Eight years after the revolution, Tunisians seem to be swinging between disenchantment and anti-establishment backlash.
The crux of today’s Libya problem in international foreign policy lies in an underappreciated UN misstep in the most important international treaty concerning Libya, the 2015 Skhirat Agreement, and the decision to vest sovereignty in the heads of independent and semi-independent sub-state institutions like the Central Bank of Libya. The negative implications of this decision must now be addressed and it is time to move onto something new, after Skhirat.
Largely overlooked in international policymaking toward Libya’s current conflict is the role of corruption as a key driver of violence, as opposed to merely its byproduct. The high-level debate on Libya at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in late September and the proposed follow-on international conference to be hosted by Germany in October or November are the perfect opportunities to correct this oversight.
Saudi Arabia surprised the global oil and gas industry earlier this month by reshuffling its top two energy positions. Long-serving technocrat Khalid al-Falih was ousted as chair of Saudi Aramco one day and as head of the Ministry of Energy the next.
One important dynamic that is not acknowledged enough is the intensifying competition between Russia and Iran to determine the future shape of Syria and their position in it. While the very real competitive dynamic between Moscow and Tehran will never transition to hostility, it is beginning to have a very real effect on the evolution of major aspects of the crisis — from active conflict theaters, to the structures of the state, control over resources, and the prospect of intra-state conflict on Syrian soil.
Things seem to be going from bad to worse for Lebanon’s economy. On Aug. 23 Fitch downgraded its credit rating to CCC, meaning both it and Moody’s now rate the country’s bonds as junk. Ten days later, on Sept. 2, Lebanon’s top officials and bankers declared the country was in a state of economic emergency and said emergency measures would be taken.
Economic development paradigms have shifted focus over past decades: from minimizing imports to encouraging exports as the path to prosperity. Individual countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have had little success under either paradigm — the result being stagnant economies and high unemployment, especially among young people. Perhaps now is the time for MENA countries to follow a different path and focus on harnessing the power of their collective domestic demand to foster economic development.
Unlike most other goods, the inflation-adjusted prices of oil and oil derivatives actually became cheaper in the years after the Syrian uprising and the loss of most of the country’s oil fields. Iran stepped in to fill the gap by shipping oil by sea through the Suez Canal. In recent months, however, these shipments seem to have ground to a halt, crippling regime-controlled areas. This paper examines several competing explanations for the slowdown in Iranian oil shipments, explores a range of possible responses for the Assad regime, and takes a closer look at the implications for the regime, its allies, and regular Syrians.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a destabilizing element in an already volatile Middle East. The Palestinians are too weak to wrest their independence from Israel. But as long as their right to self-determination is denied, they are likely to engage in regular violence targeting Israel. Absent outside intervention, Israel is powerful enough that it can suppress Palestinian demands for freedom — but it is not able to completely pacify the Palestinians. Thus, the conflict continues, punctuated every few years by rounds of more significant violence.
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region including the Turkish-U.S. crisis meeting in Ankara on Syria, the resumption of U.S.-Taliban negotiations, Trump’s creation of a new “dovish” line on Iran, a rise in Egypt’s poverty levels, Sudan’s democratic transition, the easing of female guardianship rules in Saudi Arabia, and the end of the ceasefire in Idlib, featuring Charles Lister, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Paul Salem, W. Robert Pearson, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Thomas W. Lippman, and Robert S. Ford.
The fifth generation of mobile phone networks (5G) is poised to become a key enabler of the digitalization of economies and societies. Digital transformation is at the heart of GCC nations’ ambitions to accelerate economic diversification, deliver public services more effectively and efficiently, and promote sustainable growth. GCC ambitions to accelerate the large-scale deployment of 5G dovetail with those of China’s hi-tech giant Huawei, which is competing for market share in infrastructure and smartphones. However, the US push to stymie Huawei’s efforts to expand the reach of its networking technologies has emerged as a potential stumbling block to more extensive ties between that company and GCC wireless carriers and customers.
OPEC+ nations have ended speculation about whether they would continue oil production cuts by agreeing to a nine-month extension. Led by the global petroleum powers Saudi Arabia and Russia, the group agreed on July 2 to extend the current level of cuts until the second quarter of 2020.
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region including Imran Khan’s visit to the White House, tensions between President Trump and Congress over Turkey’s new S-400 system, escalation in the Straits of Gibraltar and Hormuz, military restructuring in Iraq, increased collaboration on the region’s power supply, and changes to Egypt’s social safety net, featuring Arif Rafiq, Gonul Tol, Ruba Husari, Robert S. Ford, Dr. Ibrahim Saif, and Mirette F. Mabrouk.
When it was signed four years ago, the Iran nuclear deal was widely perceived as a diplomatic triumph, a move that would help reintegrate Iran into the global economy and restore its relations with the West. Things haven’t quite turned out that way, however.
The idea of establishing a Levant Union — one not unlike the European Union (EU), but composed of the Levantine states of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and by extension, Egypt and Cyprus — is one that ought to be explored. Such an arrangement would offer untapped potential for trade, supported by the growing trend toward greater regionalization, fueled by the rise in protectionism, increasing multipolarity, and corporate regionalization.