Research & Commentary Results

Modern Türkiye (the official spelling of Turkey since 2021) sprang like a phoenix from the ashes in 1923, overcoming daunting odds.  Its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had foolishly joined the war with the Central Powers in 1914 and naively thought its Arab subjects would remain loyal, only to have been utterly defeated and then dismembered.  A rebellion led by the empire’s most famous war hero and leader, Kemal Ataturk, overthrew the last sultan, rejected an unjust treaty to divide up the country and repelled the occupying Allies.  He established a contemporary republic based on popular

Hamas’ violent and unexpected Oct. 7 attack on Israel has shaken a fragile regional order in the Middle East. Ankara and Tehran are worried that a stronger U.S. presence in the Middle East is detrimental to their regional interests. The war in Gaza might help close the ranks between Turkey and Iran, yet there are serious limitations to a sustainable alliance between the two countries.

In mid-October 2023, Yemen’s foreign minister traveled to Kenya to attend the Munich Leaders Meeting in Nairobi and met with Kenyan officials on the sidelines. Although bilateral ties between the two countries date back centuries, Yemeni-Kenyan relations have yet to reach their full potential. The conclusion of a political consultation agreement would pave the way for the resumption of ministerial-level bilateral committees between the two governments.

For the better part of a decade, Turkey and the U.S. have been locked in what might be considered an unhappy marriage, marked by bitter misunderstandings and growing distrust. Some optimists had hoped that something of a reset might be possible, but recent events, both in Turkey’s ongoing conflict with the PKK and because of the ripple effects from Israel’s war with Hamas, likely mean that U.S.-Turkish relations, far from improving, will get colder yet in the months to come.

On Oct. 19, the Pentagon press secretary confirmed that the Iran-backed Houthi militia targeted the USS Carney, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, in the Red Sea. The USS Carney reportedly intercepted three cruise missiles and several drones without sustaining any damage or casualties. Although the Houthis have yet to claim responsibility for the attack, the drones and missiles were likely fired from north-western, Houthi-held positions in Hodeida and Hajjah governorates on Yemen’s Red Sea coast and were headed “north,” most likely toward Israel.

Prigozhin’s coup was a serious warning sign that should prompt Turkey to cool ties with Russia and rebuild its relationship with the West. Yet today, Turkey and the West look at each other in terms of problems not solutions. While the political risks of reengagement are high for both sides, the potential rewards are well worth the effort needed to overcome them.

After several quiet months on the Turkish-Syrian border, tensions have escalated in recent days. Turkish forces have intensified their attacks against the SDF in northeastern Syria and targeted PKK hideouts along the Turkish-Iraqi border. This escalation is unfolding against the backdrop of the suicide blast in Turkey’s capital, Ankara, on Oct. 1 that targeted the Interior Ministry.

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

This report provides an interim assessment of the Biden administration’s overall Middle East strategy and examines the strategic opportunities and risks for U.S. policy in the broader region.

Over the past decade of turmoil, conflict, and external military intervention in Yemen, Oman’s foreign policy has emerged as the Gulf exception. Muscat has pursued a unique role, driven by both pragmatic concern and opportunity. It has harnessed its relations with most of the actors involved, including armed non-state actors, and sought to access new economic opportunities as part of its policies of strategic hedging, omni-balancing, and undeclared alignment.

Since Turkey’s presidential election in May, western analysts have held out hope that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will moderate his strongman style of rule. Feeding their optimism are several steps Erdoğan has taken, including appointing market-friendly technocrats to his economic team, replacing the hardline interior minister, dialling down anti-western rhetoric and voicing support for Sweden’s Nato membership. All these moves, however, are aimed at strengthening Erdoğan’s one-man rule, and the west is helping him. 

Russia’s malign behavior in the Black Sea includes piracy, plunder, petroleum price cap violations, and actions to prevent the free transit of foreign commercial and naval vessels. Its largely unchallenged position in the Black Sea also helps Russia maintain access to foreign-made products and components, circumventing sanctions. The West and the broader international community have yet to act to decisively rein in these flagrant violations of international laws and norms.

Last week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity between Baghdad and Ankara. The top priorities in the talks were oil exports, the presence of the PKK in Iraq, and Iraq’s water crisis. The outcomes have been unimpressive, but there is an opportunity for Iraq to shake things up and improve its bargaining position, at least on the oil export issue, possibly more.

Turkey and Egypt, two influential regional players with a complex history of cooperation and conflict, are now working on mending their ruptured ties. As officials navigate this process, it is essential to identify practical steps to capitalize on the diplomatic breakthrough. Sustainable peace can only be ensured by shifting the focus from political ideology to shared interests. One way to do that is by creating an inclusive, multi-track process that involves state institutions, businesses, NGOs, academics, and the grassroots.