Washington says it doesn’t know who runs Iran. Tehran insists its leadership is united. MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka joins hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj to sort out where the truth lies. They look at the small circle of political and military figures now steering the war effort in Tehran: who they are, how they make decisions, and how unified they really are. They also discuss the current state of US-Iran negotiations, the role of the upcoming midterm elections in the United States, and how the Islamic Republic is preparing for a potential renewal of conflict afterward.
Crude oil is flowing out of the Gulf again, but the market is no better prepared for another disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. It has assembled a temporary system for managing one. Crude exports from the Gulf, excluding Iran, returned to pre-war levels in September, while total Gulf shipments reached 15.5 million barrels a day, more than 80% of the pre-conflict volume.
Many of the immediate consequences of the Israeli-American war with Iran are already clear. The further emergence of drones and missiles as dominant weapons of war; the danger to the global economy from the threats to vital chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb; and the inadequacy of US weapons procurement, among other issues, have garnered widespread and entirely merited attention.
The Fakhrizadeh assassination: A major failure for Iranian intelligence
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the most important figure in Iran’s nuclear program, in late November 2020 is a major failure for Iran’s intelligence services. Despite all the secrecy and the emphasis on protecting Fakhrizadeh, however, he was still assassinated in the Absard area, about 70 km from Tehran, on Nov. 27. Why was he killed despite such a high level of protection, and what effect will his death have on the Iranian regime’s intelligence and security structures?
In our final episode of the year, host Alistair Taylor interviews several MEI scholars on the key events that transpired across the Middle East in 2020 including in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, and they discuss US defense and diplomatic strategy in region as the as the transition to the Biden administration gets underway. Guests include Paul Salem, Bilal Saab, Randa Slim, and Marvin Weinbaum.
A look back at the year’s most important developments with analysis from Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Randa Slim, Gerald Feierstein, Gonul Tol, Jonathan M. Winer, Khaled Elgindy, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Grace Wermenbol, Syed Mohammad Ali, Robert S. Ford, and Khaldoun Khelil.
Iran’s internet shutdown last year was an exercise of its digital power that had been years in the making. Since 2013, the Iranian government has invested heavily in developing its domestic internet known as the National Information Network (NIN). With critical internet infrastructure under its control, the Iranian government can isolate its citizens from the global internet by filtering content, restricting communications, and controlling which platforms they can use.
What could environmental cooperation between Iran and the GCC look like?
The Persian Gulf states are among the most vulnerable on earth to the effects of climate change, which makes environmental cooperation necessary for their survival. Located in one of the hottest and driest parts of the planet, the region is vulnerable to extreme heat waves, dust storms, and water scarcity. All of these will increase in frequency and severity with further climate change. Protecting the natural environment of the region is not just an ecological concern, but a security one as well. Unmitagated climate change could spur conflict over limited resources and produce waves of migrants. While the future may seem bleak, environmental cooperation also presents a unique opportunity for improving the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran. Successes from cooperation on essential environmental issues could be the start of a more general rapprochement.
A recipe for intolerance: Iran’s blueprint for cracking down on Christians
the reality of life for religious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran has proven very different, as many Iranians will attest, regardless of their political or religious viewpoints. One recent illustration is the 80 lashes given to two Christian converts in the past two months for drinking wine as part of Holy Communion. One of these converts is currently serving a six-year prison sentence; the other is in internal exile, having already spent two years in prison. The charge against them? “Acting against national security by establishing house-churches and promoting ‘Zionist’ Christianity.” In the regime’s eyes, these converts, and all others like them — a recent survey suggests there may be as many as 1 million — are no Christians. They are erring Muslims. So any punishment is justified.And in spite of what regime figures like to say about the “tolerance” of the Islamic Republic, from the early days of the revolution — as soon as they were firmly in power — the ayatollahs began a crackdown on civil and religious liberties.
Special Briefing: The Trump administration’s potential last-minute Middle East policy moves
From Israel/Palestine and Lebanon to Iran and Afghanistan, there are a number of areas where the Trump administration may make policy moves before leaving office on Jan. 20. Experts from across MEI weigh in with their thoughts on what to watch out for over the next seven weeks.
DIY futures in the Middle East: What if small got bigger?
It’s difficult to look at the Middle East and consider its future optimistically. Much of the analysis of the region centers on crisis and collapse. There is plenty of both, fueled by wars and civil conflicts, poverty, extremism, and more. Given the human toll, focusing on all this is natural. It is also necessary if solutions to deeply rooted problems are ever to be developed, leading to a better future.A related risk is becoming blinded to “weak signals” — early indicators of what could become features of potential alternative futures. Weak signals are developments that are emerging outside the dominant norms and trends of today. In the Middle East, probably the most dominant norm is the inability of governments throughout the region to provide security and prosperity for their citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic is making this even more apparent, and markedly worse. It is not just the obvious failed states — as Steven Cook recently observed, “sometimes state failure is a more chronic condition.” But in the midst of this — and fueled by it — there is evidence of activities at the local level to create what is missing. Could these be signals of a future different than the one it is so easy to expect for the region?
“Deeds matter most” was the official diplomatic response to Joe Biden’s election from the Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif. It came in the form of an early morning Tweet, an appropriate medium given the new political norm established in recent years. The statement read like one from a career diplomat urging “dignity, interest, and responsible diplomacy,” based not on empty rhetoric, but on actions — measurable steps that would demonstrate each side’s commitment to “multilateralism, cooperation, respect for law …” Yet the tweet’s author, Mr. Zarif, has a history of practicing the age-old political principle of “do as I say, not as I do.” Indeed, when it comes to U.S.-Iran relations, the month of November is the perfect time to assess each side’s deeds in this decades-old conflict. Bombastic rhetoric has been a hallmark of this rancorous relationship since Islamic revolutionaries stormed America’s embassy in Tehran in early November 41 years ago. Yet for all the regime’s bluster, including slogans like “Death to America,” its deeds, especially toward Iranians, speak much more loudly.
Despite fresh comments from Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah that Joe Biden’s victory in the U.S. elections would not dramatically alter America’s pro-Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East, Hezbollah appears largely optimistic of its future under the new administration. The Party of God seems wary of the next few months, however, until President Donald Trump leaves the White House in January. While Hezbollah will certainly benefit from a reboot in diplomatic relations between the U.S and Iran, which could translate into much-needed liquidity for the organization and a strengthening of its internal position, it still faces numerous domestic challenges that money alone cannot solve.
Iran’s strong hand in the Arab world is missing in the Caucasus
Iranian military advisers and pro-Iran foreign proxy groups are present from Yemen and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Tens of thousands of armed men operating across the Middle East look to Tehran for guidance and patronage. This sort of sway has made Iran into a regional power broker — at least in the Arab world. But Tehran’s deep ideological and financial investments in Arab states have come at the expense of neglecting Iranian interests closer to home.
Five lies Iran will try to spread, and how Biden must combat them
It should come as no surprise that Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei is once again predicting America’s “political, civil and moral decline” in the wake of the U.S. elections. But the regime’s preemptive attacks on President-elect Biden as an “iron fist in a velvet glove” and its demands that his administration “compensate for past mistakes” mark a departure from the Islamic Republic’s more restrained approach to previous transitions — and portend a flurry of commentary coming out of Tehran over the next two months.
The oldest peer-reviewed publication dedicated to the study of the modern Middle East, MEI’s flagship journal covers politics, society, and culture in the region.
