Shahmahmood Miakhel

As the original Abraham Accords signatories — Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain — observe the third anniversary of their September 2020 agreement, there is a sufficient basis to evaluate whether the Abraham Accords are real, hype, or something in-between. Much like the case a year ago, the results so far remain mixed.

One year after the tragic death of Mahsa Jina Amini sparked nationwide protests, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been striving to suppress dissent while the spirit of resistance among the people has become an integral part of everyday life. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his allies have failed to address underlying social grievances, and there are no indications that society will remain passive. With both sides actively resisting one another, the options for the Iranian regime and the protest movement have narrowed, potentially leading to a reignition of demonstrations and street confrontations.

The groundbreaking March 2023 normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran could potentially reshape the political landscape of the Middle East. It has already paved the way for de-securitization and the resumption of diplomatic relations. However, critical security issues remain unresolved, casting doubt on the long-term sustainability of the process. Capitalizing on this rare opportunity, Riyadh and Tehran should move forward to finalize a comprehensive non-aggression pact as the foundation for their future security relations.

For all the hype about the potential normalisation of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, it remains vastly unclear whether the United States — the indispensable enabler and guarantor of such a deal — is willing or able to accept the kingdom’s conditions to reach an agreement.

In return for its cooperation, Saudi Arabia wants from Washington a formal defence pact, assistance in building a civilian nuclear programme, and expedited access to high-end US weapons, including F-35 fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

History might very well show that the people’s protests that broke out in September 2022 in Iran were the final opportunity for the Islamist regime to change political course. But as the past year has shown, the regime in Tehran utterly failed to seize the moment.

On Sept. 8, the Kurdish-led SDF, a key U.S. ally, announced the end of its “Operation Security Enhancement” in Deir ez-Zor in northeast Syria. While framed as an operation targeting ISIS sleeper cells and criminals, it aimed at quashing an armed uprising led by Arab tribesmen, particularly members of the Akidat tribe. While multiple factors may have contributed to fueling the uprising, the importance of the region’s longstanding grievances cannot be overstated.

Thirty years on since its historic signing, the Oslo Accords framework continues to define virtually all aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations as well as America’s and the broader international community’s approach to the peace process. Yet Oslo’s extraordinary longevity stands not as a testament to its utility but to its unmitigated and ongoing failure.

Nearly five months on, Sudan’s war between its army and largest paramilitary force has destroyed much of Khartoum, the adjacent cities of Bahri and Omdurman, as well as key towns in Darfur. The warring forces have killed thousands of civilians, destroyed critical infrastructure, and forced a staggering 4.9 million people to flee their homes. The U.N. is providing important humanitarian assistance, but it should be doing far more, especially to advance accountability and improve coordination in the messy diplomatic arena. Both the high-level week in New York and the Human Rights Council session in Geneva present opportunities that it should not squander.

Pakistan’s intensifying economic, political, and security instability is not good news for China’s strategic investments. So, what are Beijing’s options?

Moldova is a country with a rich tapestry of multiple ethnic identities and linguistic traditions, but one where policymakers have long grappled with the complexities of preserving minority rights, fostering national unity, and addressing regional autonomy through engagement with the Gagauz minority.

At the start of 2023, optimism was high that China would see a rapid recovery in consumer spending and an acceleration in GDP growth. Since then, however, the world’s second-largest economy has been in the doldrums. China’s ailing economy is a problem not just for China but for the entire world. A prolonged slowdown or a sudden financial crash, were it to occur, would ripple across global markets — including the countries of the Middle East, whose economies have become increasingly intertwined with that of China.

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