Why have authors revisited it over the decades through literary works, and what makes it appealing to international readers?
What these attacks and many others in the region have in common is Iran’s irrefutable involvement. They may have different local contexts and their perpetrators, all loyal to Iran, may have different motivations, but every single one of those attacks was possible only because Iran provided either the weapons or the know-how to assemble and use them.
On Dec. 23, Jordanian Minister of Industry, Trade, and Supply Yousef Shamali and Russia’s Ambassador to Jordan Gleb Desyatnikov attended a ceremony to finalize a bilateral cooperation agreement on science, culture, and education. This agreement highlights Jordan’s delicate foreign policy balancing act. The government, led by King Abdullah II, will continue to work with a diverse group of countries, even those with tense relations with the West, to bolster its security and economic opportunities. Mitigating security threats and increasing business opportunities is key to political stability and the continuation of the king’s rule amid Jordan’s persistent socio-economic problems. However, the king will need to be careful not to undermine his closest allies by working with their adversaries.
Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?
يوم 17 يناير/كانون الثاني، نفذ الحوثيون هجومًا آخر استهدف منشأة نفطية إماراتية في أبوظبي، ما أدى إلى مقتل ثلاثة وافدين، وإلحاق أضرار بالبنية التحتية. ظاهريًا، يبدو أنهم يذكَّرون الإماراتيين بمدى ضعفهم وإمكانية الإضرار بهم إذا استمرت الهجمات ضد مصالح الحوثيين في اليمن. وبحسب ما ورد، كانت وسائل الهجوم عبارة عن طائرات مسيرة، وهي أداة بسيطة غير متماثلة متاحة للكثيرين واستخدمها الحوثيون على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة. لسوء الحظ فإن القصة هنا قد أصبحت مألوفة للغاية وتتطلب استجابة متسقة الآن. ففي نهاية المطاف، من المرجح أن يتم نسخ وتكرار ما أصبح روتينيًا في الخليج في مواقع أخرى.
While a negotiated agreement by the parties to deescalate militarily and return to the negotiating table would be the preferred outcome, there’s little or no reason to believe that the Houthis, who have responded to their losses in Shabwa by escalating their attacks, are yet interested in talking. Rather, by issuing pleas for de-escalation, the international community risks sending the Houthis yet another message that their intransigence, which is the root cause of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Yemenis, will be rewarded by new pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to limit its response to Houthi aggression. In this regard, the Biden administration, with its international partners, risks repeating the failed strategy of 2021.
إن التوترات الاقتصادية والسياسية القائمة منذ فترة طويلة بين الولايات المتحدة والصين تستمر في الامتداد إلى قطاع التكنولوجيا، حيث جعلت القوتان العظمتان هذه الصناعة الحيوية أكثر من أي وقت مضى مسرحًا لحرب باردة جديدة. يبدو أن حدة التوتر ستزداد سوءًا في الفترة القادمة، مما قد يؤدي إلى ما وصفه البعض بانشقاق العديد من العُقَد المترابطة فيما يتعلق بتصنيع التكنولوجيا وتطويرها.
On Jan. 10, the governor of Shabwa announced its liberation from the Iran-backed Houthis. This victory followed a seemingly successful Houthi military campaign over the past couple of years to expand their influence around the city of Marib, weaken the internationally-backed government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and solidify their grasp on strategic northern areas. However, while significant, the victory in Shabwa is unlikely to be replicated in the rest of the country, given the very specific political and regional dynamics that helped to bring it about. Moreover, the Houthis’ drone attack on Abu Dhabi on Jan. 17 presents a further challenge to the advance of pro-UAE forces into Marib.
Look to the people of the region first, then the evolving competition among regional states and global powers, for signs on what to expect.
On Jan. 17, the Houthis perpetrated another attack, targeting an Emirati oil facility in Abu Dhabi, killing three international citizens, and damaging infrastructure. The story here is unfortunately all too familiar and begs a coherent response now. After all, what is becoming routine in the Gulf will likely be copied and repeated in other locations.
إن استراتيجية المملكة العربية السعودية لزيادة محفظتها من الأصول النظيفة والمتجددة قد تم تعزيزها في عام 2021، حيث شهدت المملكة العديد من عمليات تمويل المشاريع في قطاع الطاقة الشمسية وأطلقت صندوق البنية التحتية الوطني لتنويع اقتصادها.
Saudi Arabia’s leviathan sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), has recently sold a 5% stake in the Saudi Telecom Company (STC). The firm is the largest and most profitable in the regional telecoms sector. The 3.2B USD sale, completed in early Dec. 2021, is yet another step in Riyadh’s privatization drive as part of its Vision 2030 agenda, and highlights the growing role of the Kingdom’s domestic financial sector.
Saudi Arabia’s strategy to push through its portfolio of clean and renewables assets was further strengthened in 2021 as the kingdom witnessed several project financings in the solar sector and launched the National Infrastructure Fund (NIF) to diversify its economy.
On Nov. 22, the Dubai Expo hosted an event where the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, and Israel signed a cooperation agreement that would broker an exchange of renewable energy and water between Jordan and Israel. The signing of the agreement between the respective minsters of the three countries took place in the presence of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and U.S. Climate Envoy John Kerry, who played a role in getting the deal done.
