Analysis

There is only one thread holding together the unprecedentedly disparate parties that will establish and support the nascent Israeli government announced on the night of June 2, an hour before the midnight deadline. That thread is, of course, a shared loathing for Benjamin Netanyahu. Whether that thread will even get the new government past its first hurdle, which is a vote of confidence in the Knesset, much less to its theoretical four years, is an open question. Until recently no one could have imagined such a political monstrosity might be conceived, let alone gestated, but there’s a decent chance this government will get off the ground.

The recent push by a number of Arab states to normalize relations with the Assad regime is based on the false premise that the war is over and it is necessary to restore ties to lobby Damascus to change its relationship with Iran. Other regional dynamics are also a factor: The UAE, for example, sees it as a necessary balance against what it perceives as adversarial actions by Turkey with the Syrian jihadist group HTS in Idlib. Yet these rationales for rehabilitating the Assad regime are completely fallacious. The downsides and policy consequences will not only affect Arab states, but will also harm American interests, making it difficult for the U.S. to fully pivot to address the rising threat from China.

In the final leg of his recent Middle Eastern tour, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stopped in Amman for half a day to meet King Abdullah. Blinken’s main objective was to support the shaky cease-fire reached between Palestinian factions in Gaza and Israel after an 11-day military showdown. Speaking at a press conference on May 26, Blinken said that “the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah was crucial, as it always has been in different issues, his role was essential in reaching a cease-fire in Gaza.”  Jordanians were less confident of their government’s role in ending what most saw as “Israeli aggression against Gaza,” however. Even before the recent military clash Jordanian pundits, some known for their close ties to the government, were critical of the lukewarm official response to the Israeli provocations of Palestinians at Al-Aqsa Mosque and in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem.

Russia’s foreign policy in areas of the Arab world and Africa where the Soviets once wielded significant influence decades ago has become increasingly assertive in recent years. One such area is Sudan, a pro-Soviet country from 1969, when Gaafar Nimeiri took power, until the communist-backed coup of 1971.

With U.S. forces on track to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan by mid-July, two months ahead of the September deadline set by President Joe Biden, the thousands of Afghans who have worked with U.S. personnel as interpreters to further American policy objectives in Afghanistan are now in harm’s way. As part of the new Defense Rapid Reaction series, experts from MEI’s Defense & Security Program weigh in with their thoughts on how the U.S. should respond to this pressing issue.

The recent round of fighting between Israel and Hamas, and especially the events that preceded it in Jerusalem, were the first significant test of the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements signed in 2020. Saved by Hamas’ intervention, the four normalizing Arab governments were nevertheless forced to address the consequences of their agreement in the face of popular discontent with the situation at home as well as criticism from other Arab and Muslim states over their relative silence. How they respond to the evolving Israeli-Palestinian tension going forward will be critical not only in regard to their own relations with Israel but also in terms of the future path of Arab-Israeli normalization.

The USCGC Hamilton recently completed a visit around the Black Sea. This visit was notable for a couple of reasons. First, this was the first time the United States Coast Guard has operated in the Black Sea since 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia. Second, this U.S. deployment to the Black Sea came on the heels of a sizable Russian military buildup in the region.

Singer Kamilya Jubran, founding member of the iconic Palestinian band Sabreen, once famously sang, “We’ve tried resistance, we’ve tried confrontation, we’ve tried intifada, we’ve tried peace. What else is left to us?” The answer of course, that hung in the air of her breathtaking vocals, was “to sing.”

The synergies between the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean theaters have grown substantially in recent years. Speaking at a meeting in Paphos, Cyprus in mid-April 2021 with his counterparts from Greece and Israel, as well as the former minister of state for foreign affairs of the UAE (now an advisor to the UAE president), the Cypriot foreign minister noted, “The evolving web of regional cooperation is creating a new narrative.” A week later, the UAE and Israeli fighter jets flew together publicly — for the first time — in an international aerial exercise hosted by Greece. How can we explain the signs of growing cooperation between these actors that seemingly operate in close but not completely overlapping arenas?

In his statement commemorating the Armenian Remembrance Day on April 24, President Joe Biden said, “We honor their story. We see that pain. We affirm the history. We do this not to cast blame but to ensure that what happened is never repeated.” Biden’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide, following similar steps by the House of Representatives and Senate in 2019, has strained U.S.-Turkish ties even further at a time when bilateral relations are at an all-time low. Although there is little room for reconciling Washington’s and Ankara’s conflicting takes on history, cultural heritage diplomacy offers the Biden administration a positive agenda to engage receptive stakeholders in Turkey to strengthen pluralism and social inclusion.

On April 8, the top U.S. diplomat in Pakistan visited the Chinese-operated port of Gwadar — the first such visit by an American official in 15 years. The move appears to be part of a campaign by Pakistan to promote its regional connectivity agenda and simultaneously signal that this effort isn’t solely wedded to China and its Belt and Road Initiative.

In March 2021, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum held its first meeting as a recognized international organization. Delegations from member countries – including Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine – gathered in Cairo to organize a regional gas market. The forum is a unique space that offers a platform for dialogue between European and Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, it is rare that Israeli and Palestinian delegations cooperate on the international stage. Yet, as the inaugural meeting demonstrated, the conflict is never too far away. When the delegates voted on whether to grant the United Arab Emirates observer status in the forum – a privilege given to the United States and European Union – Palestine vetoed, a clear demonstration of Ramallah’s frustration with the normalization process that started a few months ago.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran approaches its 13th presidential election, the candidacy of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13), once strongly supported by the conservative camp, poses a significant challenge to other conservative candidates by dividing their base. Given Ahmadinejad’s transformation into an opposition voice — one who openly crosses the Islamic Republic’s redlines — the ruling establishment is now facing a predicament on whether to allow the controversial statesman to run, or to bar him from participating in the presidential elections.

The 5G technology revolution is poised to change society irreversibly in the Middle East. The evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT) powered by 5G networks could prove life-enhancing. Already, the Gulf countries have led the way in adopting 5G technology in the region and the rollout of 5G showcases the Gulf’s new role as a leader in digital technology. Although the Gulf countries have made strides to be global tech leaders, their neighbors in the region seriously lag behind in their abilities to adopt large-scale 5G technology. This disparity will further deepen the divides in development between the Gulf and the rest of MENA. Looking to the future, the Gulf will surely pull ahead as the tech hub of the region, but there are still important benefits for the rest of the region to reap as they slowly adopt next generation technology. 

While riots and even violent military clashes between Israel and the Palestinians are unfortunately nothing new, and the conflict itself has been of interest to the international community for many decades, the recent, sudden escalation in violence has come as a surprise to many outside observers. This has forced individual states and international organizations to take a stance on what’s happening, including the EU. For the EU, the Middle East conflict is one of the greatest challenges in the immediate neighborhood and a major factor hindering the implementation of its European Neighborhood Policy in the eastern Mediterranean.