Salam Kawakibi

Before Tunisian voters have their say in the presidential election on Oct. 6, state institutions have already had their say. The security services, judicial authorities, and the High Independent Electoral Authority (ISIE) have either obstructed or officially barred over a dozen potential candidates from running. Of the three eligible candidates officially approved by the ISIE, only President Kais Saied and former Saied supporter Zouhair Maghzaoui remain outside of prison. Candidate Ayachi Zammel was arrested on Sept. 6. Many other potential candidates attempted to run from prison or were jailed for alleged technical violations of election laws. By restricting the list of potential candidates effectively to two, state institutions have embraced their historically paternalistic, modernizing role toward a distrusted citizenry.

After more than six months of talks, the United States and Iraq look set to announce a significant agreement stipulating that the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition will withdraw entirely from the country over the next two years.

Shiraz Maher – Co-Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) – and Charles Lister – Director of MEI’s Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs – speak to MEI Editor in Chief Alistair Taylor about ISIS and the detainee dilemma. What is the international community to do with the tens of thousands of foreign ISIS detainees and their families, including children, held in makeshift facilities in northeastern Syria under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces?

In the corridors of power in Brussels, it is common to hear that the position of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is an impossible job. It may actually become even more difficult for the outgoing Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who is set to succeed the Spanish Josep Borrell as the European Union’s foreign policy chief in the coming weeks.

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

The question of whether Armenia’s recent shift away from reliance on Russia is reversible is central to understanding its democratization trajectory. In recent years, Armenia’s dependency on Russia for security and economic stability has been severely tested, particularly during the 2020 Second Karabakh War and subsequent Azerbaijani incursions on sovereign Armenian territory, where Russia’s lack of support led to widespread disillusionment. This discontent has spurred Armenia to diversify its security, economic, and diplomatic ties, with a notable strengthening of relations with the United States. However, the sustainability of this shift remains uncertain, as it hinges on various societal factors and internal dynamics.

Azerbaijan’s takeover of Karabakh in September 2023, while a disruptive event, has opened the window for renewed dialogue to peacefully resolve the longstanding tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While the ongoing negotiations are unlikely to lead to a comprehensive peace deal in the near term, they could alter the strategic calculus of key actors in the region. The most likely and consequential outcome of the talks will be a peace framework agreement that could rebalance the regional status quo, potentially leading to a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan seeks to establish itself as a major actor in the global energy transition space as it prepares to host the 2024 UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, on November 11-22. COP29 offers many opportunities to improve US-Azerbaijani energy cooperation, including by coordinating the United States’ clean energy technology goals with Azerbaijan’s renewable energy revolution.

Russia’s concern about an escalation of hostilities in Lebanon reflects its long-standing partnership with Hezbollah. Due to this multidimensional relationship, Russia has urged Iran to exercise restraint against Israel to prevent the outbreak of a destructive hot war in Lebanon.

Algeria is poised for a presidential election on Sept. 7 that, while seemingly predetermined, reveals the complexities of a political landscape profoundly shaped by popular disillusionment following the failure of the 2019 Hirak protest movement. Five years on, incumbent Abdelmadjid Tebboune is promising a second term based on the “continuation of the social state,” but his attempt to renew a social contract based on populist promises of a neoliberal economic renewal is colliding with the lack of institutional reforms necessary to achieve them.

A reflection on the state of conflict and political change in the Levant by Middle East Institute’s Vice President for International Engagement.