Shana Cohen

The following article addresses the question of how the Middle East might develop in the coming decade. Long-term and detailed strategic predictions are a thankless task and are often doomed to failure. Therefore, this article refrains from attempts at prophecy but deals instead with “thinking about the future.” It opens with an analytical framework for scenario development, supplemented by “trends impact” and “horizon scanning.” The second section studies “the futures of the past,” in terms of what we might learn about the pitfalls of future projection and scenario-building from those outlining possible futures for 2020 from years past. Then, on the basis of the first two sections, four scenarios elaborate some distinctly different pathways that the Middle East might take to 2030. Finally, the article concludes with several key takeaways for Israeli decision makers.

Only two days after an extremist attack that saw 14 missiles rain down on Erbil, and in the midst of a new coronavirus surge and lockdown, the Chaldean Catholic Archbishop of Mosul, Najeeb Michaeel, was optimistic about the upcoming visit of Pope Francis.

“Everyone is very happy about this historic event,” he said of Iraq’s inaugural papal visit, from his home in Ankawa, Erbil’s Christian enclave, which has given refuge to thousands of those displaced by ISIS. A previously planned visit in 2000 by Pope John Paul II to Ur, birthplace of the Prophet Abraham according to the Torah, was foiled by protracted negotiations with the government of Saddam Hussein. In 2020, Pope Francis had to cancel a trip due to security and pandemic concerns.

Earlier this week, Georgian law enforcement arrested United National Movement (UNM) party chairman Nika Melia on charges of inciting violence during anti-government demonstrations in 2019. The arrest has left many outraged and is the latest event to deepen political divisions in the country. There are valid arguments as to how the government could have handled Melia’s arrest better. But more important is what’s at stake for the future of Georgia – both domestically and as a member of the international community.

Earlier in February, Iran’s minister of intelligence, Mahmoud Alavi, signaled that if the U.S. continues provoking the country, Tehran might lash out like a “cornered cat” and consider the nuclear option. Will Joe Biden’s late reentry into the JCPOA and the expected resulting increase in tensions influence Iran’s strategic logic on nuclear weapons? A look back at the history of Iran’s decision making on the issue suggests that shifts in military threat assessments are as important as technical developments when it comes to Tehran’s nuclear strategy.

There have been some Iranian advances in building relations with Black Sea states over the last 30 years. However, Tehran’s wavering commitment to deeper ties with its northern neighbors, with the exception of Russia, has considerably reduced the potential footprint Iran could have otherwise had in the Black Sea region. Tehran’s ongoing standoff with the United States, its ideologically driven preoccupation to make advances in the Arab world, and a gradual but clear submission to Russian hegemony has meant that the Black Sea region is a policy matter of secondary importance to decision-makers in Tehran.

Throughout 2020, the geopolitics between the Middle East and its northern frontier have converged further. Russia, Turkey, and Iran not only compete for influence (as states and through non-state actors) in core countries of the Middle East and North Africa like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and beyond in the Gulf. They also happen to be the three former imperial powers in the Caucasus – the crucial link between the Black and Caspian Seas on the seam of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu is everything Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hates. He is a disillusioned former Islamist, a member of Parliament from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), and a human rights defender. Hence the jail sentence of two years and six months against him for a 2016 Twitter post advocating peace. Last week, Turkey’s top appeals court approved the jail sentence against Gergerlioğlu for spreading terrorist propaganda five years after his Twitter post, paving the way for him to be barred from Parliament.

In early December 2020, at least eight people were killed and hundreds of others were injured during violent protests in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) sparked by deteriorating economic conditions and the government’s failure to pay public sector salaries. Stories like this rarely break out beyond the local press, and analysis about the KRI is all too often driven by elite-centered narratives that do not properly account for the opinions and social realities of the broader population. This does a disservice not only to the ostensible subjects of reporting and analysis about the Kurdistan Region but also reinforces misperceptions about Kurdistan that have major policy implications.

Beijing’s economic presence across the Maghreb has grown in recent years. The new global power has forged a close partnership with Algeria and Morocco, while also continuing to develop relationships with other countries in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated the depth of Sino-Maghreb relations.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region plays a central role in the global oil and natural gas markets. The region is home to more than 52 and 42 percent of global crude oil and natural gas proven reserves, respectively. In the past decade, the region generated 36 and 22 percent of global crude oil and natural gas, respectively. The abundance of hydrocarbons has sometimes been a mixed blessing for the economies of MENA countries, which have been reluctant to promote energy efficiency or sector diversification. Around the globe, energy intensity —energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per $1,000 GDP— became 15% more efficient between 2001 and 2018. In contrast, MENA became 8% less energy efficient according to the same measure during that period.

Iran’s attempts to achieve cyber dominance both within the MENA region and around the world have been well documented, particularly its efforts to spread pro-Iranian messaging and “tell Iran’s story.” This strategy is shaped by the challenging international context facing Tehran, which is suffering economically under U.S. sanctions and largely constrained from purchasing weapons under a recently expired U.N. arms embargo.

There was little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. The new U.S. administration under President Joe Biden appears poised — based on staffing decisions and declared policies — to revert to a U.S. policy in the Middle East that more closely resembles that of Obama. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, who fought bitterly and publicly against Obama’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran nuclear issue, remains at the helm in Israel. The stage may be set for a sequel of the acrimonious relationship between Jerusalem and Washington.

On January 14, 2021, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted about Palestinian refugees, proclaiming “(less than) 200,000 Arabs displaced in 1948 are still alive and most others are not refugees by any rational criteria.” A month earlier, on December 11, a group of 22 Republican members of Congress sent a letter to President Trump requesting that he instruct the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to declassify a report on the approximate number of Palestinian refugees, with the intention of redefining and disenfranchising millions of Palestinian refugees of their refugee status. The intent behind the request is made evident by the letter, which states, “The issue of the so-called Palestinian ‘right of return’ of 5.3 million refugees to Israel as part of any ‘peace deal’ is an unrealistic demand, and we do not believe it accurately reflects the number of actual Palestinian refugees

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