Research & Commentary Results

On June 6 Israel’s coalition government lost an important vote, in which more than half of the Knesset members on both sides voted against their own most fundamental beliefs in a desperate effort to either bring down the coalition or to save it. The substance of the legislation was barely more than a pretext, but the opposition smelled blood and was willing to do virtually anything to regain power.

The considerable financial shortfall experienced by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) over the past couple of years has measurably affected its morale, readiness, and operational capacity. There couldn’t be a worse time for the LAF to potentially fall apart. A series of monumental challenges await Lebanon now that the parliamentary elections are over, all of which demand a modicum of stability that only the LAF can provide.

On May 17, 2022, Iran inaugurated a drone factory in neighboring Tajikistan, its first drone production facility abroad. With this factory, Iran intends to reinforce bilateral relations and reduce recent tensions with Tajikistan, address shared security concerns on the Afghan border, boost profits in a growing export market, and complicate Israeli efforts to further sabotage its drone program.

Relations between the EU and the Gulf countries have been on life support for a long time. The two sides have become experts at talking past each other, blithely skidding from crisis to crisis. But on May 18, the EU made the first serious effort in a long time to bridge this gap, by introducing a proposal for a “Strategic Partnership with the Gulf.”

On May 19, Ghaida Rinawi Zoabi, one of Meretz’s two Arab Knesset members, announced she was leaving the governing coalition and her party. On May 22, however, it was announced that she had rejoined both. What happened and what does it tell us about the state of Israel’s fragile coalition government?

Palestinian Authority (PA) officials repeatedly deny acquiescing to the economic peace model with Israel, but such rhetoric is not reflected in their actions. In recent years integration between the Palestinian and Israeli economies has only deepened.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

In recent months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been on a charm offensive. But that spring in Turkey’s diplomacy may now be reverting to winter as Ankara has blocked Swedish and Finnish accession to NATO even as a key arms deal is pending with Washington and U.S. relations with Greece are at a high.

There are certain events that are so impactful that you remember exactly where you were and what you were doing when you heard about them. The killing of Shireen Abu Akleh, the veteran Al Jazeera journalist, last Wednesday in the occupied West Bank was for me just such an event — both because of who she was and what I was doing at the time. 

When Emmanuel Macron was elected president five years ago, many analysts wondered how it might affect France’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). At the time, France found itself at a crossroads, having to contend with the shift in U.S. policy toward the region during the presidency of Donald Trump, growing dissension within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), increasingly deteriorating relations with Iran, tensions with Turkey after the failed 2016 coup, and ongoing bloodshed in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, all while conducting a military campaign against ISIS. Following Macron’s recent reelection to a second term, the key question now is whether he will maintain or change his current policy toward the region.

On Feb. 28, Turkey triggered the Montreux Convention, not used since World War II, and closed the Turkish Straits to military ships. This one move interrupted Russia’s maritime logistical supply line to Syria, interfered with its ability to rotate naval assets in the Mediterranean, and prevented Moscow from bringing additional warships to the Black Sea. Russia can no longer supply its Syria operation or deliver defense exports to its customers using navy ships. However, close observation of traffic through the Turkish Straits reveals that Russia is continuing its naval operations in the Mediterranean and Black seas.

Relations between Washington and some of its traditional Gulf Arab partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are at their lowest point in history, which is why the Biden administration on Monday sent a high-level delegation to Abu Dhabi: specifically to pay respects upon the death of former UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and to congratulate his successor, Mohamed bin Zayed, but more generally to try to heal those ties.

This article describes Saudi Arabia’s historic and arduous journey to national-defense transformation, launched around 2015. It analyzes the challenges and opportunities of defense reform in the kingdom while highlighting the role of the United States in this process. Last, the article discusses the future of US-Saudi defense relations.

In September 2021, a year after the Abraham Accords were signed by Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (Morocco and Sudan joined a few weeks later), U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken spoke enthusiastically of Arab-Israeli collaborations already under way in various domains including energy, health care, technology, medicine, and tourism.

A senior Chinese military delegation landed in Iran for a visit in late April. The readouts from Tehran were rather dull, but there is more to this visit than meets the eye. While a new “axis” may not necessarily be forming, there are troubling trendlines that Western policymakers need to counter.