بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.
While much of the discourse surrounding the Iron Dome controversy is mired in hysterics and hyperbole, some have put forward a more rational case for providing additional funding for it. One of the standard arguments advanced in recent days is that Iron Dome is crucial not only for saving Israeli lives but is equally important (perhaps even more so) for saving Palestinian lives. This claim has been echoed by numerous American and Israeli analysts and even Members of Congress, and seems to have been accepted by a number of journalists as well. But is it actually true?
For Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco has been touted as confirmation that U.S. policy in the Islamic world is doomed to fail. The immediate geopolitical and ideological gains, however, could be overshadowed by the potential challenges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan may pose for Iran’s security and regional interests in the long run.
China’s recent multi-sectoral engagements in Turkey suggest that the Black Sea region’s significance is on the rise in Beijing, and under President Erdoğan, Turkey has consistently sought its favor and investment.
Though aware of the weaknesses of the former Afghan government, none of the Central Asian governments seemed prepared for the rapidity and decisiveness of the Taliban victory. Not unreasonably, Central Asians fear that it will spur the growth of regional terrorism and extremism, either through direct Taliban sponsorship or inspiration. The five Central Asian states backed the anti-Taliban opposition in the 1990s and then the U.S.-led NATO military campaign in Afghanistan after 2001. Presently, the Central Asian governments are eschewing policies that could antagonize the new regime while looking for indications whether the Taliban have genuinely turned over a new leaf and renounced international terrorism. If they have, then some Central Asian countries seem open to economic and perhaps other cooperation. If not, Central Asians will likely rely on Russia for enhanced security support.
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?
We rarely miss an opportunity to criticize our Gulf Arab partners — sometimes rightly so — for not doing enough to safeguard collective interests. But one must acknowledge that on Afghanistan, and especially our just-completed exit from the country, most of our Gulf Arab partners absolutely shined. They deserve a ton of credit for the role they played in our large, challenging, and deadly evacuation — a role which was nothing short of indispensable.
Mick Mulroy and Ken Tovo join host Alistair Taylor to discuss their recent paper on how US intelligence and military operatives effectively collaborated with local Kurdish partners in Northern Iraq in the early 2000s, why it was a successful partnership, and what lessons it may provide for future operations. The paper, “Irregular Warfare: A Case Study in CIA and US Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002-03,” is available now on MEI’s website.
The failure of the Afghan army is a reminder that Pentagon-led security cooperation programs are more expensive and less effective than those led by spies.
A reinvigorated international approach to Yemen is possible. The current architecture for advancing a negotiated peace is being challenged by both international and local developments. The protracted nature of the conflict, the risk that it could worsen, and local political developments over the past two years necessitate a recalibration of the peace process, informed by realities on the ground, the urgent needs of the population, and the demand for security. Evolving coalition priorities, renewed U.S. engagement, and the appointment of a new U.N. special envoy may be an opportunity to advance conflict resolution. Achieving greater unity among southern actors will be key to the success of national-level talks and is urgently needed to prevent a further descent into violence, extremism, and humanitarian catastrophe.
Despite their unique characteristics and contexts, the Russian occupation of two regions in Georgia and its annexation of Crimea in Ukraine share a variety of similarities when it comes to the human rights situation on the ground.
At the dawn of the Biden era of American foreign policy, a more mature, realistic Saudi foreign policy is emerging to match the shifting signals from Washington. In some measure, the Saudis are readopting elements that traditionally characterized their policy preferences before the meteoric rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the kingdom’s de facto ruler.
Now as we watch this debacle unfold in our exit from Afghanistan, what lessons learned from Iraq should we apply today and is there still time? There are lessons learned from Iraq that are applicable in Afghanistan because although history does not repeat itself, it certainly rhymes a lot and yes, there is always time.
Since 1979 U.S. policies toward Iran have alternatively ranged from some version of “maximum pressure” to appeasement and back again while maintaining the same assumptions and calculus: the clerics would ultimately fall when the elite and middle class had enough and were willing to pay the price for revolting. Today, however, the landscape is evolving. While Iran’s leaders appear to be adapting, U.S. thinking is rooted in the past.
Suddenly and seemingly without warning, Russian forces amassed in Crimea and near the Ukrainian border in April 2021. Heavy armor, long-range missiles and artillery, modern air forces, and elite airborne infantry units deployed into positions that raised alarm in Ukraine and throughout Europe. The situation today appears stable, but reports of new and upgraded hardware, including unmanned vehicles, demand a fresh evaluation of the Russian way of war.