Research & Commentary Results

Saudi Arabia is under direct assault, and America’s response is muted. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s verbal threats against Iran, which is behind the attack, he’s not seriously contemplating using force. What’s most urgent now for U.S. policymakers is how to prevent this from happening again and how to most effectively defend U.S. partners from aggression in this still vital part of the world.

Saudi Arabia surprised the global oil and gas industry earlier this month by reshuffling its top two energy positions. Long-serving technocrat Khalid al-Falih was ousted as chair of Saudi Aramco one day and as head of the Ministry of Energy the next.

One important dynamic that is not acknowledged enough is the intensifying competition between Russia and Iran to determine the future shape of Syria and their position in it. While the very real competitive dynamic between Moscow and Tehran will never transition to hostility, it is beginning to have a very real effect on the evolution of major aspects of the crisis — from active conflict theaters, to the structures of the state, control over resources, and the prospect of intra-state conflict on Syrian soil.

Things seem to be going from bad to worse for Lebanon’s economy. On Aug. 23 Fitch downgraded its credit rating to CCC, meaning both it and Moody’s now rate the country’s bonds as junk. Ten days later, on Sept. 2, Lebanon’s top officials and bankers declared the country was in a state of economic emergency and said emergency measures would be taken.

Economic development paradigms have shifted focus over past decades: from minimizing imports to encouraging exports as the path to prosperity. Individual countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have had little success under either paradigm — the result being stagnant economies and high unemployment, especially among young people. Perhaps now is the time for MENA countries to follow a different path and focus on harnessing the power of their collective domestic demand to foster economic development.

Over the past few weeks, my colleagues at MEI have debated whether the U.S. should stay in Syria or leave. Here I’d make a different argument: that it doesn’t really matter. The president has already made the decision to leave, and while his aides may have been able to slow roll the troop drawdown, the reality is that Donald Trump has made it clear the U.S. will not disburse any additional resources. Even within the 2020 Democratic field, not a single candidate has advocated increasing resources.

Unlike most other goods, the inflation-adjusted prices of oil and oil derivatives actually became cheaper in the years after the Syrian uprising and the loss of most of the country’s oil fields. Iran stepped in to fill the gap by shipping oil by sea through the Suez Canal. In recent months, however, these shipments seem to have ground to a halt, crippling regime-controlled areas. This paper examines several competing explanations for the slowdown in Iranian oil shipments, explores a range of possible responses for the Assad regime, and takes a closer look at the implications for the regime, its allies, and regular Syrians.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a destabilizing element in an already volatile Middle East. The Palestinians are too weak to wrest their independence from Israel. But as long as their right to self-determination is denied, they are likely to engage in regular violence targeting Israel. Absent outside intervention, Israel is powerful enough that it can suppress Palestinian demands for freedom — but it is not able to completely pacify the Palestinians. Thus, the conflict continues, punctuated every few years by rounds of more significant violence.

Responding to Daniel Serwer’s “not so progressive case for withdrawing from Syria,” Charles Lister makes the case that the U.S. should remain in Syria — at the very least for long enough to secure conditions in which a realistic set of objectives could be achieved, including the existing counter-ISIS mission.

The United States and Turkey have agreed on a way forward that may marginalize Kurdish forces.

Elizabeth Tsurkov has courageously put forward what she calls a progressive case for staying in Syria. I would regard myself as progressive but I’m not convinced, even if I would have supported many of her arguments in the past. In arguing for an indefinite presence in Syria, Tsurkov relies on the notion that staying gives the U.S. influence over Ankara and Moscow, serves as a counter to Tehran, and pressures the Assad regime, possibly even creating “internal fissures in its senior ranks” and causing “the Assad regime to institute reforms that would benefit all Syrians.” Those fissures and reforms have been desired for the past eight years but have not yet appeared. It would be easier to argue that withdrawal is more likely to cause them, and to pressure Ankara and Moscow into countering Tehran.

Despite the fiery rhetoric, the long-time conflict between Turkey and the PKK has mostly been a controlled fight following tacit rules. But recent events, including Turkey’s increased efforts to assassinate PKK leaders and the targeted killing of a Turkish consulate official in the Iraqi Kurdish capital on July 17, risk overturning the status quo and ushering in a violent new era.

Ideally, the various sides of the Syrian civil war would seize the opportunity to reach an agreement. However, the Assad regime’s current intransigence and inability counter ISIS necessitate continued U.S. protection of northeastern Syria and efforts to stabilize it until such a deal can be made. This is not an ideal scenario, but the cost of a pullout at this stage will be immense.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region including the Turkish-U.S. crisis meeting in Ankara on Syria, the resumption of U.S.-Taliban negotiations, Trump’s creation of a new “dovish” line on Iran, a rise in Egypt’s poverty levels, Sudan’s democratic transition, the easing of female guardianship rules in Saudi Arabia, and the end of the ceasefire in Idlib, featuring Charles Lister, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Paul Salem, W. Robert Pearson, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Thomas W. Lippman, and Robert S. Ford.

In light of Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, the United States and its other NATO allies have questioned Turkey’s commitment to the alliance. Retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of the United States Army Europe and Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and MEI’s Gonul Tol join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the reasons for President Erdogan’s decision and what it means for the future of U.S.-Turkey relations.