COVID-19 and the Middle East
From Morocco to Afghanistan, the scholars and experts at MEI take a closer look at how the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Middle East.
From Morocco to Afghanistan, the scholars and experts at MEI take a closer look at how the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Middle East.
Amid an unprecedented political, economic, and financial crisis and the emergence of a new threat from the global coronavirus pandemic, Lebanon needs all the help it can get. The U.S. has long been an important source of assistance, and yet, as conversations with officials in both Beirut and Washington make clear, the argument for halting U.S. aid to Lebanon seems to be gaining ground.
Iraq has been relatively calm in recent weeks. This could change following Mohammad Allawi’s withdrawal as prime minister-designate, but Iran’s proxies in Iraq are giving dialogue a chance before pushing ahead with what they say is revenge for the slaying of Qasem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Al-Quds Force.
As Lebanon nears a breaking point due to its acute financial crisis, the Trump administration faces a policy dilemma: should it financially support a corrupt ruling faction that is allied with Hezbollah – Iran’s friend and Washington’s nemesis – or should it hold off on aid and watch the country fall apart?
The past decade and a half have been a real whirlwind for Hezbollah, but the group seems to have weathered all of these storms, at least for now. However, it’s one thing for Hezbollah to survive and another altogether for it to thrive. In a special roundtable report from MEI, renowned Hezbollah analysts offer their perspectives on a series of key questions about the major upcoming challenges facing the group. This report includes contributions from Bilal Y. Saab, Nicholas Blanford, Nizar Hamzeh, Matthew Levitt, Magnus Ranstorp, Bruce Riedel, Randa Slim, and Michael Young.
Lebanese and Iraqi protesters have faced an uphill battle drawing global media attention since Arab Spring-like uprisings erupted in both countries last October. Coverage of the protests has been dwarfed by other major international news stories running concurrently with the uprisings, such as Brexit and the Hong Kong protests. The main implication of low coverage has been a lack of sustained international pressure on Lebanese or Iraqi political leaders to accommodate protester demands for wholesale systematic changes.
The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.
In response to numerous comments from readers about his article “Lebanon’s inconvenient truths,” author Bilal Saab has published a brief rejoinder.
By any objective standard, the Lebanese protest movement has failed. This is not necessarily an indictment against it. Rather, it’s a reality one cannot and should not ignore. The responsible thing to do now is to try to understand why it has fallen flat, despite more than 100 days of demonstrations in various regions of the country including the capital, Beirut.
First, a word of solace. In the annals of history, the Lebanese are in good company as most uprisings and revolutions failed to attain their goals. And even when they did, success either didn’t last long or was completely reversed due to counterrevolutions and other spoilers, both foreign and domestic.
Against the backdrop of a massive economic and financial crisis and a now three-month-old nationwide protest movement, Lebanon swore in a new government on Tuesday — a technocratic cabinet that is widely seen as a “shadow government” for Hezbollah and other entrenched political leaders. MEI’s Paul Salem, Randa Slim, and Bilal Saab join host Alistair Taylor to discuss what lies ahead.
No amount of analytical nuance or ingenuity can challenge the conclusion that the newly formed government in Lebanon is Hezbollah’s creation. The only question left to answer is: why did Hezbollah do it?
The new government is politically aligned with the pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian axis in Lebanon, and is very unlikely to drum up international and regional support.
Lebanon’s in trouble and the Lebanese may soon face the real reckoning that they’ve thus far avoided. Having bought time they’ve increasingly needed with money they’ve increasingly lacked, but somehow conjured, they’re running out of both. Its leaders must act, soon, to avoid a complete catastrophe. And, whether avoiding or coping with collapse, the Lebanese must well and truly consider how to shape a better future.
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.
Introduced in August and subsequently delayed due to the country’s political upheaval, the National Lebanese Strategy for Cybersecurity is composed of two main sections: 1) preparation of a cybersecurity strategy and 2) establishment of a national cybersecurity agency.