Research & Commentary Results

The Biden administration has been trying to diplomatically reengage with China, although so far with little response from Beijing. Any broad reengagement would necessarily include reengagement in the Middle East and North Africa. Both sides have a long list of common interests in the Middle East; the areas where their interests diverge relate mainly to suspicions of the other side’s long-term strategy and global ambitions. How can Washington and Beijing build on common interests in the region while addressing their long-term concerns, reducing some of them and accommodating robust competition or even sharp adversarial attitudes in other areas?

Chinese companies are well positioned to participate in Iraq’s efforts to expand its oil production capacity and develop domestic gas supplies, as they are actively engaged in various energy-related undertakings throughout the country. However, if indeed China’s strategy is, as some have suggested, to become the dominant player in Iraq’s economy, achieving that objective will likely prove difficult given Iraq’s challenging operating environment and contentious politics.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has destabilized and distressed the entire Black Sea neighborhood. Yet despite the war, or perhaps because of it, strategically important foreign direct investments into Black Sea littoral countries, including from the Gulf, have endured or even grown.

Over the last two decades, the Mediterranean has become an important region. Many scholars, policymakers and analysts have mostly referred to this region from a nexus of security, geopolitics and traditional energy politics. With the war in Ukraine, the relevance of this whole region has increased along the same line. The Mediterranean today is home to some of the most enduring conflicts in the world. New energy resources are being discovered in disputed areas in an environment of intense geopolitical competition over regional leadership and energy routes within and beyond the region.

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In the past few years, Jordan’s public debt has become a major policy concern for the government, the international community, and key donors that support Amman. The public debt has risen significantly over the past 15 years, raising many questions about Jordan’s future macroeconomic stability, public debt sustainability, and the government’s ability to finance development projects.

Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine helped influence the updated European Maritime Security Strategy’s approach to the Black and Mediterranean seas, with implicit and explicit references to the war dispersed throughout the document. The updated EUMSS showcases the wide array of security issues present in the region, including seaborne UXOs, human and drug trafficking, and threats to critical infrastructure. But security in the Black and Mediterranean seas will require greater cooperation with non-EU countries.

When Saudi Arabia suddenly announced in early April that it would reduce its oil production by 500,000 bpd, followed shortly thereafter by several other OPEC+ members, bringing the total cut to 1.1 million bpd, Japan was greatly concerned. In spite of Japan’s serious efforts to work toward a carbon-neutral society, the country is still heavily dependent on oil, the overwhelming majority of which comes from the Persian Gulf.

Last week’s spring meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington, D.C., were an important occasion for financial and economic leaders from the MENA region to meet with their counterparts from these IFIs and major bilateral donor countries. At the same time, they serve as a lead up to the important Annual Meetings that will be held in Marrakech, Morocco, in the fall — the first time they will be hosted by an Arab or African country.

The World Bank’s MENA regional economic update released on April 6, 2023 is one that may herald a sharp divide, both within the region, with its uneven economic trajectory and obstacles to human capital development, and globally, as a cleavage between energy exporters and importers.

The development of small-scale LNG and the domestic deployment of LNG as a transport and power-generation fuel could help to lower Saudi Arabia’s carbon footprint as well as improve air quality by reducing vehicle exhaust.

The oil and gas sector has been the dominant driver of Qatar’s economy. Over the years, although that sector has remained the major focus of Qatari investments, the emphasis has increasingly shifted towards the expansion of the country’s gas production and LNG export capacity. While the construction boom ahead of the 2022 FIFA World Cup powered the Qatari economy in recent years, income generated by the expansion of the country’s LNG production and export capacity is likely to drive the economy for many years to come — both despite and partly because of the market turmoil caused by the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The structural pretext that drove West Asia’s cycle of competition and proxy conflict is still in place without a clear solution in sight

Ukraine’s partners, led by the United States and spread over the globe, have increasingly responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022 with a dizzying array of financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners have provided military assistance over the last year — that is, by delivering a wide range of equipment, ammunition, and training — significantly undermines the longer-term objective of developing a sustainable system via which Ukraine can generate combat power in the coming years to overcome Russian aggression.

Relations between Tehran and Baku have long had their ups and downs, but a recent series of events in late March have once again brought tensions to a boil. However, despite the mutual threat perceptions, the recurring tensions between the two countries have not gotten out of control and led to military conflict. In fact, over the past three decades, relations between Tehran and Baku have consistently followed a cycle of escalating and de-escalating tensions.