From Morocco to Afghanistan, the scholars and experts at MEI take a closer look at how the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Middle East.
On March 9, Afghanistan’s sitting president, Ashraf Ghani, took the oath of office for a second term. However, on the same day the country’s chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, also declared himself president at a rival swearing-in ceremony. The controversy has plunged the country into further political uncertainty and potential chaos, dashing hopes of an immediate return to peace following the historic U.S.-Taliban deal on Feb. 29.
On Feb. 12, the director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergei Naryshkin, made an official visit to Oman. During his trip to Muscat, Naryshkin engaged with senior Omani officials on strategies to de-escalate tensions in the Persian Gulf, counterterrorism cooperation, and approaches to conflict resolution in Syria and Yemen.
With intra-Afghan talks in question, the peace process appears in limbo.
It is a near truism that U.S. relations with Pakistan have been historically unstable, waxing and waning, climbing to heights of interdependence and sinking to mutual recrimination. Yet this is presently a period unmarked by either high promise or driven by crisis. Rather than a reason, however, for leaving the relationship untouched and unexamined, this can be a time of unusual opportunity to create a more deliberative approach to thinking about the bilateral relationship and for shaping fresh initiatives.
While President Ashraf Ghani’s regime refuses to give ground, the risk of nationwide disturbances is very real.
Whatever else it may do, the pending agreement is intended to provide the political cover for a U.S. departure from Afghanistan at an opportune time with this an election year.
The picture of how the two Pakistani Taliban leaders died is hazy and who killed them uncertain.
The passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said on Jan. 10 truly marks the end of an era.
18 years after CIA and U.S. special operations elements touched down in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, ongoing, incremental troop reductions reveal the smoke and mirrors manner in which the U.S. is withdrawing from the conflict in lieu of a negotiated settlement.
The announcement of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said’s passing on Jan. 10 marked the end of an era. Now that the Arab world lost its longest-serving leader, none of the Gulf states has a ruler that was on the throne when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981. Most Omanis have never known another leader and this transition period, marked by three days of mourning, is an emotional time for those in the sultanate.
The Taliban still apparently balk at an accord that makes any provision for the retention of an American counter-terrorism force.
Over the past five years, the focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategists has remained on the Middle East, especially after the emergence of ISIS in 2014, while Islamist terrorist organizations operating in South Asia have been considered a secondary threat. However, the fact remains that South Asia is home to more Islamist terrorist organizations than any other region of the world. Al-Qaeda was born there, in Afghanistan, and ISIS has roots in the region. But at the turn of the decade both global jihadist groups are now facing major challenges and the critical question is whether they will manage to survive this period of crisis amid a severe leadership vacuum following the death of ISIS’s supreme leader and caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the killing of al-Qaeda heir apparent Hamza bin Laden.
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.
The commitment by its foreign benefactors to underwrite the Afghan regime’s viability and ability to withstand Taliban insurgency is in serious doubt.