Eran Etzion is a diplomat and strategist with more than 20 years of experience in senior government positions. He was head of policy planning at Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and deputy head of the National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s office.
In 2014-2015, he was a visiting scholar at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, and the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, both at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
In 2015, he founded ICSF, Israel Center for Strategic Futures, a Think-Do NGO dedicated to introducing innovative foresight into the Israeli decision-making process and public discourse.
Amb. Richard Murphy
Any Middle East observer would find a question about the basic posture of Israel vs. ISIS a practical no brainer. Such an observer would confidently state that these two entities are staunch enemies, currently engaged in multiple types of warfare and destined to continue on that path. For Israel, according to this intuitive rational, ISIS is but another link in a long chain of terror entities sworn to its destruction, much like Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and many others. For ISIS, the narrative would continue to claim, Israel is a natural primary target.
In this issues of MEI’s weekly briefing, contributors Daniel Serwer, Randa Slim, Eran Etzion, and Alex Vatanka provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including discussions between the United States, Russia and Turkey on Syria policy at the G20 Summit, the Syrian opposition’s transition plans, Russian moves on Israel-Palestine, and Iran’s energy policy.
Israeli-Russian relations have attracted unusual levels of interest in recent months, against the backdrop of Russia’s military intervention in Syria and the unprecedented creation of a ‘de-confliction’ mechanism between the I.D.F. and the Russian forces. As is so often the case in today’s hyper-connected media and political environment, this small nucleus of reality was blown out of proportion and portrayed as nothing short of a strategic love affair.
For successive Israeli governments and the defense establishment, the Syrian arena has traditionally been considered Israel’s “front yard” in terms of threat analysis, early warning and force readiness. The defense budget, comprising 7.7 percent of Israel’s G.N.P. in 2011 (latest available data), included considerable allocations designed to meet the Syrian army’s threat.
The so-called ‘French initiative’—a boost-plan for the moribund ‘Middle East Peace Process’ designed to bring Israel and the P.L.O. back to the negotiating table under an international umbrella through a series of multilateral summits—was born in classic French diplomatic opulence. Not nearly half-baked, the initiative was presented ceremoniously in a grandiose manner by a foreign minister who was replaced shortly after, prompting knee-jerk reactions from all parties.
This paper is part of a MEI scholar series titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”
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