire paradigm of a secure Gulf under the protection of the U.S. military umbrella has been undermined.

The unprecedented attack on critical Saudi oil infrastructure in Abqaiq and Khurais on Sept. 14 came just days after U.S. President Donald Trump’s dismissal of hawkish National Security Advisor John Bolton had opened a narrow window of diplomacy for Iran-U.S. negotiations to deescalate spiraling tensions.

The Sept. 14 attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing plant has put Pakistan in a place it never wanted to be: possibly forced to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The Turkey-U.S. relationship has been going through one of the most difficult periods in its history. Yet, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is still hopeful. He has put all his eggs in President Trump’s basket and thinks it will pay off. He pinned his hopes on a meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the UNGA to iron out differences.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif do not expect to meet with senior U.S. officials in New York this week. For that to happen, President Donald Trump has to first lift the sanctions on Iran, and that is an unlikely scenario.