Marvin G. Weinbaum is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI), specializing in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. He is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he directed the university’s Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies for 15 years.
Dr. Weinbaum’s research and teaching have centered on national security, state building, democratization, and political economy in South Asia. He is the author or editor of six books and has contributed over 100 scholarly journal articles and book chapters on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and broader regional issues.
From 1999 to 2003, Dr. Weinbaum served as an analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the US Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has also held Fulbright research fellowships in Egypt (1981–82) and Afghanistan (1989–90), and served as a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 1996–97. Over the course of his career, Dr. Weinbaum has received research awards from the Social Science Research Council, the Ford Foundation, the American Political Science Association, and other major funding institutions.
He holds a PhD from Columbia University, an MA from the University of Michigan, and a BA from Brooklyn College.
The Tortuous Route of the U.S.-Afghan Security Pact
Yesterday, the United States and Afghanistan completed a bilateral security pact ensuring that U.S. troops will remain in the country. It now goes to a council of elders—the loya jirga—for authorization. MEI spoke with Scholar-in-Residence Marvin Weinbaum about the pact’s sticking points, next steps for its approval, and what each country gains from the agreement.
What does the U.S.-Afghan security pact stipulate?
This piece was originally published by Foreign Policy Blogs on December 20, 2012
Assertions and opinions in this publication are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
This article was first published by The National Interest. on September 26, 2012
Assertions and opinions in this publication are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
Pakistan's Military Holds the Keys to a Thaw with the U.S.
This Opinion first appeared in the the National on June 15, 2012
Just when U.S.-Pakistan relations appear to have reached a new low, yet another event drives them lower still, further complicating chances of stabilising bilateral ties.
Over the last 18 months, the deterioration of relations has been punctuated by a series of incidents, most dramatically the May 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden and the U.S. air strike last November at Salala, in which 24 Pakistani solders died.
Are Iran’s leaders rational actors? This question matters when justifying any decision by Israel to preempt Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. An Iranian regime seen as driven to destroy the Jewish state has to be dealt with differently than one whose objectives are mediated by calculations of costs and benefits. Deterrents that would be normally expected to restrain a state would not work with an irrational Iran.
Over the last year, relations between Pakistan and the United States have been driven to ever-lower depths. The leaderships of both countries are struggling to rebuild the semblance of a working relationship, especially regarding Afghanistan. Pakistan has long been convinced that the United States and its allies were bound to fail in Afghanistan and that the American war on terrorism is responsible for the threats Pakistan faces from its own extremists.
*Co-written by James P. Farwell. This article originally appeared in the National Interest online on June 9, 2011
Informed observers are increasingly raising the fear that new elections will put the Muslim Brotherhood in control of Egypt’s parliament and the presidency. Of course it will try. Senior Brotherhood leader Sobhi Saleh, who helped write Egypt’s interim constitution, said in a recent video that he expects the new government to be Islamist.
When Egyptians, fed up with corruption, dictatorship, and lousy government, pushed President Hosni Mubarak out the door, some worried whether the burst of enthusiasm for free, open elections and democracy would be squelched by Islamist groups like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. History teaches that the real question isn’t who starts revolution, but who wins it. What begins as a quest for democracy can produce a new dictatorship.
Few question the desirability of finding a political resolution to the Afghan conflict or doubt Pakistan’s pivotal role. The growing divide of opinion in this country is over how best to achieve that outcome. One camp led by our military strategists insists that various political agreements are likely to result from accumulated military successes, sustained by Afghan governance reforms and economic improvements. Visible counterinsurgency gains are expected to gradually wean fighters away from the ranks of the insurgency.
This Commentary first appeared in McClatchy News on January 5, 2011.
The assassination of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, Pakistan's largest province, has illustrated the increasingly chaotic environment in that country, which only promises to get worse in the new year. Weeks before his death, Taseer had the courage to say what his fellow politicians were unwilling to: that Pakistan's blasphemy law must be repealed in order for Pakistan to enter the community of modern nations.
