Research & Commentary Results

Afghanistan’s neighborhood is in the midst of a consequential restructuring of its security architecture. Key regional actors Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and China have been continuing to adjust their defense plans and security partnerships to meet the growing threats posed by domestic and cross-border terrorism. At the same time, these four countries have also been looking for new ways to fill the vacuum in southern Asia left by the United States military’s departure from Afghanistan.

With the signing of a presidential memorandum on Feb. 4, the administration of Donald Trump has returned to a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, but circumstances have changed drastically since the policy of intensified sanctions was originally crafted during his first term. Regional geopolitics will present the White House with a new set of variables, while changes in the petroleum markets will affect how the administration approaches sanctions on oil exports.

Nearly three years on, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reshaped trade and investment in the energy sector, leading to an increase in Gulf imports of Russian oil and a sharp rise in the region’s hydrocarbon exports to Europe as well as further fueling the growth of Gulf investment in renewable energy projects located in and targeting the continent.

Either maintaining Russia’s military bases in Syria or finding an alternative outpost in the Mediterranean will prove extremely difficult for Moscow. And part of the problem with pursuing the latter option, particularly if in Libya, is that it would require a full-on transformation of Russia’s military presence model — from more traditional bases designed to establish deterrence by showing the flag in the region to building up a military and logistical operation inside a security “gray zone.”

A very different Middle East will greet President-elect Trump this month compared to the region he experienced during his first term. However, there are opportunities to advance American interests for a more stable and less conflictual Middle East, which might not require the kind of intense US commitment we have seen over the last quarter-century.

On Dec. 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell. This is a fact, but it woefully understates the enormity, speed, and consequences of what has transpired. The brutal dictatorship that ruled Syria for more than 50 years disintegrated in fewer than 10 days. Celebrations erupted across public squares, thousands of Syrian refugees lined up at the borders of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon eager to return, and the release of political prisoners fueled hope for a new era after decades of despotism and conflict. However, concerns about Syria’s political future and territorial integrity quickly surfaced.

The Middle East and North Africa has the potential to become the world’s largest renewable energy-producing region. Compared to the immense scale of its resources, renewable energy is virtually untapped at present. This study maps the emerging regional trends in renewable energy development and MENA renewable energy supply chains across North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant. The most successful MENA nations in developing their renewable energy resources to date are doing so through the establishment of green energy ecosystems, in which the development of utility-scale renewable energy infrastructure is coordinated with that of robust offtake markets and the establishment of commercially viable storage and transportation mechanisms to service them.

Morocco is a regional leader in renewable energy development. The country’s success stems from its multi-faceted green energy ecosystem that is giving rise to international renewable energy export supply chains based on production of green hydrogen, in the form of green am-monia, as well as phosphates, other minerals and metals, fertilizers, agri-food products, and electric vehicles. As rising green industrial manufacturing and green agricultural production are becoming drivers of long-term, private sector employment, a synergy is emerging between Mo-rocco’s efforts to expand its already significant renewable energy sector and its objective of in-creasing the number of women and young people engaged in formal employment.

Within the next 25 years, the Middle East and North Africa will be a global leader in renewable energy production and a hub for international renewable energy supply chains. Morocco, the UAE, and Jordan are spearheading the regional trend to develop green energy ecosystems in which renewable energy is used, in part or entirely, to power the manufacture of intermediate and finished goods for export.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has provided several strategic opportunities for Iran to increase its foothold in the Greater Black Sea Region. A closer analysis of Iran’s deepening footprint there is necessary to inform how the next administration in Washington and the new European Commission can strengthen and better coordinate their policy responses.

There is currently a discrepancy between the strategic objectives and enabling conditions for solar power in the Gulf and the level of actual deployment. Despite the region’s considerable promise as a potential global leaders in solar power, including one of the world’s highest levels of solar irradiance and strong supporting operating conditions, renewable power accounted for only 2% of generation capacity in 2022.

The hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states are located in the heart of the global sunbelt, endowing them with some of the greatest solar resources in the world. Peak load hours in these countries also align well with daily and seasonal solar radiation levels. Nevertheless, actual deployment of renewable power, including solar, is among the lowest in the world, even though output has increased significantly over the past five years. This paper analyzes why solar power has seen some success in a few states, while in others there has been little momentum.

The Middle East and North Africa is typically viewed from afar as a region of major energy exporters rather than consumers. Consumption patterns vary significantly within the region itself, but a variety of factors warrant giving its energy demand much closer attention than it generally receives on an international level. The range of factors that will determine the changes in demand from every country in the region, each with their respective intricacies, are far too numerous to examine in the space of this study. However, many of the key drivers that are expected to have a broad impact on shaping the evolution of regional demand to the end of the current decade deserve critical review.

The MENA region is set to experience substantial growth in demand for energy during the remaining years of the present decade. Factors driving this growth vary enormously by sub-region and individual country, but there are broad similarities in the forms of both primary and final energy demand growth that are expected to materialize by 2030.

The Persian Gulf-Black Sea International Transport and Transit Corridor, which Tehran proposed eight years ago, remains relevant today in the context of strategic competition, as it offers Iran and participating countries an alternative trade route that bypasses traditional Western-dominated shipping lanes, potentially reshaping regional economic dynamics and geopolitical influence.