Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is at its core an ideological army, not a national one, and its notorious enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history. But many Israelis to this day think Iran could be a natural partner as long as the country gave up its pursuit of ideologically driven regional dominance, disavow calls for the destruction of Israel, and were instead to again allow the regular army, the Artesh, to pursue Iranian national interests.
One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoys keeps visiting Iran. Igor Levitin, Putin’s advisor, has visited Tehran twice in 2023, totaling five visits in the last six months. During his latest visit, Levitin met with top Iranian figures, including Mohammad Mokhber, first vice president and top economic coordinator, and Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
Both historical and modern-day conflicts in the Middle East have all been centered around classical territorial considerations of the loss or recovery of land. Escaping that cycle required a shift away from one of the main root causes of conflict: geography. The current changes in the region, characterized by a significant drive toward de-escalation and a growing willingness to periodically part ways with traditional allies, may be telling symptoms of a profound tectonic shift toward “quantum politics.”
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
It has been long enough since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021 for us to reach some conclusions about how the regime intends to govern and the policy options this presents. For a variety of reasons the U.S. now finds itself drawn into several areas of policy in Afghanistan and trying to decide what form and degree of engagement with the Taliban government can best advance American interests.
When Saudi Arabia suddenly announced in early April that it would reduce its oil production by 500,000 bpd, followed shortly thereafter by several other OPEC+ members, bringing the total cut to 1.1 million bpd, Japan was greatly concerned. In spite of Japan’s serious efforts to work toward a carbon-neutral society, the country is still heavily dependent on oil, the overwhelming majority of which comes from the Persian Gulf.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”1 Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.
In recent years, Iraq has become one of the leading destinations for Chinese investments in the Middle East and a crucial link in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. To capitalize on its geostrategic location and central position within the Chinese BRI, Iraq is seeking to develop a sprawling new 54-square-kilometer port project, known as al-Faw Grand Port, which will reduce the country’s reliance on Arab Gulf ports and overland transit from Iran and Turkey. The project also underscores Iraq’s growing economic rivalry with neighboring Iran, as both countries seek to carve out a similar niche in handling regional transit traffic.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The multipolar moment has arrived in Pakistan’s backyard. Like China and India, Pakistan too is attempting its own geopolitical rebalancing. It seeks to revive ties with the United States and other Western countries. This pivot to the West comes after an earlier one to the East that began more than a decade ago. But, like the previous pivot, Pakistan’s efforts to rekindle ties with the West are unlikely to succeed unless it embraces the imperatives of economic reform and political stability.
After an intense round of secret negotiations between Iranian and Saudi representatives, facilitated by Chinese mediation, Tehran and Riyadh announced in mid-March that they would resume diplomatic relations. It is unclear if the Saudi-Iranian détente will last, but at least for now, China’s role in resolving this diplomatic stalemate seems to indicate the beginning of a multi-faceted de-Westernization process in the region.
The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.