Research & Commentary Results

As the war in Gaza continues to unfold, essential questions about Russian and Iranian support for Hamas remain. They include whether Russia played any role in providing support to Hamas ahead of its Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Evidence available from foreign-language publications in Russian, Persian, Arabic, and Hebrew, as well as those in English, provides provocative leads, which, if accurate, have serious potential implications. 

A long courtship

The renewed violence in Gaza could not have come at a less opportune time for the climate agenda in the Middle East. From energy economics to environmental degradation, the ripple effects of conflict will complicate the path ahead.

Oct. 7 sounded the death knell of the Abraham Accords. Yet the end to the initial conceit of the Abraham Accords does not mean an end to the essential role that the Abraham Accords partners can play in helping broker an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Outside of the security risks brought about by war, the Israel-Hamas conflict has yet to result in major changes in the regional natural gas market.

Despite the Houthis’ geographical distance from Israel and perceived limited capabilities, the threat they represent is all too real and if underestimated, they have the potential to derail diplomatic efforts and destabilize the region, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Over the last three weeks, there has been a notable escalation in attacks targeting international coalition bases in northeastern Syria orchestrated by Iranian-backed militias operating in Iraq and Syria. Concurrently, there have been reports indicating the establishment of operational centers aimed at coordinating these strikes. These developments appear to be part of an effort to exploit the widespread popular discontent with the United States and Israel, with the strategic aim of expanding and consolidating Iranian influence in Syria.

Hamas’ violent and unexpected Oct. 7 attack on Israel has shaken a fragile regional order in the Middle East. Ankara and Tehran are worried that a stronger U.S. presence in the Middle East is detrimental to their regional interests. The war in Gaza might help close the ranks between Turkey and Iran, yet there are serious limitations to a sustainable alliance between the two countries.

What further diplomatic steps should the U.S. take to respond to the Israel-Hamas war and its broadening regional reverberations? MEI has asked a group of former U.S. ambassadors and senior government officials specializing in the region to weigh in.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

China has long sought to brand itself as a “neutral” player and force for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere, willing and able to talk to “all sides.” Beijing’s nascent ambition to play the role of peacemaker and its potential to shape regional events was on display when it succeeded last March in brokering the détente between Riyadh and Tehran. The Israel-Hamas war offers no such low-hanging fruit. On the contrary, it poses a major test of China’s Middle East peace diplomacy — and an opportunity to examine some of our own, perhaps faulty assumptions.

Hamas’ murderous raid on Oct. 7, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,300 Israelis, mostly civilians, may well turn out to be a consequential inflection point, having unleashed political and popular forces that could lead in a positive or, just as likely, extremely negative direction.

Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.

This report provides an interim assessment of the Biden administration’s overall Middle East strategy and examines the strategic opportunities and risks for U.S. policy in the broader region.

Last week saw a flurry of diplomatic activity between Baghdad and Ankara. The top priorities in the talks were oil exports, the presence of the PKK in Iraq, and Iraq’s water crisis. The outcomes have been unimpressive, but there is an opportunity for Iraq to shake things up and improve its bargaining position, at least on the oil export issue, possibly more.

Efforts to reform the Iraqi Kurdish security forces known as the Peshmerga are at serious risk of failing. Tensions between the ruling parties of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region are not new, but the working relationship between the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has collapsed over the past year. As a result, officials within the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs are no longer capable of preventing the politics of partisan self-interest from consuming the reform project. The prospects for the depoliticization and unification of the Peshmerga have rarely seemed more remote.