Defense and Security

Irregular warfare (IW) is increasingly common in the 21st century and the U.S. must learn from its successful experiences with it and apply those lessons to great power competition. For the past two decades the CIA and Army Special Forces have demonstrated how to leverage interagency relationships and apply complementary capabilities to achieve successful IW outcomes. The CIA/Army Special Forces partnership in Northern Iraq during the invasion of Iraq demonstrates the value of this interagency team and provides lessons and a model for the conduct of IW in the future.

As we near the 13th anniversary of the end of the Russia-Georgia war, we reflect on the continuing tragedy of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Georgia. The consequences of this Russian aggression continue to place a heavy burden on Georgia today. Since 2008, we have witnessed the country’s tremendous commitment to overcoming Russia’s malign influence. Georgians’ overwhelming and bipartisan support for the country’s path toward EU and NATO integration has not been diminished — despite continuous Russian pressure.

There were two parts to the Iraqi prime minister’s request to President Biden on July 26 in their meeting at the White House: end Washington’s combat mission in Iraq but maintain U.S. military assistance there. The first part was aimed mostly at Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s domestic audience; the roughly 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq are there primarily to advise and assist the Iraqi army. But the second part deserves a bit of thought.  

One of US President Joe Biden’s top foreign-policy priorities is to rebuild America’s alliances and partnerships, which are vital to US strategic interests and international security. Yet to ‘pick up the pieces of Donald Trump’s broken foreign policy’, as Biden tweeted in January 2020, will require a great deal of effort given the harm that his predecessor inflicted on the country’s reputation as a partner of choice.

the years leading up to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban had strained relations with Iran. Tensions between the two sides escalated to the point that the Iranian government and the Quds Force actually assisted American forces during the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.

Tehran’s policy toward the Afghan Taliban has created new clashes within Iranian government circles. These clashes recently escalated as influential hard-line media and associates of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) made public efforts to portray the Taliban in a positive light. 

The United States and Pakistan have had a complex and often disappointing “love-hate” relationship since 1947 — one severely tested during the 20-year U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. We believe the time has come for serious policy consideration of whether and how both nations can achieve a more strategically beneficial and sustainable post-intervention relationship between the American and Pakistani governments and their populations

As a Lebanese actor ideologically tied to Iran, Hezbollah has multiple allegiances and objectives that do not always align symmetrically. Hezbollah’s regional activities are a reflection of the group’s increasingly close alignment with Iran, rather than the interests of the Lebanese state or citizenry. Today, Hezbollah’s regional adventurism is most pronounced in its expeditionary forces deployed in Syria and elsewhere in the region, but no less important are the group’s advanced training regimen for other Shi’a militias aligned with Iran, its expansive illicit financing activities across the region, and its procurement, intelligence, cyber, and disinformation activities. Together, these underscore the scale and scope of the group’s all-in approach to transforming from one of several Lebanese militias into a regional player acting at Iran’s behest.

The withdrawal from Afghanistan marks the end of a historic chapter. It involves more than just the conclusion of a drawn-out international military engagement in Afghanistan. Rather, it signals the end of a decades-long phase in which Western militaries placed the broader Middle East and the fight against international terrorism at the center of their strategic attention. With competition between the great powers on the rise, Western militaries have realized their current vulnerabilities vis-à-vis near-peer competitors and the need to shift gears.

In a politically significant statement, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has asked the Afghan Taliban to “end the occupation of their brothers’ soil.” This follows a Taliban warning of severe consequences if Turkey were to remain in charge of security at Kabul Airport after the exit of American troops. Erdoğan’s message is likely to be interpreted differently by different stakeholders in the unfolding Afghan tragedy, a situation characterized by escalating violence, political uncertainty, and regional chaos.

منذ بداية الانتفاضة السورية مايو 2011 وحتى صيف العام 2015، فشلت الميليشيات الإيرانية إلى جانب الجيش السوري والميليشيات المحلية في إعادة السيطرة على البلاد، على الرغم من العدد الهائل لمجموع هذه القوات أمام المتمردين الذين كانت حركتهم فوضوية في مقابل أجهزة أمنية وقوات منظمة، حيث سيطرت هذه القوات المتمردة على النظام السوري مساحات واسعة من سوريا.

The Russian military intervention in Syria in late 2015 brought about a clear change in the balance of power in the military, political, and psychological spheres. The Russian military, especially its air force, dramatically tipped the scales in the conflict between the armed opposition, the regime, and the Iranian militias. Moscow’s intervention was also accompanied by a project to regain control over the security and military situation in Syria, but this effort proved far less successful.

The decision to withdraw the relatively small number of U.S. troops from a supporting role to our Afghan partners to preserve our hard-fought-for gains in Afghanistan was a mistake.

Even the most ardent supporters of President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan recognize the inherent tension in his policy. Biden promised Afghanistan’s top leaders in a recent meeting at the White House that he would maintain U.S. material support to the country. But ensuring a “sustained” partnership with a politically fragile Afghan government requires first and foremost an Afghan force that’s capable of defending that government, providing some security across the country, containing the Taliban, and preventing terrorists from once again setting up shop and plotting attacks worldwide like they did on 9/11. 

The forces and agencies of Kurdistan’s Ministry of Interior and the Kurdistan Region Security Council, collectively referred to the Kurdistan Region Interior Forces, are now the region’s main security actors, but their role as instruments of partisan rivalry and enforcers of public loyalty to the political bureaus threatens the Kurdistan Region’s stability. This report makes the case that coalition security sector reform efforts should be refocused on them. Although Peshmerga reform is necessary to improve the Kurdistan Region’s ability to combat external threats, it is equally, if not more important to start the same reform within these internal forces and agencies to achieve durable stability.