A need for mediation in Lebanon as the government and protestors reach a standstill
It remains to be seen how resilient the protest movement is and how long it can remain mobilized for, especially if political leaders refuse to change their stance.
It remains to be seen how resilient the protest movement is and how long it can remain mobilized for, especially if political leaders refuse to change their stance.
As protestors take to the streets across the country, Lebanon appears to be heading towards an economic meltdown with severe consequences for Lebanese citizens of all walks of life. We are concerned that failure to tackle current problems immediately and comprehensively could result in spiraling unemployment, uncontrollable inflation, more social unrest, civil strife and a severe deterioration in public health services and other basic resources.
The launch of Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria on Oct. 9 represents an existential threat for the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria (AANES) and Kurdish parties in Syria as a whole, prompting Kurdish political factions, both within Syria and abroad, to reevaluate their survival strategies and alliances. This report explores the various political factions within the Kurdish coalitions in Syria as they functioned under the AANES and the major rifts between them. Even under these dire circumstances Kurdish political factions in Syria have responded to the Turkish invasion independently.
On Sept. 25, Lebanese President Michel Aoun told the UN General Assembly that Lebanon is prepared to welcome any country’s help in demarcating its land and maritime borders. He was referring to Lebanon’s decades-old border dispute with Israel, the resolution of which has become increasingly important as the country inches closer toward its first oil and gas drilling operations later this year.
MEI experts Paul Salem, Randa Slim, and Bilal Saab join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the massive uprising that has swept across Lebanon since last weekend, including what’s driving the protests, how the government has responded so far, and where things may go from here.
Lebanon’s current uprising, larger than the Cedar Revolution and rooted in long-held socio-economic grievances, has united protestors across the country in calls for fundamental political change. And this time, Shiites have joined the struggle. This is not a good outcome for Hezbollah — nothing threatens it more than discord within the Shi’a community — and it now finds itself in uncharted territory.
Deep political, familial, and religious ties have allowed Druze communities across the Levant to remain largely unified against external threats, but eight years of violence in Syria and a coordinated campaign by the regime and its allies now threaten to destabilize regional Druze politics and erode the sect’s political and military power. An Iranian-backed campaign by Hezbollah to incite inter-Druze violence in Lebanon has curtailed this unity, laying the groundwork for Hezbollah to expand into Syria’s Suwayda province with impunity.
If the crowds continue to take to the streets, Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation seems inevitable, but what comes next is a big question mark.
Something had to give. Decades of corruption and criminal mismanagement by Lebanon’s ruling elites — the same clique who have governed the country since its independence in 1943 — have finally led to an economic implosion and a social explosion.
“We reached a level of injustice we could no longer take. For every action, there is a reaction,” explained one civil society activist following the Oct. 1 outbreak of protests in Baghdad and central and southern Iraq.
Upon arriving in Beijing on September 19 at the head of a 55-member delegation, Iraq Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi described the visit to China as heralding a “quantum leap” in bilateral relations. The five-day visit culminated in the signing of eight wide-ranging memoranda of understanding (MoUs), a framework credit agreement, and the announcement of plans for Iraq to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, however, a wave of angry anti-government protests have swept across much of Iraq, leaving more than 100 dead and thousands wounded — a vivid reminder of the country’s ongoing struggle for stability and of the obstacles to the further consolidation of China-Iraq relations.
On Sept. 16, the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the resolution of the Syrian civil war. In all three countries, the Ankara summit was hailed as a major success, as negotiations on the formation of a Syrian constitutional committee concluded and progress was made toward resolving other outstanding challenges, such as the future of northeastern Syria and the ongoing struggle for Idlib.
For now, both Najaf and Tehran seemed to have a convergence of interests on preserving the post-2003 political order.
MEI senior fellows Randa Slim and Robert Ford join host Alistair Taylor to discuss observations from their recent trip to Baghdad and Erbil, where they met with senior Iraqi government officials and policy experts and witnessed numerous positive developments as the country emerges from a long-standing climate of violent conflict.
Iraq’s current public service regime is struggling to deliver on desperately needed services in part due to the issue of establishing a functioning federal state system across the country. Far more attention needs to be devoted to institutions and how those operating within them can deliver those services. One way to do this is to decentralize service provision to the governorates not incorporated into a region. However, this process has been hampered by administration, fiscal, and political issues. Identifying these and seeking solutions to resolve them will be key. This paper addresses the decentralization process, specifically focusing on the issues surrounding the governorates not incorporated into a region, as per Law 21.