Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The last few years have seen a lot of consolidation in Gulf financial sectors. Not only do these mergers create economic benefits, the merged entities also become potent tools for economic development. The mega-funds and other major financial institutions are part of a trend where Gulf political elites sidestep ossified bureaucracies and instead centralize power in private entities over which they have even more control.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has surrounded himself with those who would indulge him and pose little threat. His circle comprises younger, less experienced but presumably loyal princes in key ministerial positions as well as a few select, savvy, experienced older half-brothers and uncles loyal to his father. There are also several notable royal holdovers from smaller family branches, the odd competent technocrat, and a cadre of minions from across the military and security agencies.
Despite U.S. President Joe Biden’s meandering efforts to explain his about-face on Saudi Arabia—visiting the country this week after having dubbed it a “pariah” on the campaign trail—there remains much apprehension about his trip on both ends of the political spectrum. Progressives and human rights advocates worry the president will sacrifice U.S. values for short-term Faustian bargains in an attempt to secure cheap oil and expand Arab-Israeli normalization. Republicans and realists, who favor an interest-driven approach to foreign policy, aren’t sure there is enough to be gained by Washington on these fronts to justify a presidential visit.
Industry analysts widely agree that OPEC+ production levels are currently well below the members’ authorized quotas and that any production increases will mainly be met by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The challenges facing the group are daunting, but if met, seven major OPEC countries could feasibly raise crude oil production while utilizing existing infrastructure, significantly narrowing the global demand-supply gap.
Mid-term election success will tempt the American president to go for quick wins, but he must enter into talks with an eye on the global demand for energy
When gaming out the country’s likely political trajectory, most fellow Saudi watchers I know agree that the likelihood of the kingdom imploding is slight, but were that to come to pass, the consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the world would be enormous. Yet Saudi Arabia has managed to negotiate several turbulent events in its recent history with a rather remarkable lack of destabilization. And it’s most likely to continue along that trend, even in the face of what could be more storms to come.
Randa Slim is joined by Farhad Alaadin and Marsin Alshamary to discuss the latest political events in Iraqi Parliament, Muqtada al-Sadr, and what the future of Iraqi politics could look like moving forward.
تهدف هذه الورقة البحثية إلى مقاربة النفوذ الإيراني داخل المجتمع الشيعي في السعودية من خلال التركيز على أتباع مرجعية المرشد الأعلى والمعروفين بـ “خط الإمام” والجناح العسكري المنسوب للتيار والمعروف دوليًا بـ “حزب الله الحجاز” أو “حزب الله السعودي” والذي تتوجه له أصابع الاتهام بتنفيذ تفجير الخبر ١٩٩٦.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has been concerned about the potential influence of Iran’s supreme leader among its Shi’a population, especially since Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei took on the title of Vali-ye faqih, or “guardian-jurist.” Such concern is understandable given that the two countries are both neighbors and rivals: Khamenei is a marj’a, the highest-ranking Shi’a religious authority, but he is also the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces. This paper aims to investigate the Iranian influence within the Shi’a community in Saudi Arabia by focusing on the followers of the supreme leader’s marj’aiyyah, known as “Khat al-Imam,” and its military wing, “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz,” often held responsible for carrying out the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.
To identify pathways to deal with demands for economic reform and volatility in resource revenue in Iraq, in November 2021 the Middle East Institute (MEI) and Iraq Policy Group (IPG) convened a high-level workshop on the side-lines of the American University of Kurdistan’s annual Middle East Peace and Security Forum. This report provides the insights and analyses of a select group of participants, and forms part of a series of forthcoming Iraq- and Gulf-focused reports and initiatives that MEI and IPG will be convening.
Since the launch of Vision 2030 six years ago, Saudi Arabia has made considerable progress in reducing the labor-cost gap between national and foreign workers in the private sector. While the total unemployment rate has declined recently among nationals, it remains high at 11%. Drawing on evidence from Bahrain’s experience with labor market reform, this can be significantly reduced through policies designed to bridge the cost gap between citizens and foreign labor in the private sector.
For Iraqis, two key events last week will shape the rest of this year, but hopefully not many more to come. First, on June 8 the divided parliament voted in surprising harmony to pass the so-called “Food Security and Development Bill,” a controversial piece of legislation with a $17 billion price tag. Second, this was followed, almost overnight on June 9, by a call from firebrand populist Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to lawmakers loyal to his movement to “prepare their resignations.” On June 12, the 73 MPs of the Sadrist Movement tendered their resignations, and Iraq leapt even deeper into the void of political uncertainty.
Water is slowly emerging as yet another potential cause for dispute between Ankara and Tehran. As of late, the two neighboring states have been at loggerheads over a number of issues, including Syria and Iraq, where they have opposing interests. After years of quiet diplomatic juggling, the issue of transboundary water management is gradually taking center stage in the two countries’ relations, a development that could, in the medium run, have serious repercussions for regional security.
Partnering is a practical necessity for both countries but need not come at the cost of abandoning core values. The U.S. continues to exercise significant leverage and its own interests are better served globally by demonstrating credibility in what it stands for and reliability in its commitments. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has ample room to bend before it risks breaking.