Yemen

In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Charles Lister, Charles Schmitz, and Alex Vatanka provide analysis on recent events including the Syrian cease-fire, Al-Qaeda losses in Yemen, and Iran’s parliamentary elections.

Cease-fire Dead in Syria
Charles Lister, Resident Fellow

In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Randa Slim, Charles Schmitz, and Paul Salem provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including the next round of Syrian peace talks, the cease-fire in Yemen and the negotiations ahead, and Saudi King Salman’s visits to Egypt and Turkey.

Round Two of Syrian Peace Talks
Randa Slim, Director of the Initiative for Track II Dialogues

Just days before the first anniversary of the Saudi air campaign in Yemen on March 26, the U.N. special rapporteur to Yemen, Ould Cheikh, announced a cease-fire to begin April 10 followed by a third round of talks between the warring Yemeni factions on April 18. These talks have a better chance of success than previous attempts. The Houthi-Saleh alliance has long insisted that a complete and final cease-fire proceed any talks, and in previous attempts at negotiation, announced cease-fires never took hold and talks went nowhere.

U.N. mediator to Yemen, Walid Sheikh, recently succeeded in negotiating the release of a number of political prisoners held by Houthi rebels, including a government minister, as a confidence-building measure. Despite this small success, the third round of negotiations in the Yemeni conflict appear to be floundering without a start date.

Yemen’s war is a forgotten catastrophe. Peter Maurer, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stated in August: “Yemen after five months looks like Syria after five years.” All too commonly, civilians are bearing the brunt of the violence in Yemen. According to the United Nations, more than 2,700 people have been killed and more than 5,000 wounded. Schools, hospitals, and roads have been destroyed by the Saudi-led air campaign.

The recent escalation in tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran is throwing the GCC into a crisis of unity. Riyadh’s actions in particular are built on the frustration of the Yemen war and the perception of Iranian encroachment in Arab lands that the Saudi kingdom believes is its domain. King Salman and his son, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, feel the kingdom is being ignored by the international community in other hot zones, namely Syria, where the outcome of the war is being determined by Washington and Moscow.

The military campaign called Operation Decisive Storm pits Saudi Arabia and most of the GCC states, along with the United States, Britain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and several other minor players, against the Houthis in Yemen, which possess only moral support from the real target in this proxy war, Shi‘i Iran. How did such a lopsided war come about? Why has Yemen become the new battleground in a Sunni-Shi‘i fault line emerging as an ideological rival to the Cold War mentality that saw Soviet communism versus Western capitalism? What precisely is this sectarian crisis all about?

Hadi flip-flopped again. On Thursday, September 10, Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced that the government would meet with the Houthi rebels directly and without any conditions at the UN-sponsored negotiating table. As the military buildup for the assault on Sana reaches its final stages, Hadi’s announcement came with a sense of relief that Sana, having endured six months of bombardment from the Saudi Air Force, would be spared a ground assault. But two days later, Hadi reversed and

For decades, most refugee crises followed a pattern: A war erupted, usually in a poor country, and beleaguered civilians staggered across the nearest border. The United Nations organized a response, rich nations footed the bill, and aid groups sent in workers to tend to the needy. Even in extreme cases, such as the mass exodus from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the crisis was largely confined to the country at war and a few immediate neighbors.

Read the full article on LobeLog.

Three months after Saudi Arabia rounded up a few allies and began an intensive bombing campaign against the rebels known as Houthis across the border in Yemen, a conventional wisdom has developed. “It has not worked,” as The New York Times put it in a front-page article, and it probably can’t work because the strategic goals are too murky, the factions are too entrenched, the rivalries are too intense, and the conflict is too complicated to be resolved by a simplistic solution.

Oman’s government has declined to participate in the current Saudi-led military effort in Yemen. Instead, the country’s ruler, Sultan Qaboos, has called for “non-interference.” This position is an argument for internal political compromise that will eliminate the perceived need for Arab military intervention. To that end, Oman is offering a venue for talks with the hope of moving the political discussion forward.

After initially rejecting the UN call for talks, the Saudi-backed Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi faction reversed its position and agreed to meetings in Geneva on June 14.

Yemen, like many other states in the region, has never conformed to the norms of an integral nation state; it has been in a state of crisis since at least the 1990s due to constant competition between the ruling state authority and various clans, tribal groups, transnational movements, and secessionists. In addition to these layers of conflict, regional players have tried to exploit domestic instability to further their own interests.