Analysis

With the signing of a presidential memorandum on Feb. 4, the administration of Donald Trump has returned to a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, but circumstances have changed drastically since the policy of intensified sanctions was originally crafted during his first term. Regional geopolitics will present the White House with a new set of variables, while changes in the petroleum markets will affect how the administration approaches sanctions on oil exports.

This massive distraction of the Trump administration’s Gaza non-plan and the even more serious move of dismantling America’s ability to shape and influence events abroad together carry three risks for the Middle East.

Observing the unfolding of President Donald Trump’s second term from the Middle East is as confusing and disorienting as it must be from the United States. In Palestine, Egypt, and Jordan, urgent concern is focused on Trump’s surprise plan to take over the Gaza Strip, displace its population, and rebuild it as the “Riviera of the Middle East.” In Israel, the right wing is extremely pleased with Trump’s gift, but they don’t know what he has planned for the West Bank. In the Arab Gulf monarchies, leaders are generally happy to be dealing with Trump again but are alarmed by the recklessness of his Gaza plan and concerned about the potential impact his energy and tariff policies could have on their economies.

The Trump administration’s Middle East approach in its first three weeks back in office was filled with plenty of sound and fury. It’s still too soon to tell whether all of the noise signifies much of anything for the region, yet there are few promising signs of a smooth ride ahead.

Nearly three years on, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reshaped trade and investment in the energy sector, leading to an increase in Gulf imports of Russian oil and a sharp rise in the region’s hydrocarbon exports to Europe as well as further fueling the growth of Gulf investment in renewable energy projects located in and targeting the continent.

Despite a few hiccups, the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas has achieved its initial milestones. Much will depend on the upcoming negotiations regarding the next phases of the agreement. Yet for now, the fundamental questions of who will govern Gaza, who will provide security, and who will deliver the funding to rebuild it have yet to be definitively resolved.

Either maintaining Russia’s military bases in Syria or finding an alternative outpost in the Mediterranean will prove extremely difficult for Moscow. And part of the problem with pursuing the latter option, particularly if in Libya, is that it would require a full-on transformation of Russia’s military presence model — from more traditional bases designed to establish deterrence by showing the flag in the region to building up a military and logistical operation inside a security “gray zone.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a potentially disastrous showdown within the next month that could shake his hold on power, unless he manages to deter the strongly held positions of the foreign and domestic politicians and political forces on which he is dependent.

In his second term in office, President Donald Trump faces a Middle East undergoing multifaceted upheaval and an Islamic Republic of Iran currently in its weakest and most isolated position since the founding of the regime in 1979. Yet far from permanently subdued, Tehran continues to move closer to building a nuclear weapon, and it is trying to preserve its regional network of proxies and non-state allies. Trump now faces an important strategic choice on Iran policy. This report analyzes three overarching dynamics: the shifting strategic landscape across the Middle East in 2023-24; the impact of these shifts on Iran and its Axis of Resistance network; and Iran’s current position and standing at home and in the region. It concludes with a series of strategic-level recommendations for the new administration.

The election of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is a political breakthrough in Lebanon and a harbinger of what could happen in a country long dismissed as unsalvageable. Beirut’s new leadership reflects the aspiration of a majority of the Lebanese people to live in a functioning state free from the dual drivers of its failure: political violence and pervasive corruption. Those leaders must now deliver on their commitment to establish a state committed and accountable to its people and rise to meet the responsibility that comes with holding the promise of a nation’s future.

The opening act of US President Donald Trump’s second administration had very little to do with Middle East policy issues. It is too soon to predict what approach Trump might take on that front or even how much he will prioritize the region relative to the other issues on his second term agenda. His administration has sent some mixed and inconsistent signals on staffing and policy moves that don’t provide enough of a clear overall sense of the big picture on the Middle East but do offer some preview of what might be to come on three key fronts.

It is becoming apparent that negotiations between the new leadership in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face significant obstacles due to disagreements over military structure and administrative demands. These issues reflect the difficulty of reaching a mutual understanding between the two parties. As these challenges persist, there is growing talk of a potential military escalation in eastern Syria, amid residents’ fears and international mediation efforts to contain the crisis and achieve progress in the negotiations.

Normalizing regular contacts and building relationships with the Taliban leadership can offer a more effective way to hold the Islamic Emirate to account for its actions. It also gives greater promise of realizing American hopes for an Afghanistan inhospitable to global terrorists and more respectful of the human rights of its citizens.

Syria’s first post-Assad protests broke out on Dec. 25 after a video claiming to show the destruction of an Alawite shrine spread rapidly across Facebook. The video was quickly debunked as several weeks old, the shrine only partially damaged, and the damage occurring during the capture of Aleppo city rather than in an act of sectarian vandalism. But those first hours were enough to stir up the widespread fears lingering just below the surface among Syria’s Alawite minority, bringing many Alawites (as well as Sunnis) to the streets to denounce sectarianism.

The cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas announced on Jan. 15 took more than a year to reach and almost certainly will take much longer to fully realize than the four-plus months outlined in the framework. Like many things in life, this agreement was hard to build and will be easy to tear down. Indeed, the deal has already run into issues even before it is set to take effect on Jan. 19, with a dispute within the Israeli cabinet delaying a vote on it to Jan. 17.