Three signs of impending famine in Syria absent immediate action

Factor 1) The severity of the current drought

Syria is currently in the midst of one of the worst droughts in recent memory. The Syrian agriculture minister described it as the worst in seven decades.¹ While the European Commission offered a less dire description — referring to it as the worst drought Syria has suffered in 25 years² — the state of affairs is undoubtedly dire, with the head of the Union of Agricultural Specialists in the Autonomous Administration of Raqqa warning that Syria’s northeast, the country’s breadbasket, is facing “real catastrophe.”³

The data aptly illustrates the agricultural catastrophe confronting Syria. Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI)⁴ data for October 2020 to March 2021 (the wet season) shows that essentially all of the country suffered drier-than-normal conditions, with the prime wheat-producing regions of the northeast suffering vastly drier conditions than usual. In other words, Syria’s key agricultural regions saw far less rainfall than normal in the months in which they would typically receive almost all their rainfall.⁵

Figure 1 - SPI data for Syria (October 2020 - March 2021)⁶

Already, reduced or missing cereals biomass has been visible across the northeast, particularly in Hasakah governorate, which is Syria’s major wheat-producing region.⁷ The outcome is expected to be dire: U.N. experts estimate that at least 50% of Hasakah’s planted acreage could die as a result of the drought.⁸

In addition to cereals biomass, overall vegetation biomass is also disappearing. The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) for Syria’s northeast is showing significantly negative levels of vegetation health and density. Similarly, much of the country’s northwest — another key agricultural region, home to fruit trees (including pistachio and olives) and producing melon and watermelon, early vegetables, barley, wheat, corn, and sugar beet⁹ – is also suffering negative vegetation health.

Figure 2 - NDVI data for Syria (May 2021) relative to long-term average¹⁰

But if Syria won’t be able to rely on rainfall to sustain its crops, will irrigation enable it to maintain agricultural production instead? This is looking increasingly unlikely for three key reasons:

• Firstly, only 16-17% of Syria’s planted land is irrigated according to the latest data.¹¹ Compounding this is the ongoing fuel crisis, which is reducing the capacity to run wells using diesel fuel, meaning the extent of irrigated land is also decreasing.¹²
• Secondly, the Euphrates supplies the irrigated lands with water, and the amount of water flowing down through the river has lessened as Turkey has also suffered from several poor rainfall seasons.¹³
• Thirdly, this naturally decreasing flow of water down the Euphrates is being compounded by ongoing investment in dams by Turkey along the waterway. Turkey’s three largest dams now sit along the Euphrates, and as these are used to siphon off more and more water as the dams become increasingly central to Turkey’s energy production,¹⁴ the amount of water reaching northeastern Syria is significantly decreasing.

Accordingly, not only is Syria’s irrigated land a small percentage of its cultivable land, but it is being further jeopardized by the declining water flow through the Euphrates. We are already clearly seeing the effects of this lesser flow. For instance, at Syria’s Tabqa Dam, near Raqqa, water levels as of June 2021 were at 20% of their normal level.¹⁵ It is important to note that the impact extends far beyond irrigated land — 60% of Syria’s water resources originate from Turkey,¹⁶ so the decreased Euphrates flow is directly threatening the accessibility of drinking water for Syrians nationwide.

The agricultural misgovernance that was practiced throughout the rule of the Assads — sustained overgrazing caused desertification, and groundwater reserves were overused and depleted¹⁷ — since the 1960s has meant Syria’s agriculture has lost its resilience to water scarcity. Accordingly, droughts like the current one now pose a far greater danger of agricultural collapse.

The ability of Syria to feed itself is fast disappearing, and this is evident in spiraling food insecurity across the country.
 

