Research & Commentary Results

Since Aug. 13, speculation has been rife that the Sultanate of Oman will soon follow the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) lead and formalize full-fledged ties with Israel. Yet, at least thus far, Muscat has refused to join the UAE, Bahrain, and now Sudan in normalizing relations with Tel Aviv. As a moderate Arab country, where tolerance is firmly embedded into the national ethos and the Ibadi sect of Islam, Oman appears to be maintaining a balanced position on the overall Arab trend toward normalizing relations with Israel. Muscat’s positive reaction to the Abraham Accords is not a major change in strategy and is more illustrative of Oman’s longstanding position on normalization.

The upcoming American presidential election is top of mind for the Arab Gulf states. This is no surprise as there is so much at stake for them. As the race enters its final critical week, all eyes are on who will occupy the White House for the next four years — and the Arab Gulf states have their preferences. America is still indispensable to Gulf security, but the Gulf is also becoming an indispensable regional partner for whoever wants to lead the world in the 21st century. Today both sides need each other more than ever before.

With the announcement that Kuwait’s long-time ruler, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, had passed away, on Sept. 29, at the age of 91, the Gulf states lost their second senior statesman of 2020 following the death of Sultan Qaboos of Oman at the beginning of the year. Like Qaboos, Sheikh Sabah played an outsized role within the GCC as well as in regional and international affairs.

Last September, at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani proposed the optimistically named “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” (HOPE). Over the past year, however, Iran’s plan has failed to gain any traction with the GCC states, even as the region’s security environment has fundamentally changed in ways that are detrimental to the Islamic Republic.

On September 15, President Trump presided over a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Abdullatif Al Zayani, respectively, signed a general declaration of principles, called “The Abraham Accords.” Numerous analysts have focused on the regional impact of the normalization of relations between Israel and these two Gulf Arab countries. However, this development has worldwide geopolitical implications — including for China.

Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have initiated a process that, if it comes to fruition, will bring about the normalization of relations between the two countries. The broader geostrategic challenges that the agreement could pose for Israel and the UAE have not been part of the public discourse, however, and any balanced treatment requires a discussion of those aspects as well.

In an Aug. 13 tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated the Israeli-Emirati accord to normalize relations as a “HUGE breakthrough.” Israel’s integration into the region has been a goal of U.S. and Israeli foreign policy for decades, and the mid-August announcement was the first major official step in that direction in over 25 years. But is this really a game changer for Israel’s strategy in the Middle East?

As unimportant as the move may seem for Yemen, the UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel and patronage of the STC, if left unaddressed, may ultimately lead to undesirable outcomes for both Yemen and the broader Arab world

In a new briefing book released ahead of the U.S. elections in November, entitled Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East, MEI scholars lay out key issues across the region, highlight the U.S. interests at stake, and provide policy insights and recommendations for the path forward. 

On Feb. 16, 2015, then British Ambassador to Yemen Jane Marriott wrote an article titled “Yemen: the ball is in the Houthis’ court,” asserting that the future of the country and its stability were dependent on the Houthis.

The U.S.-China rivalry is in uncharted territory. There is no clearer example of this than the U.S.’s intensifying and increasingly global fight with Chinese company Huawei over the security of 5G.

On Aug. 14, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in exchange for a suspension of Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. International reactions to this historic deal were sharply polarized, but the two main strategic rivals of the United States, Russia and China, responded cautiously to the announcement.

MEI’s Gerald Feierstein and Mick Mulroy join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the country faces crises on multiple fronts, from the unchecked spread of COVID-19 and widespread hunger to renewed fighting and a lack of international funding.

Oman’s independent and creative foreign policy has been a boost to a region fraught with instability, but the combination of a new sultan and an adverse regional environment means Muscat’s trademark foreign policy may be diminished.

The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries-old and complex. While the world’s attention is focused mainly on the “great power competition” in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa.