Research & Commentary Results

On Dec. 3, MEI’s Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs convened a webinar on the future of Palestinian refugees and their place in the policy discourse following the election of President-elect Joe Biden and the departure of the Trump administration. Below is a summary of the major takeaways from the event, organized by topic.

When looking at a map of all artillery and airstrikes in the period from November 2019 through November 2020, first, it is quite clear that the majority of attack are carried out by either Syrian, Russia, or pro-government forces across the northwest of the country, save for northern Aleppo, where the Turkish military is more active.

A look back at the year’s most important developments with analysis from Paul Salem, Alex Vatanka, Randa Slim, Gerald Feierstein, Gonul Tol, Jonathan M. Winer, Khaled Elgindy, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Grace Wermenbol, Syed Mohammad Ali, Robert S. Ford, and Khaldoun Khelil.

Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, a critical step toward a political solution to the Syrian crisis is the drafting of a new Syrian constitution. To that end, the Constitutional Committee in Geneva has conducted three rounds of discussions, with little to show for it. One of the key components of the new constitution is the decentralization of power. The issue is hard for Syrians to approach objectively, however, because — depending on their class, ethnicity, and religion — they have been impacted by the highly centralized system of governance in vastly different ways. In order to understand the different views of Syrians on the issue of decentralization in a new constitution, The Day After (TDA), a Syrian organization that works toward empowering civil society, democratic transition, and justice in Syria, conducted a survey of 2,966 persons between June and July 2020, including Syrians within the country as well as in the diaspora. In general, support for a decentralized political system is on the rise. Compared to a survey conducted by TDA two years earlier, there was an increase of over 20 percentage points among all respondents for a decentralized system in Syria.

The fascination with the peaceful removal of leaders by a simple vote in the United States has always contrasted painfully with the inability of most Middle Eastern populations to do the same.

Iraqi authorities have taken a series of preventative and remedial measures to deal with the pandemic and its second order effects. However, since early June, the number of positive COVID cases has soared, while job losses and rising prices have caused the national poverty rate to climb. Three overlapping segments of the Iraqi population — the forcibly displaced, women, and children — have been hit especially hard by the public health and socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19.

It’s difficult to look at the Middle East and consider its future optimistically. Much of the analysis of the region centers on crisis and collapse. There is plenty of both, fueled by wars and civil conflicts, poverty, extremism, and more. Given the human toll, focusing on all this is natural. It is also necessary if solutions to deeply rooted problems are ever to be developed, leading to a better future.A related risk is becoming blinded to “weak signals” — early indicators of what could become features of potential alternative futures. Weak signals are developments that are emerging outside the dominant norms and trends of today. In the Middle East, probably the most dominant norm is the inability of governments throughout the region to provide security and prosperity for their citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic is making this even more apparent, and markedly worse. It is not just the obvious failed states — as Steven Cook recently observed, “sometimes state failure is a more chronic condition.” But in the midst of this — and fueled by it — there is evidence of activities at the local level to create what is missing. Could these be signals of a future different than the one it is so easy to expect for the region?

While the Israeli-Palestinian issue and renewal of negotiations is unlikely to feature prominently on his agenda anytime soon, Biden’s election generates renewed positive momentum.

On Nov. 17 and 19, MEI’s Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs convened a two-part series looking at the future of Palestinian politics and the Palestinian national movement. Below is a summary of Part 2, “Toward a Palestinian National Strategy,” which examined the efficacy of the Palestinian leadership’s current focus on a negotiated two-state settlement, as well as alternative visions and means of liberation, such as a one-state solution and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

On Nov. 17 and 19, MEI’s Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs convened a two-part series looking at the future of Palestinian politics and the Palestinian national movement. Below is a summary of Part 1, “Reviving Palestinian Political Life,” which focused on issues such as national reconciliation, elections, succession, the future of institutions like the Palestinian Authority (PA), and reform of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Gerald Feierstein, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Fatima Abo Alasrar, Marvin G. Weinbaum, and Yesar Al-Maleki.

Despite fresh comments from Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah that Joe Biden’s victory in the U.S. elections would not dramatically alter America’s pro-Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East, Hezbollah appears largely optimistic of its future under the new administration. The Party of God seems wary of the next few months, however, until President Donald Trump leaves the White House in January. While Hezbollah will certainly benefit from a reboot in diplomatic relations between the U.S and Iran, which could translate into much-needed liquidity for the organization and a strengthening of its internal position, it still faces numerous domestic challenges that money alone cannot solve.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to play a larger role in the Black Sea region. China has been wooing littoral states in hopes of securing new markets for its goods and investing in infrastructure projects. But some worry that there is more to Chinese actions in the region than meets the eye. The worry is that China will increase its political and diplomatic clout in a region that is considered vital for Russian interests and create tension between Moscow and Washington. Despite the uneasiness in the West about China’s increasing presence in the Black Sea, there is not enough focus on the issue in the scholarly debates in Western capitals. The MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative aims to contribute to the debate on the role of China in the Black Sea. We hope the articles in this report will help to address several important unaddressed questions.

In 2018, Assad’s Syrian government forces, with Russian support, managed to regain control of opposition-held areas in Daraa. Russia has emerged as the primary power broker by arranging agreements between the rebels and the regime, which, in turn, has allowed the rebels to keep some of their arms under the banner of the Russian-formed Eighth Brigade. Nevertheless, since 2018, the tight-knit tribal networks in Daraa have functioned as a nucleus for the continuation of the uprising against the Assad regime. The same tribal attributes that create interconnectedness among the people of Daraa, however, also render them susceptible to the regime’s strategy of pitting clans against each other and leveraging the resulting strife to justify the use of force with the goal of asserting full control.

This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Marvin G. Weinbaum, Hafsa Halawa, Robert S. Ford, and Thomas W. Lippman.