Research & Commentary Results

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, vital to the global supply of both oil and liquefied natural gas. The issue of freedom of navigation in the strait has long been a source of tension, but until recently any attempt by Iran to physically close it looked highly implausible, unless it resulted from either a major embargo or total blockade of Iranian ports by the West, or a large-scale military confrontation. However, the events of the past three years showed Iran can still ensure a major disruption of the flow of energy without a formal blockade and without an increased risk of military confrontation with the West. Iran has a variety of means at its disposal, especially through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval forces, and the Iranians make no secret of their desire to be recognized as the dominant military power in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

During the National Day of Villages and Nomads in Iran on Oct. 6, President Ebrahim Raisi visited Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province and spoke about combatting rural deprivation, an issue that has become central to Raisi’s domestic agenda.

Mohammed Alsulami and Kasra Aarabi join Banafsheh Keynoush to discuss the latest talks between long-time regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. Several rounds of talks between Riyadh and Tehran been held in Baghdad since April. They are taking place amid a broader regional trend toward deconfliction and as negotiations in Vienna over the revival of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal appear to have bogged down.

More episodes

In recent years, Israel has waged a campaign against the military buildup of its enemies, mainly Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. This ongoing effort is called “the campaign between the wars,” or the Mabam Campaign. Several events in recent weeks have given rise to questions about the effectiveness of this campaign, however, and have underscored the need to rethink its future.

Iran is a neighboring country for Saudi Arabia and we from the Gulf states respect its people and culture, sharing many similarities as nations throughout different historical periods. However, there are, unfortunately, profound disagreements that have significantly increased since the 1979 revolution because of Tehran’s foreign policy approach based on ideological promotion and projection.

The government of President Ebrahim Raisi has been in place since early August and yet Tehran is still unsure about when and how it should resume the nuclear talks with world powers in Vienna.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

Women in higher positions within the Iranian state who are loyal to the system of the Islamic Republic and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s leadership are dissatisfied with the new government under President Ebrahim Raisi, and especially with its composition. They had expressed their hopes that with women accounting for half of Iran’s population, they could be responsible for at least one of the ministries in the cabinet. Instead, Raisi’s government, approved by parliament at the end of August, is made up of conservatives and includes not a single woman. What impact is that likely to have on support among women who back the system? Will these women fight for greater political participation within the government or become disillusioned with it? And what consequences might that have for the Iranian state in the longer run?

Grievances have been piling up unaddressed in Tihama, Yemen’s Red Sea coastal plain, for almost a hundred years. Since the revolt of al-Zaraniq against Imam Yahya Hameed al-Din of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom (then North Yemen) in 1925-26, consecutive Imams and the republican elite have pursued policies that have systematically marginalized the Tihamis. They have been deprived of a fair share of their region’s wealth, as well as opportunities for equitable power-sharing and economic empowerment.

Iran’s new conservative government under President Ebrahim Raisi has based its approach to the nuclear talks for the revival of the 2015 JCPOA on three key documents that lay out clear directives.

Iran-Azerbaijan relations have been going through a rough patch recently; both sides have genuine concerns that they want addressed.

After three years of decline and instability, the Iranian economy has stabilized. Some of the macroeconomic indicators, especially inflation, remain worrying, but the country’s GDP has returned to marginal growth, which is a reminder that the economy has been resilient in the face of massive external and internal pressures. Experts agree that the diversity of economic activity has been the key reason for this resilience. This piece explores three potential medium-term scenarios: 1) A return to the JCPOA; 2) An interim deal that would ease the sanctions pressure; and 3) A continuation of the current sanctions regime.

Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are high right now but both sides will very likely soon step down. Neither Tehran nor Baku can afford to let recent events lead to a full-fledged crisis or a military showdown between the two Shi’a Muslim-majority countries. On the surface, this latest spat is about Azerbaijan’s resentment toward Iran for providing an economic lifeline through trade and transit options to its landlocked arch nemesis, Armenia. In reality, the split that underpins the ongoing Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions is more about fundamental foreign policy choices that Tehran and Baku have each made and are unlikely to reverse.

It was another hot, dry year in the western U.S., with almost the entire region in drought. Vital reservoirs have fallen to dangerous lows. More than 7,000 miles away, Iran is grappling with water problems that are similar to the U.S. Southwest’s but more severe.

The new government of Iran, under President Ebrahim Raisi, still looks like a black box. It isn’t yet clear what policy the new officials in Tehran want to pursue in the nuclear negotiations — or even if they will negotiate at all. Hossein Amirabdollahian, Iran’s new foreign minister, shed some light on this darkness and said that “consultations are underway within the new Iranian government on how to continue the Vienna nuclear talks.” It appears the “consultations” have reached a meaningful point and the replacement of key positions has begun in the foreign policy apparatus. As a first move, Ali Bagheri Kani, a conservative close to former top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, replaced Abbas Araghchi, the political deputy foreign minister. The emerging new team in Tehran looks strange not only to the U.S. and Europe, but also to Russia.