This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Maxim A. Suchkov, Ibrahim Jalal, Eliza Campbell, Alex Vatanka, and Marvin G. Weinbaum.
Last September, at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani proposed the optimistically named “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” (HOPE). Over the past year, however, Iran’s plan has failed to gain any traction with the GCC states, even as the region’s security environment has fundamentally changed in ways that are detrimental to the Islamic Republic.
On September 15, President Trump presided over a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Abdullatif Al Zayani, respectively, signed a general declaration of principles, called “The Abraham Accords.” Numerous analysts have focused on the regional impact of the normalization of relations between Israel and these two Gulf Arab countries. However, this development has worldwide geopolitical implications — including for China.
Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have initiated a process that, if it comes to fruition, will bring about the normalization of relations between the two countries. The broader geostrategic challenges that the agreement could pose for Israel and the UAE have not been part of the public discourse, however, and any balanced treatment requires a discussion of those aspects as well.
In an Aug. 13 tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated the Israeli-Emirati accord to normalize relations as a “HUGE breakthrough.” Israel’s integration into the region has been a goal of U.S. and Israeli foreign policy for decades, and the mid-August announcement was the first major official step in that direction in over 25 years. But is this really a game changer for Israel’s strategy in the Middle East?
As unimportant as the move may seem for Yemen, the UAE’s normalization of relations with Israel and patronage of the STC, if left unaddressed, may ultimately lead to undesirable outcomes for both Yemen and the broader Arab world
In a new briefing book released ahead of the U.S. elections in November, entitled Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East, MEI scholars lay out key issues across the region, highlight the U.S. interests at stake, and provide policy insights and recommendations for the path forward.
On Feb. 16, 2015, then British Ambassador to Yemen Jane Marriott wrote an article titled “Yemen: the ball is in the Houthis’ court,” asserting that the future of the country and its stability were dependent on the Houthis.
The U.S.-China rivalry is in uncharted territory. There is no clearer example of this than the U.S.’s intensifying and increasingly global fight with Chinese company Huawei over the security of 5G.
On Aug. 14, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in exchange for a suspension of Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. International reactions to this historic deal were sharply polarized, but the two main strategic rivals of the United States, Russia and China, responded cautiously to the announcement.
MEI’s Gerald Feierstein and Mick Mulroy join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the country faces crises on multiple fronts, from the unchecked spread of COVID-19 and widespread hunger to renewed fighting and a lack of international funding.
Oman’s independent and creative foreign policy has been a boost to a region fraught with instability, but the combination of a new sultan and an adverse regional environment means Muscat’s trademark foreign policy may be diminished.
The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries-old and complex. While the world’s attention is focused mainly on the “great power competition” in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa.
When the Saudi-led coalition launched military operations against the Houthi insurgents on March 26, 2015, all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, except for Oman, joined the multinational force. As has become clear, each of the Arab Gulf sheikdoms has its own national interests and unique history of relations with Yemen and Yemeni factions, and these have shaped their changing perceptions of the war over the past five and a half years. Kuwait’s role in Yemen’s multidimensional conflict is a case in point.
As many of the Gulf states pivot away from oil and gas, they have turned to digital development as a way to attract foreign investment and spur domestic growth. A critical part of these digital transformations is the widespread adoption of 5th generation mobile communication networks (5G). Large-scale investment in 5G rollouts in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain reflect this reality.