Factor 2) Unprecedented food insecurity

As laid out above, Syria’s ability to feed itself is set to continue to decline precipitously. However, the starting point for this decline is already dismal, as the Syrian population has never been this vulnerable. According to a World Food Programme (WFP) statement, about 12.4 million people (nearly 60% of the population) are now food insecure and do not know where their next meal will come from: “This is the highest number recorded in the history of Syria, with an increase of 57 percent since 2019.”¹⁸ Of this 12.4 million, 1.3 million are already severely food insecure.¹⁹

Moreover, even before the drought, things have been getting steadily worse in the past few years, with the nationwide average cost of a standard reference food basket increasing month on month between August 2019 and May 2021, only changing trajectory in May due to the official devaluation of the Syrian pound the month before.²⁰ The severity of the situation is highlighted by two key statistics: First, the national average of food prices increased by more than 200% from mid-2020 to mid-2021,²¹ and second, there was a 61% rise in the number of households that reported poor or borderline food consumption from May 2020 to May 2021.²²

Given Syria’s dwindling agricultural production, could it import the food it so desperately needs? Unfortunately, this is highly unlikely as Syria’s foreign currency reserves are almost non-existent. Even Russia, Syria’s closest partner along with Iran, has not come anywhere close to fulfilling the deal it signed with Damascus to export 1.5 million tons of wheat to the country by the end of 2021 due to Syria’s lack of funds.²³ As shown in Figure 3, global food prices have hit the highest level in over a decade, rising by more than 30% in the last year according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).²⁴ A drastic increase in the price of wheat over the past year, as shown in Figure 4, has been a large driver of this. Accordingly, it is inconceivable that Syria will be able to afford to import food, especially the wheat it so desperately needs, from other nations at market prices.^{25, 26}
 

Figure 3 - Food Price Index²⁷

Figure 4 - Global Wheat Prices 

Factor 3) Declining humanitarian aid funding

The demand for humanitarian assistance in Syria has never been greater. However, in the face of this growing demand, humanitarian funding to Syria, at least through the U.N., is actually declining. As of June 2021, merely 15% of the $4.2 billion (i.e. $0.63 billion) requested by the U.N. for Syria for the year 2021 had been delivered, as compared to $1.4 billion of the $3.8 billion (i.e. 37%) requested for 2020 by the same point that year.²⁸ As the figure below makes clear, despite growing needs, reported humanitarian donor funding for Syria, as of Nov. 25, 2021, is at its lowest level since 2014.²⁹
 

As governments worldwide respond to the pandemic-inspired economic downturn, aid budgets have been early casualties. The effects of these cuts on humanitarian efforts in Syria are already painfully evident. The WFP provides food assistance to more than 5 million people across Syria every month. But the agency is facing "severe funding constraints and recently had to reduce the monthly food ration that families receive,"³⁰ cutting a substantial number of calories from its food baskets in September 2021 due to declining resources. This was the third consecutive such cut.³¹ The WFP is only 31% funded and urgently needs nearly $480 million for the next six months.³²

The imperative for donor governments

Clearly, such aid cuts are occurring at the worst possible time, when aid needs to be increased due to Syria’s rapidly declining ability to feed itself as a result of the drought. As droughts are perceived as slow-burn situations compared to humanitarian catastrophes like natural disasters, donor governments don’t seem to be aware of the extreme urgency that the humanitarian response to Syria’s drought requires. The imperative for donor governments is to immediately shift gears and transition to a proactive, pre-emptive approach regarding the coming famine in Syria as opposed to a reactive one. Humanitarian action requires significant time for planning and implementation, meaning action is required now. Waiting any longer might mean it will be too late. To avoid this impending humanitarian crisis, donor governments should focus their efforts on three fronts:

1. Increase humanitarian aid to Syria to meet the minimum requested by U.N. agencies, especially the WFP.
2. Ensure aid reaches affected populations and is not diverted along the way, predominantly by the Syrian regime. This includes ensuring the exchange rate applied to U.N. transfers matches that in the black market and U.N. agencies are independent from pressure by the regime.³³
3. Ensure the renewal of cross-border aid to northwest Syria, or better still, come up with a permanent alternative mechanism for delivering aid to those areas without it being influenced by the Assad regime. While other parts of Syria are not faring much better, northwest Syria is particularly vulnerable as most of the population live hand to mouth, in scattered camps, under the constant bombardment of Russian and regime planes.