Houthi drone strike on Tel Aviv illustrates unstoppable “democratization” of high-technological capabilities
The recent Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv, which struck an Israeli apartment building near the Embassy of the United States, killing at least one person, should surprise no one. And the fact Israel’s state-of-the-art air defense could not prevent it will probably embolden future attempts.
The geopolitical implications of Houthi attacks and Israeli retaliation
The Houthis’ strategy of escalation has the potential to upset the fragile balance of power in the Middle East and underlines the ability of smaller actors to influence larger geopolitical outcomes through calculated risks and alliances.
Turkey is not “lost,” but it is time for other NATO allies to more strongly reengage
Turkey’s loyalty to the Alliance is frequently questioned, including accusations of fence-sitting, especially when it comes to Russia. To ask, “Who lost Turkey?” is to misread the situation. Turkey is increasingly, albeit carefully, moving away from the Kremlin.
The situation in the Red Sea is not getting better
The current situation is not only intolerable – it is unsustainable. It is time to recognize that the Houthis, with strong and persistent support from Iran, are in a position to hold not only the US but virtually the entire global system hostage.
US President Joe Biden will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Washington this week. The meeting provides an opportunity to double down on considerations of what a “day after” might look like and how best to promote moderate Palestinian voices in the effort to rebuild Gaza.
CENTCOM says ISIS is reconstituting in Syria and Iraq, but the reality is even worse
On July 16, CENTCOM announced that after six months of 2024, “ISIS is on pace to more than double” the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq it claimed in 2023. But the reality is far worse than this statement suggested because the data represents only a fraction of ISIS’s actual attacks in Syria and Iraq.
Key takeaways for NATO and the Middle East from the Washington Summit Declaration
At the Washington Summit, NATO member states mostly focused on efforts to counter Russia and to support Ukraine. However, the 2024 summit communiqué also addresses non-Euro-Atlantic risks and opportunities, based on the idea that “conflict, fragility and instability” elsewhere directly affects NATO security.
NATO, North Africa, and the Sahel: Squaring the triangle of insecurity
With NATO celebrating 75 years since its founding, Alliance members will gather in Washington, DC, on July 9-11, for a historic summit. Two of the key issues on the agenda will be addressing the acute threats emanating from the Black Sea region and adopting a strategic approach toward the Middle East and Africa.
In its 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO declared the Black Sea Region (BSR) of strategic importance for the Alliance, yet this recognition has never translated into NATO developing a proper strategy toward its critical southeastern flank. That glaring gap must be addressed right away.
NATO’s narrow window of opportunity for an effective Southern Strategy
While the Washington Summit is unlikely to deliver any ground-breaking outcome, it certainly offers the opportunity to articulate the nexus between security in Europe and the Mediterranean-African region. NATO also has the opportunity to renew and streamline its partnerships with Middle Eastern and North African countries while strengthening its outreach to Africa.
Libya remains the key for NATO to counter Russian malign activities in Africa
Eight years ago, few would have predicted that Russia could move in as quickly and comprehensively throughout Africa as it has done. Now there is widespread recognition of the threat posed by the destabilizing Russian expansion in Africa, to NATO, its members, and the African region.
From “fierce entanglement” to a viable path toward Palestinian statehood: A pragmatic proposal
The Israelis and Palestinians are stuck with each other in a situation of “fierce entanglement.” Things never got “bad enough” for Israel to work toward a better and lasting solution with the Palestinians until Oct. 7 abruptly changed the status quo. After the visceral anger subsides and Hamas is replaced in Gaza, Israel and the Palestinian Authority must work together for something other than “waiting for the next round of violence.”
Netanyahu has sought to direct the blame for the debacle of Oct. 7, as well as the subsequent failures in the management of the war, squarely on the Israeli security establishment, while avoiding taking personal responsibility that would cost him his job.
