Research & Commentary Results

This article was first published on Foreign Affairs.

Alexandria, like Cairo, is a mismanaged city with little to offer by way of basic services, much less cultural activities. But unlike Egypt’s insular, desert capital, it is a Mediterranean city, cooler, less polluted or crowded than Cairo (with just six million inhabitants), no longer a cosmopolitan hub but open to the world in material and other ways. There are signs here of a trend toward “social transformation”—a focus on the immediate surroundings, the city itself, to explore and expand its possibilities.

If it manages to overcome some rather formidable obstacles, Egypt’s much touted “mega project of the century”—the Suez Canal Corridor Project (SCCP)—has the potential to transform the country into a world-class center for trade and industry.

As voters headed for the polling stations in late May to elect a president for the second time since Hosni Mubarak’s 2011 ouster, the interim authority announced the state budget for the 2014 financial year. The budget included austerity measures that were sure to be painful for ordinary Egyptians, and the timing of the announcement suggests that the interim authority wanted to shield the new president from responsibility.

The enormous costs exacted on Palestinians in Gaza by Israel’s Operation Protective Edge have sparked a rocky rehabilitation of Egyptian attitudes toward Palestinians among Egypt’s political class and the public at large. Consequently, the Sisi government may see the merits of moderating the hardline approach to Gaza that has characterized Egypt’s polices since the ousting of President Mohammad Morsi one year ago.

Discussions between Egypt and Other Concerned Parties

Days before the first anniversary of the August 14 violent police crackdown on the Rabaa and Nahda squares in Cairo, Egypt’s High Administrative Court ordered the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the liquefaction of its assets.[1] Since the ouster of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters have faced a state crackdown. Thousands are currently in prison and hundreds have been killed in clashes with security.

Read full article at The Washington Post.

Free media in a democratic society allows people to evaluate and challenge, to scrutinize honestly and debate accurately. But what happens when mainstream media unknowingly fails the public? Marda Dunsky argues that, when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a decade-old conflict at the center of U.S. interests in the Middle East, the American mainstream media has failed the public and even perpetuated violence.

The terrible war in Gaza, the third and worst of its kind in the last decade, is a product of Palestinian political disarray, Arab disunity, and division in Israel. Washington’s policy of “no direct talks” with Hamas and bitter partisanship between the White House and Congress have also limited effective U.S. intervention.  As such, this latest tragedy is yet another symptom of decades of failure to resolve the larger Israel-Palestine conflict, which, without major policy changes, will surely drag on regardless of the latest cease-fire.

The current crisis in Gaza represents the first real foreign policy test for Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.  Hamas’s rejection of the Egyptian initiative to end hostilities calls into question Egypt’s ability to maintain its decades-long special status as mediator, a role it assumed by virtue of its relations with all parties – Israel and the United States on one hand, and the PLO and Hamas on the other.

A proposed deal to export Israeli natural gas through Egypt has the potential to enable Israel’s entry into its first major export markets, help Egypt escape a deepening energy crisis, and welcome the first European players into Israel’s natural gas industry. However, the deal is complicated by political realities and a history of deeply rooted grievances between the two countries, made worse by the recent violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

Amb. Philip Wilcox, MEI scholar and president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, discusses the motivations that led to the current escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas, and why Israel decided to pursue a ground assault in Gaza.

Israel’s ground assault continues an historical pattern of dealing with threats from adversaries. How well has this strategy worked before?

A few days ago, heavy court sentences were imposed on seven men who were convicted of attempted rape, attempted murder, and torture, in a ruling seen by many as unprecedented in Egypt. In the words of one activist, the verdict was “a strong message to all harassers that their actions are no longer tolerated or accepted.”[1]  This comes in the wake of the government’s vows to combat the problem of sexual harassment; a new law passed last month criminalized sexual harassment for the first time.

Just 48 hours before handing over the reigns to now President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt’s interim President Adly Mansour signed into law a controversial piece of legislation that regulates elections for Egypt’s new House of Representatives.[1] Since the law was announced in early June, it has generated conflicting analysis regarding its impact on the nature of the electoral system, the character of the legislature that will be elected as a result, and the extent to which it might further empower the president.

In thinking about how the crisis between Israel and the Hamas leadership in Gaza might play out, it’s useful to reflect upon the preceding Israeli incursion into Gaza in November 2012.