How the current twin crises of the global coronavirus pandemic and economic collapse will affect the GCC governments remains an open question.
Absent major military escalation by his foreign patrons, Khalifa Hifter has now lost the war he initiated against Libya’s internationally recognized government in Tripoli. The question remains, however, of how to end Libya’s proxy war and restart the necessary political process to bring about sustained peace.
Mirette Mabrouk and Dr. Sherif Kamel join host Alistair Taylor to discuss Egypt’s economy and the role of entrepreneurship. Like countries across the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt has been hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic and the economic fallout is likely to be severe.
A possible influx of returnees from the Gulf swelling the ranks of the unemployed is bad enough, but it also comes with a serious complication — the possible loss of remittances.
Despite an unprecedented global slump, this is hardly an ideal time to cut into social spending.
This is only the latest flashpoint in a series of social media disinformation campaigns targeting Qatar.
On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.
It’s difficult to overstate the importance of the Canal to the international shipping trade, but it’s importance to Egypt economy is even greater still.
Climbing unemployment is a major specter for Egypt.
The April 20 Netanyahu-Gantz agreement legitimized the possibility of an Israeli law that will act as a unilateral annexation of parts of the West Bank to start as early as July 1, based on the controversial Trump Middle East plan. Articles 28 and 29 of the deal condition such annexation on the “consent of the Trump administration” and note that such a move would only be possible if the annexation preserves “the security and strategic interests of the state of Israel including the need to keep regional stability, keep existing peace agreements, and pursue future peace agreements.”
The amendments have been designed to provide relief on both the individual and corporate levels.
This is not the time to hang out the “Mission Accomplished” banner for the MFO. At a nominal cost to the U.S. in money and manpower, for nearly 40 years, the mission has been a phenomenal success. At a time when the U.S. commitment to the region is being viewed with increasing skepticism, the MFO is a prime example of U.S. capacity to organize and lead a multinational effort to support regional security and stability.
In an effort to boost its economic competitiveness, Qatar is hedging its bets on emerging technologies. The Gulf sheikhdom, eager to diversify its gas-dependent economy, is cultivating various technological areas, notably artificial intelligence (AI).
Egypt’s three top sources of foreign revenue — tourism, remittances, and the Suez Canal — are likely to be hard hit by the crisis.
The Middle East is facing an unexpected turning point. The region will not look the same after COVID-19 as it did before it. The geoeconomics and geopolitics of the world are in free fall because of COVID-19, the oil price war, and a severe economic shutdown. For the Middle East and the Gulf monarchies in particular, the oil price war against Russia and U.S. shale and the shutdown of economies around the world have increased the pressure on the Gulf’s already-depleted financial resources, which usually act as a safety valve for the turbulent region.