The killing of Qassem Soleimani: Was there a better way?
In the early hours of Jan. 3, 2020, a U.S. Military MQ-9 drone fired multiple air-to-ground missiles and killed the commander of the elite Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds Force, Major General Qassem Soleimani. The targeted killing of Soleimani was carried out as he left the Baghdad International Airport under overt military authorities. Given that the strike was carried out under this authority, it was publicized globally shortly after it was completed. There were other options available to target Soleimani, however.
While yesterday’s vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives on a decision to remove U.S. forces is not legally binding, it creates dynamics inside the U.S. and Iraq that make a U.S. decision to remove its forces all but inevitable.
How we planted the seeds of war with Iran: Decisions made in Washington brought us to this fateful moment
For almost 40 years, American national security officials have looked down the barrel of the gun of war with Iran. I sat in rooms in the White House and Pentagon several times as small groups of senior officials considered what such a war would look like, how it would end, and whether we would be better off for having fought it.
The answer was always the same: It would be highly destructive in several nations, it would end in a stalemate with the Iranian regime in place, and nothing positive would have been accomplished.
Just when we thought we had a good understanding of President Donald Trump’s Middle East policy — which boils down to “get out of the region and avoid another endless war there” — he pulls off something dramatic like this.
After a career in the military with a lot of time spent in this region, I have learned that you must respect your adversaries and their ability to hurt us.
In the wake of the airstrike, there have been many calls inside Iraq for restraint among Iraqis and between the Americans and the Iranians, most notably from the Shi’a clerical establishment in Najaf. There is a wide consensus in Iraq that the country should not be at the center of an American-Iranian military fight.
The killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, was a major and unexpected blow to the Iranian leadership. It punctured the aura of invincibility and the hubris that have characterized Soleimani and his colleagues’ behavior.
Introduced in August and subsequently delayed due to the country’s political upheaval, the National Lebanese Strategy for Cybersecurity is composed of two main sections: 1) preparation of a cybersecurity strategy and 2) establishment of a national cybersecurity agency.
The three uprisings in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon represent the revolt of a new generation seeking to build a better future for itself. Since 2011, there have been 11 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. All 11 uprisings have similar drivers: the explosive dysfunction of high demographic growth, low levels of economic development and job creation, poor government performance and services, and high levels of corruption and inequality.
Political analyst Hafsa Halawa and MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the political crisis in Iraq following the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, the protest movements that have rocked both Iraq and Iran, and the impact of Iranian impact in Baghdad on Iraq’s development going forward.
Hezbollah and Amal change tactics and ratchet up violence amid ongoing protests
While Hezbollah has largely remained immune to criticism, owing to its widely perceived role as an effective resistance movement against Israeli aggression, the powerful Iran-backed Shi’a militia and political party is now viewed by many demonstrators as part of the corrupt and morally bankrupt political establishment that must be replaced. Against this backdrop, supporters of Hezbollah and its Shi’a ally the Amal Movement have been quick to resort to violence.
