President Trump’s Gaza ploy is really aimed at the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia most directly, to rebuild Gaza and cozy up to Israel.
Nearly three years on, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reshaped trade and investment in the energy sector, leading to an increase in Gulf imports of Russian oil and a sharp rise in the region’s hydrocarbon exports to Europe as well as further fueling the growth of Gulf investment in renewable energy projects located in and targeting the continent.
Despite a few hiccups, the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas has achieved its initial milestones. Much will depend on the upcoming negotiations regarding the next phases of the agreement. Yet for now, the fundamental questions of who will govern Gaza, who will provide security, and who will deliver the funding to rebuild it have yet to be definitively resolved.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a potentially disastrous showdown within the next month that could shake his hold on power, unless he manages to deter the strongly held positions of the foreign and domestic politicians and political forces on which he is dependent.
In his second term in office, President Donald Trump faces a Middle East undergoing multifaceted upheaval and an Islamic Republic of Iran currently in its weakest and most isolated position since the founding of the regime in 1979. Yet far from permanently subdued, Tehran continues to move closer to building a nuclear weapon, and it is trying to preserve its regional network of proxies and non-state allies. Trump now faces an important strategic choice on Iran policy. This report analyzes three overarching dynamics: the shifting strategic landscape across the Middle East in 2023-24; the impact of these shifts on Iran and its Axis of Resistance network; and Iran’s current position and standing at home and in the region. It concludes with a series of strategic-level recommendations for the new administration.
The cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas announced on Jan. 15 took more than a year to reach and almost certainly will take much longer to fully realize than the four-plus months outlined in the framework. Like many things in life, this agreement was hard to build and will be easy to tear down. Indeed, the deal has already run into issues even before it is set to take effect on Jan. 19, with a dispute within the Israeli cabinet delaying a vote on it to Jan. 17.
A very different Middle East will greet President-elect Trump this month compared to the region he experienced during his first term. However, there are opportunities to advance American interests for a more stable and less conflictual Middle East, which might not require the kind of intense US commitment we have seen over the last quarter-century.
More than a year has passed since the horrific attacks that took the lives of 1,200 innocent Israeli citizens on Oct. 7, 2023, a devasting day that led to many more devasting days in Gaza, where tens of thousands of innocent people have died and countless more have experienced suffering on an industrial scale. All hopes that the war might soon wind down are fading, as the conflict has expanded regionally and internationally and attention has been diverted to a hot cease-fire in Lebanon and the dramatic events unfolding in Syria. Saudi Arabia can help support a credible path to peace.
The current Israeli government’s extremism encompasses two entwined trends in Israeli political culture. The first is the rise and mainstreaming of the ideological settler movement and far-right nationalism. The second is Israel’s growing authoritarian tendencies, manifested in systematic efforts to reshape state institutions. As democratic institutions are weakened, the government faces fewer barriers to implementing its expansionist territorial agenda, while the mainstreaming of far-right ideology helps justify the erosion of democratic safeguards. Yet the vast majority of Israelis fail to recognize the connection between these trends, as do most policymakers in the United States.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
There is currently a discrepancy between the strategic objectives and enabling conditions for solar power in the Gulf and the level of actual deployment. Despite the region’s considerable promise as a potential global leaders in solar power, including one of the world’s highest levels of solar irradiance and strong supporting operating conditions, renewable power accounted for only 2% of generation capacity in 2022.
The hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states are located in the heart of the global sunbelt, endowing them with some of the greatest solar resources in the world. Peak load hours in these countries also align well with daily and seasonal solar radiation levels. Nevertheless, actual deployment of renewable power, including solar, is among the lowest in the world, even though output has increased significantly over the past five years. This paper analyzes why solar power has seen some success in a few states, while in others there has been little momentum.
In only six days, a broad coalition of advancing opposition forces coordinated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has captured all of Idlib province, almost all of Aleppo province, and a sizeable stretch of northern Hama — a humiliating defeat for Bashar al-Assad and illustrative of the fragility of regime rule in Syria.
MEI Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs Nimrod Goren and Associate Research Professor Ilai Saltzman discuss potential shifts in US policy, the outlook for Israeli politics in 2025, and the challenges to advancing peace on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Tune in for expert insights on what lies ahead.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.