The inaction trap: Paralysis and denial in Lebanese politics
Saturday marks the 100th day since Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri secured a razor-thin majority nomination to form a new cabinet — his fourth in 11 years. In October 2019, street protests had forced his “national unity” government to resign. His comeback a year later was a cause for disillusionment among protesters and a signal that politics as usual, in its collusive and inefficient nature, was there to stay. The absurdity of the Lebanese debacle lies in how easy and acceptable it was — and still is — for the established political class to shy away from crucial and courageous decisions when the country needed them most.
فرضت الحكومة اللبنانية حالة إغلاق صارمة عقب تسجيل أكبر حصيلة إصابات يومية الأسبوع الماضي منذ أن بدأت الجائحة. وتحصد الحكومة اللبنانية الآن ما زرعته بعدما أرخت القيود الصحية العامة خلال فترة العطلات.
A Shift Among the Shi'a: Will a Marj'a Emerge from the Arabian Peninsula?
This paper looks at the political implications of the relationship between Shi’a in the Gulf states and Iranian marj‘as, the historical background to these ties, and Gulf states’ concerns surrounding the outflow to Iran of religious taxes. In some Gulf countries, these issues are tied to concerns about the loyalty of Shi’a to the nation. The authors argue that the emergence of a marj‘a who would be based in one of the Gulf states could quell these concerns.The authors identify potential marj‘as from the region and steps that Gulf states must take so that their Shi’a citizens will shift their allegiance from foreign-based marj‘as to domestically based ones.
Threats, Victims or Allies? Migrant Communities in Kuwait's COVID19 Response
This article discusses Kuwait’s response to COVID-19 against the backdrop of two longstanding conceptions in the country about the role and position of non-citizens, particularly that of low-wage migrant workers. It recounts the efforts of the country’s small but vibrant civil society sector to respond to the pandemic-related needs of blue-collar migrant workers by approaching them as equal partners in solving shared challenges.
The GCC al-Ula Statement: Perhaps a step, but not a solution
The leaders of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar — signed a “solidarity and stability” agreement, dubbed the “al-Ula Statement” after the Saudi city in which it was inked, at their Jan. 5 summit meeting.
The United States and the Gulf: Trapped in transition?
The mixed messages and pendulum swings in U.S. Gulf policy in recent years are rooted in and have further fueled deep questioning and a largely unresolved debate within the United States about America’s role in the region, and indeed in the world. Like the U.S., relations between the GCC and Iran are locked in confrontation. Breaking this impasse requires decisive U.S. reengagement in Gulf affairs led by vigorous, sustained diplomacy that promotes intra-GCC reconciliation and supports efforts aimed at tempering the Saudi-Iran strategic rivalry.
A look back at the year’s most important developments with analysis from Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Randa Slim, Gerald Feierstein, Gonul Tol, Jonathan M. Winer, Khaled Elgindy, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Grace Wermenbol, Syed Mohammad Ali, Robert S. Ford, and Khaldoun Khelil.
Monday Briefing: An end to the intra-GCC dispute: Headline or hype?
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Gerald Feierstein, W. Robert Pearson, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Paul Scham, and Marvin G. Weinbaum.
Special Briefing: The Trump administration’s potential last-minute Middle East policy moves
From Israel/Palestine and Lebanon to Iran and Afghanistan, there are a number of areas where the Trump administration may make policy moves before leaving office on Jan. 20. Experts from across MEI weigh in with their thoughts on what to watch out for over the next seven weeks.
DIY futures in the Middle East: What if small got bigger?
It’s difficult to look at the Middle East and consider its future optimistically. Much of the analysis of the region centers on crisis and collapse. There is plenty of both, fueled by wars and civil conflicts, poverty, extremism, and more. Given the human toll, focusing on all this is natural. It is also necessary if solutions to deeply rooted problems are ever to be developed, leading to a better future.A related risk is becoming blinded to “weak signals” — early indicators of what could become features of potential alternative futures. Weak signals are developments that are emerging outside the dominant norms and trends of today. In the Middle East, probably the most dominant norm is the inability of governments throughout the region to provide security and prosperity for their citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic is making this even more apparent, and markedly worse. It is not just the obvious failed states — as Steven Cook recently observed, “sometimes state failure is a more chronic condition.” But in the midst of this — and fueled by it — there is evidence of activities at the local level to create what is missing. Could these be signals of a future different than the one it is so easy to expect for the region?
Despite fresh comments from Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah that Joe Biden’s victory in the U.S. elections would not dramatically alter America’s pro-Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East, Hezbollah appears largely optimistic of its future under the new administration. The Party of God seems wary of the next few months, however, until President Donald Trump leaves the White House in January. While Hezbollah will certainly benefit from a reboot in diplomatic relations between the U.S and Iran, which could translate into much-needed liquidity for the organization and a strengthening of its internal position, it still faces numerous domestic challenges that money alone cannot solve.
