Iran came one step closer to becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) last week with the approval of its bid, 15 years after it first applied. The accession process is expected to take up to two years to complete.
Iulia Sabina-Joja and Alex Vatanka join the program to discuss Iranian foreign policy and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Amid growing concerns about the regional repercussions of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the SCO met for its 20th anniversary summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 16th and 17th. Regional security cooperation and Iranian accession were at the top of the agenda, with Iran formally joining the organization as a full member on September 17th.
For Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco has been touted as confirmation that U.S. policy in the Islamic world is doomed to fail. The immediate geopolitical and ideological gains, however, could be overshadowed by the potential challenges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan may pose for Iran’s security and regional interests in the long run.
The images of desperate Afghan citizens trying to leave their country, beyond highlighting a massive human tragedy, may become a symbol of the so-called war on terror. Many of those Afghans already understand the feeling of abandoning their homes, because their families experienced it. They know what happens when foreign armies withdraw from their country and the tragedies that can ensue. The difference this time, however, was the deadline — only a few weeks.
Ebrahim Raisi, the eighth president of Iran, has taken over at a time when the Islamic Republic is facing a series of major potential crises. Over the next several decades, these crises could have consequences that will not only affect Iran itself, but may reverberate across the region as well. This article will address the 13 crises facing Raisi’s government and Iranian society more broadly.
In the June 2021 elections, the Iranian presidency was handed to Ebrahim Raisi on a silver platter. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made sure the election process was engineered, down to the smallest detail, for a shoo-in Raisi victory. For Raisi, this is something of a double-edged sword. At a minimum, it means policy continuity in Tehran, including in the realm of hybrid military-economic affairs. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) will not only continue to have a free hand to shape Iran’s military and regional agenda, but it will also return to center-stage as far as economic planning is concerned. The same thing happened during the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; he too gave the IRGC an free hand — a decision that he later came to regret. Raisi has no choice though. His political fortunes rest on continued support from Khamenei and the IRGC. Don’t expect him to unveil any trailblazing policies anytime soon.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
With Iran, American policymakers have often chased phantoms in search of solutions to problems they did not understand. This futile shadow-chase continues when “experts” argue that the U.S. should somehow encourage the break-up of Iran on ethnic or linguistic lines. This idea is simply wrong.
Elisabeth Kendall and Nadwa al-Dawsari join Charles Lister to discuss Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its place in Yemen’s persistent internal conflict.
On Aug. 25, Iran’s parliament voted on the cabinet of its new president, Ebrahim Raisi, approving 18 out of the 19 ministers put forward. Raisi’s government is full of revolutionaries likely to adopt a hardline approach to domestic and international affairs, leading to heightened geopolitical risk and potentially prolonging the country’s economic crisis.
Under President Ebrahim Raisi, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is poised to exert greater control over Iran’s national security agenda and economy. Several of his ministers and advisors were members of the IRGC or have connections to it.
A reinvigorated international approach to Yemen is possible. The current architecture for advancing a negotiated peace is being challenged by both international and local developments. The protracted nature of the conflict, the risk that it could worsen, and local political developments over the past two years necessitate a recalibration of the peace process, informed by realities on the ground, the urgent needs of the population, and the demand for security. Evolving coalition priorities, renewed U.S. engagement, and the appointment of a new U.N. special envoy may be an opportunity to advance conflict resolution. Achieving greater unity among southern actors will be key to the success of national-level talks and is urgently needed to prevent a further descent into violence, extremism, and humanitarian catastrophe.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Many analysts oversimplify the political conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia as one driven by sectarianism or Shi’a-Sunni tensions that has shaped the two states’ outlook and actions in the Middle East. However, their political differences are actually much more complex and deeper rooted.
The July 29 suicide drone attack on the Israeli oil tanker Mercer Street, which left two British and Romanian crewmembers dead in the Arabian Sea, was carried out by Iran and was intended to cause human casualties and physical damage, according to the investigative report from U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM). While Tehran denied any hand in the strike, the G7 directly blamed Iran and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised a “collective response.”