Research & Commentary Results

Jordan has the lowest rate of women’s economic participation of any country not at war. According to the ILO, the kingdom’s female labor force participation rate is below 15%, while that of men is about 60%. This is lower than rates of female labor force participation in neighboring Lebanon (23%), Saudi Arabia (22%), and the West Bank and Gaza (18%). As the COVID-19 pandemic stretches on, the government of Jordan should take the opportunity to expand the accessibility of remote work and corresponding opportunities for Jordanian women who aim to play a role in their nation’s economy.

Lebanon is currently at a crossroads as the government faces the daunting tasks of rebuilding the economy, restoring public trust, and clearing the way for free and fair parliamentary elections in May of 2022. The country finds itself spiraling downward — an agreement with the IMF is yet to be realized, poverty and emigration are increasing, and there are growing threats to stability due to a failing economy and widespread corruption. Given this critical situation, it is worthwhile to review U.S. interests in Lebanon’s survival and consider key recommendations for U.S. policy to help Lebanon avoid complete collapse and help the Lebanese people move toward economic recovery, political legitimacy, and a more capable, transparent, and sovereign state.

Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.

Saudi Arabia has undergone tremendous social change in recent years, but it has struggled to make good on some of its more ambitious financial goals. Much of the promised foreign direct investment has yet to arrive, and the kingdom’s growth agenda has drained its foreign reserves. Most of Mohammed bin Salman’s more eye-catching promises, including futuristic urban megaprojects, remain unfinished.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Vladimir Putin in the 1990s, military and economic relations between Iran and Russia have improved, as their tensions with the West have intensified. One aspect of the relationship that has received little attention is their growing economic and trade cooperation involving the production, export, and import of halal meat and other products since 2015.

On Jan. 13, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressed alarm that millions of Afghans are on the “verge of death” thanks to a lethal brew of “freezing temperatures and frozen assets.” This was no idle warning. Notwithstanding the decline in fighting following the Taliban’s victory in August 2021, Afghanistan’s economy is in a deepening spiral of impoverishment and destitution.

Iran’s new president, Ebrahim Raisi, has presented his first draft budget bill for the upcoming Iranian year (1401), which starts on March 21, 2022. Rather than facilitating a much-needed economic recovery, the proposed budget is designed to strengthen the regime’s power base and impose austerity while keeping society under control.

Morocco’s phosphorus fertilizer industry, with its massive production capacity and international reach, has transformed the kingdom into a gatekeeper of global food supply chains. Morocco’s centrality to global food security rests with the fact that all food crops, indeed all plant life, require the element phosphorus to grow and Morocco possesses over 70% of the world’s phosphate rock reserves, from which the phosphorus used in fertilizers is derived. By becoming one of the world’s leading fertilizer exporters, instead of continuing to just export the raw material, Morocco has enriched its economy and elevated its international standing. In Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, the kingdom’s combination of joint venture partnerships in local fertilizer production and deft direct outreach to farmers has resulted in a remarkable boost in African agricultural yields and the notable expansion of Morocco’s soft power influence across the continent.

While some of Saied’s rhetoric as well as his symbolic and legislative decisions may appear to some as revolutionary, the post-July 25 political system has thus far maintained continuity from both the pre- and post-revolutionary way in which the state governs: a top-down, policing approach with deference to — and reinforcement of — existing socio-economic hierarchies. In presiding over and perpetuating this system, whether with verve or reluctantly, Saied has become an ordinary politician, following in the footsteps of many others who have held positions of power.

In a volatile international environment, unpredictability reigns. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the Sahel, where myriad existing security challenges have only been exacerbated by the devastating impact of COVID-19. Despite significant stabilization efforts, the situation is growing increasingly complex and various interrelated vulnerabilities weigh heavily on the region’s security agenda, including the pandemic, terrorist threats, chronic economic instability, climate change, skyrocketing demographics, and weak governance systems, as well as unprecedented food insecurity and extreme poverty.

Long-simmering economic and political tensions between the U.S. and China have continued to spill over into the technology sector, where the two superpowers have made this ever-more vital industry the site of a new Cold War. The acrimony looks poised to only get worse moving forward, potentially leading to a tech decoupling, and 5G is at the heart of it. Some third parties have sought to find a way to navigate this divide and the dilemma is particularly acute for the Gulf states. As they seek to balance their relationships with both Washington and Beijing, several have chosen to stake out their own territory by building an Open Radio Access Network (RAN). This initiative could be a potential solution to the current conundrum that would give states 5G sovereignty in an era of great power competition, with a digital twist.

إن استراتيجية المملكة العربية السعودية لزيادة محفظتها من الأصول النظيفة والمتجددة قد تم تعزيزها في عام 2021، حيث شهدت المملكة العديد من عمليات تمويل المشاريع في قطاع الطاقة الشمسية وأطلقت صندوق البنية التحتية الوطني لتنويع اقتصادها.

بعد شهرين في السلطة، أعطت الحكومة المغربية الجديدة إشارات إلى أنها تريد إعطاء الأولوية للتنمية الاجتماعية والتعافي من الآثار المطولة لكوفيد 19 على البلاد. ومع ذلك، فإن استقرار الاقتصاد الكلي، والموارد المالية المحدودة، وزيادة الإنفاق الدفاعي تحد من مدى قدرة الدولة على متابعة وتمويل خطط التنمية الاجتماعية التي تشتد الحاجة إليها.

In Iraqi folklore, Saturday is both an ominous and auspicious day. Iraqis say it is Awwad —“repetitive” — and hence they prefer to postpone taking important decisions to other days of the week. For many Iraqis this week, the news of Dr. Sinan al-Shabibi’s unfortunate passing on Saturday, Jan. 8 could not have come on a worse day. While the loss of one of Iraq’s last firmly independent voices, a respected economist and former central bank governor and someone who genuinely sought the country’s economic transformation, was ominous, in time the day may also become auspicious if his memory and legacy help to inspire a new generation of Iraqis to realize his aspirations for the country.

Saudi Arabia’s leviathan sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), has recently sold a 5% stake in the Saudi Telecom Company (STC). The firm is the largest and most profitable in the regional telecoms sector. The 3.2B USD sale, completed in early Dec. 2021, is yet another step in Riyadh’s privatization drive as part of its Vision 2030 agenda, and highlights the growing role of the Kingdom’s domestic financial sector.