“لم تحقق الولايات المُتحدة أي نتائج، بل وجهت إشارات خاطئة عندما تراجعت عن دورها في مواجهة الحوثيين”.
The president’s decision to end support for Saudi Arabia’s offensive operations in Yemen was certainly broadly anticipated. Nevertheless, it offers new hope for an end to more than six years of brutal conflict that has largely pitted Saudi-led coalition forces against Houthi rebels supported by Iran.
On Feb. 4, the Biden administration announced the appointment of Timothy Lenderking as the U.S. special envoy to Yemen. In a televised speech, President Joe Biden said that by appointing Lenderking, the U.S. is stepping up its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Yemen and by extension the humanitarian catastrophe the war has created. While Lenderking’s appointment is a much-needed step, the “end the Yemen war” discourse championed by Western policy analysts, diplomats, and peace advocates is highly problematic and disconnected from the reality on the ground.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
“بينما ليس هناك حل عسكري للصراع، فليس ثمة حل سياسي أيضًا”.
When it comes to the Persian Gulf, saving the environment might seem like it would be the last item on the to-do lists of the region’s Iranian and Arab rivals. It is an urgent matter, however — and one that could help turn these foes into friends. The United States can play an important role in this: It has helped the region to resolve conflicts over water in the past, and it could do so again.
On December 18, Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced a new cabinet as part of his efforts to implement the political annex of the Riyadh Agreement (RA) signed on November 5, 2019 between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). The agreement included several political, security and economic provisions such as: the formation of a new government that includes the STC; the disarmament and integration of militias and military formations under the auspices of the ministries of defense and interior; support of the Yemeni economy; and the demilitarization of Aden.
As long as weapons transfers to armed non-state actors are not adequately restricted and the monopoly of violence is not exclusively in the hands of the government, it will be impossible to build sustainable peace in Yemen.
The Middle East is in turmoil, with civil wars raging in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. COVID-19 is now an additional factor on top of the violence and monumental international support tasks, all of which require a sustained commitment. The effects of the deadly COVID-19 pandemic highlight the need for more robust international stabilization efforts to achieve long-term peace and self-sufficiency in the Middle East.
One underrecognized aspect of Houthi operations that the recent FTO designation brings under scrutiny is their online presence. Ansar Allah maintains accounts on YouTube and Twitter, with 26,300 followers and 16,800 followers respectively. It also has an active group with over 22,000 participants on Telegram, an instant messaging service legally headquartered in London with servers in Dubai. The group even has its own official website.
MEI experts Gerald Feierstein, Alex Vatanka, Gonul Tol, and Charles Lister join host Alistair Taylor to survey what lies ahead for the region in the year ahead, with particular attention to Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
This week’s briefing features contributions from Gerald M. Feierstein, Emiliano Alessandri, and Marvin G. Weinbaum on Yemen, Tunisia, and Pakistan.
The leaders of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar — signed a “solidarity and stability” agreement, dubbed the “al-Ula Statement” after the Saudi city in which it was inked, at their Jan. 5 summit meeting.
The mixed messages and pendulum swings in U.S. Gulf policy in recent years are rooted in and have further fueled deep questioning and a largely unresolved debate within the United States about America’s role in the region, and indeed in the world. Like the U.S., relations between the GCC and Iran are locked in confrontation. Breaking this impasse requires decisive U.S. reengagement in Gulf affairs led by vigorous, sustained diplomacy that promotes intra-GCC reconciliation and supports efforts aimed at tempering the Saudi-Iran strategic rivalry.