Research & Commentary Results

Beset by severe socioeconomic grievances, Algeria is now facing the most challenging economic situation since the 1988 October Riots, when thousands of young people took to the streets to protest an economic crisis caused by the decline in oil prices, austerity measures, and a youth bulge that led to mass unemployment. The latest food shortages are not the first, however, and given the administration’s current approach, they are unlikely to be the last. While the authorities have blamed business owners and even consumer behavior for the crisis, the underlying drivers are more systemic and structural.

Jordan has the lowest rate of women’s economic participation of any country not at war. According to the ILO, the kingdom’s female labor force participation rate is below 15%, while that of men is about 60%. This is lower than rates of female labor force participation in neighboring Lebanon (23%), Saudi Arabia (22%), and the West Bank and Gaza (18%). As the COVID-19 pandemic stretches on, the government of Jordan should take the opportunity to expand the accessibility of remote work and corresponding opportunities for Jordanian women who aim to play a role in their nation’s economy.

Lebanon is currently at a crossroads as the government faces the daunting tasks of rebuilding the economy, restoring public trust, and clearing the way for free and fair parliamentary elections in May of 2022. The country finds itself spiraling downward — an agreement with the IMF is yet to be realized, poverty and emigration are increasing, and there are growing threats to stability due to a failing economy and widespread corruption. Given this critical situation, it is worthwhile to review U.S. interests in Lebanon’s survival and consider key recommendations for U.S. policy to help Lebanon avoid complete collapse and help the Lebanese people move toward economic recovery, political legitimacy, and a more capable, transparent, and sovereign state.

When addressing security challenges in the Middle East, the United States must re-examine how it engages with and views women’s potential security contributions.

Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.

Saudi Arabia has undergone tremendous social change in recent years, but it has struggled to make good on some of its more ambitious financial goals. Much of the promised foreign direct investment has yet to arrive, and the kingdom’s growth agenda has drained its foreign reserves. Most of Mohammed bin Salman’s more eye-catching promises, including futuristic urban megaprojects, remain unfinished.

Ethiopia is Iran’s gateway to the Horn of Africa and the broader East Africa region. By helping Ethiopia in its ongoing conflict with the rebel Tigray Defense Forces, which represent the Tigray ethnic minority, Iran is preserving its so-called strategic depth in the region to bolster its influence.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Vladimir Putin in the 1990s, military and economic relations between Iran and Russia have improved, as their tensions with the West have intensified. One aspect of the relationship that has received little attention is their growing economic and trade cooperation involving the production, export, and import of halal meat and other products since 2015.

What these attacks and many others in the region have in common is Iran’s irrefutable involvement. They may have different local contexts and their perpetrators, all loyal to Iran, may have different motivations, but every single one of those attacks was possible only because Iran provided either the weapons or the know-how to assemble and use them.

As Russia amasses more than 100,000 troops along Ukraine’s borders, the Kremlin is holding the country at gunpoint while imposing outrageous demands on the West. NATO has never attacked Russia, while Moscow has waged wars against Georgia and Ukraine and still occupies their lands and militarizes the Black Sea.

On Jan. 13, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressed alarm that millions of Afghans are on the “verge of death” thanks to a lethal brew of “freezing temperatures and frozen assets.” This was no idle warning. Notwithstanding the decline in fighting following the Taliban’s victory in August 2021, Afghanistan’s economy is in a deepening spiral of impoverishment and destitution.

Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?

يوم 17 يناير/كانون الثاني، نفذ الحوثيون هجومًا آخر استهدف منشأة نفطية إماراتية في أبوظبي، ما أدى إلى مقتل ثلاثة وافدين، وإلحاق أضرار بالبنية التحتية. ظاهريًا، يبدو أنهم يذكَّرون الإماراتيين بمدى ضعفهم وإمكانية الإضرار بهم إذا استمرت الهجمات ضد مصالح الحوثيين في اليمن. وبحسب ما ورد، كانت وسائل الهجوم عبارة عن طائرات مسيرة، وهي أداة بسيطة غير متماثلة متاحة للكثيرين واستخدمها الحوثيون على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة. لسوء الحظ فإن القصة هنا قد أصبحت مألوفة للغاية وتتطلب استجابة متسقة الآن. ففي نهاية المطاف، من المرجح أن يتم نسخ وتكرار ما أصبح روتينيًا في الخليج في مواقع أخرى.

Iran’s new president, Ebrahim Raisi, has presented his first draft budget bill for the upcoming Iranian year (1401), which starts on March 21, 2022. Rather than facilitating a much-needed economic recovery, the proposed budget is designed to strengthen the regime’s power base and impose austerity while keeping society under control.

In the past several months, Biden administration officials have been pushing back against an encroaching narrative that the United States has abandoned the Middle East. But deepening partnerships built on a shared threat are not enough to assuage the concerns of all valuable allies in the region given the increasing perceptions of U.S. unreliability. To address these concerns, the U.S. needs to identify positive nexuses across policy priorities as well. One ripe option in this frame is Lebanon, where the United States has a reliable and long-standing partner in the Lebanese Armed Forces.