Analysis

Almost every written piece on Turkey’s relations with Asia begins with a reference to the ancient Silk Road. When Turkish statesmen address Chinese audiences, they often use this metaphor to point out the “millennia-old cultural exchanges and neighborly relations” between the two countries. Inside Turkey, however, few can make sense of this anachronistic notion of shared identity. Asked about ancient Sino-Turkish ties, many will only recall how the Chinese built the “Great Wall” against the nomadic tribes of Central Asia—considered to be the forefathers of modern Turks.

On September 30, 2013, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his government’s long-awaited reform or “democratization” package. In Turkey’s highly polarized political atmosphere, responses ranged from describing the package as a historical victory for democracy that will finally free Turkey from heavy chains imposed upon it for decades, to an electoral ploy designed to polish the country’s badly damaged image as a result of the Gezi Park incidents, with no substantial improvements in democratic standards. As often is the case, the truth lies in the middle.

This article first appeared in Al-Monitor.

This article first appeared in Foreign Policy.

In April, Egyptian graphic novelist Magdy el-Shafee went to Abdel Moneim Riad Square in downtown Cairo to protest a draft law put forth by the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). It would only be two months until the Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, would be ousted by the Egyptian military.

In recent years, Sino-Turkish relations have grown increasingly close. Sino-Turkish trade, for instance, saw a sharp rise from $4.87 billion in 2005 to $19 billion in 2012, a rise of 292.09 percent. In 2005, 44,077 Chinese citizens traveled to Turkey, and this number rose to 114,582 in 2012—a 159.96 percent increase. 2013 has seen such an overwhelming number of visits and travels to Turkey from China that the Chinese government has adopted some restrictive measures, such as limiting the number of delegations from various levels of government and universities that can make the trip.

Think of American mainstream media in the aftermath of 9/11 and you might get a general idea of the state of the Egyptian equivalent since the June 30 uprising against Muslim Brotherhood rule—allowing, that is, for less sophistication and a considerably greater measure of crudity. The fluttering flags at the top of television screens, along with variations on the “war on terror” banner, were copied almost identically, if less tastefully, by both state-owned and private Egyptian television stations from CNN, FOX, and the rest.

In C.S. Lewis’ fantasy land of Narnia, the white witch put a spell on her realm to ensure that there would be perpetual winter and that Christmas would never come. For 34 years American-Iranian relations have been similar: a long, hard freeze unbroken by any cracks or signs of thaw.

Since the West’s economic crisis in 2008, Turkey has been less keen to join the EU, and many Turks have begun to discuss the advantages of being closer to Asia, including China, the pivotal Asian force. China has been Turkey’s third-largest trading partner for ten years now, and this standing even excludes energy imports such as oil and natural gas. While both sides are intent on deepening relations in all aspects, some obstacles must be overcome in the near future, such as the trade deficit between the two countries, which leaves Turkey indebted to the powerhouse that is China to the tune of more than $20 billion annually.

Turkey’s foreign policy under the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government continues to attract widespread attention by scholars and policy circles alike. Over the past decade, the way Turkey has formulated and implemented its policies toward the rest of the world has transformed from a traditionally status quo-ist and reactive stance that emphasizes maintaining close relations with the West to a more assertive, multidimensional, and proactive approach with a broader geographical scope. While the process of accession to the European Union (EU) remains the main axis of its foreign policy, Turkey is now showing greater interest in regions hitherto neglected, including Asia, and this interest is materializing in the form of greater dialogue between countries, expanding economic and commercial relations, and frequent exchanges between peoples.

Three months after the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood remains in shock. In two and a half years, the group went full circle, from an outlawed organization to one that won a plurality in parliamentary elections and saw its candidate win the presidential election, to that president’s ouster a year later and the subsequent court verdict ordering the group’s shutdown. During this short journey, the Brotherhood shifted alliances.

The members of the Friends of Yemen, comprising over 30 governments and several international institutions, including the United Nations, World Bank, Arab League, and European Union, gathered for their sixth meeting September 25 in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly. Chaired by the governments of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, participants praised Yemen’s efforts to implement a political transition through inclusive and comprehensive dialogue and negotiation—a stark contrast to the course of events in better-known Syria and Egypt.

Last week, MEI scholars Allen Keiswetter, a retired Foreign Service officer, David Newton, former ambassador to Yemen, and Roby Barrett, author of Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context (2011), gathered for an informal discussion about Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which began in March.

The openly difficult relationship between Saudi Arabia and Muslim Brotherhood chapters across the region has become a salient feature of Middle East politics since the advent of the “Arab Spring.” This mutual mistrust has increased in the wake of the Kingdom’s recent support for the military takeover in Cairo and the generals’ subsequent repression of the Brotherhood there. But how is the Islamist organization affected by this dynamic in Syria, where the Muslim Brothers and the Saudis both battle against Bashar al-Assad?

This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy.