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This essay looks at five North African states, arguing that the armed forces — for a variety of often case-specific reasons — are actually not as politically powerful and thus influential in foreign policy-making as one might expect. It first discusses the political strength of the military establishments of five North African states — Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt — and then investigates the difference, if any, that the recent Arab upheavals have made in their involvement in foreign policy-making.
The Durand Line issue has continued to complicate the unpredictable nature of the Afghan-Pakistani relationship since the birth of Pakistan. Constant tension haunts their neighborly relations, as apprehensions and suspicions co-exist with some affable gestures. No Afghan government, including the present one headed by President Ashraf Ghani, has ever recognized the legitimacy of the Durand Line, which runs through mountainous terrain and remains largely unpoliced.
Whenever power is contested in a country—any country—the political fight over who will ascend to the helm provides opportunities for foreign powers to intervene, and in some cases, influence the outcome of the political process.
Such behavior can carry short-term rewards when a new leader, put into power with the help of the foreign government, tilts favorably toward the sponsor; but it also can be counterproductive.
Accusations are mounting that Iran is ramping up its engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Like a lot of Iran’s murky foreign policy, it is difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff. The three questions that need to be answered to clear up the murky relationship between Iran and the Taliban are: why the change in Iran’s policy; when did this policy change occur; and what is the level of support afforded to the Taliban?
Unlikeliest of Allies
Since the government of Narendra Modi took office in 2014, India and the U.A.E. have moved relatively quickly to consolidate their existing ties and to explore new areas of cooperation. During this time, they have elevated the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, with the expressed intention of extending their cooperation to the security and defense spheres. This essay discusses these recent developments, with particular attention to the role of Pakistan as a constraining factor in India-U.A.E. relations going forward.
Economic and trade relations have been the most dynamic and significant component of the fundamental changes that have taken place in India’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) countries since the early 1990s. As a consequence, the Gulf has become of vital strategic importance for India in terms of energy security, trade, investment, and remittances. This essay discusses the contours of India’s trade relations with the G.C.C. countries, including the contributions they have made to India’s economic ascent and the scope for their further development.
India has become Israel’s largest arms export market in the world over the last decade (replacing China); and Israel has become one of India’s largest arms supplier. Why did India develop a strong military partnership with a country it had ignored for 42 years? What can explain the development of defense ties in spite of limited political leadership involvement over the past decade? Finally, what are the prospects for defense relations as India grows to become one of the world’s largest defense importer? This essay answers these questions by providing an account of the evolution of Indo-Israeli defense cooperation over the past 25 years.
India has sought to continue its five-decade long cordial relationship with Syria despite the conflict raging there, and has been providing muted support for Bashar al-Assad’s government. However, as the Syrian conflict has dragged on, it has become increasingly clear that the conflict in Syria is the epicenter of the tremors that are shaking the region, placing India’s own national interests at risk. This essay examines the arc of India’s policy toward the Syrian crisis, within the context of the broader thrust of Indian foreign policy towards West Asia under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
India’s interests and capabilities extend well beyond the sub-continent. This essay is part of a series that explores the geopolitical dimensions, economic ties, transnational networks, and other aspects of India’s links with the Middle East (West Asia) — a region that plays a vital role in India’s economy and its future. More ...
The discourse of Non-Alignment continues to shape the political culture of the Indian establishment’s strategic thinking in the field of foreign policy, notwithstanding the decline of Gandhian-Nehruvian moralism and increasing adaptation to the culture of power-centered realism in recent years. This essay shows that gradualism and risk avoidance remain deeply embedded features of India’s conduct of external relations, including its relations with West Asia.
This essay, which launches the MAP series on India’s relations with the Middle East (West Asia), delineates the extraordinary transformation of India’s deeply fraught relations with the region into, arguably, India’s most satisfying set of external relationships.
Addressing Egypt’s economic woes remains a matter of urgency for the stability of the government and the country as a whole. Egypt’s economic recovery plan, which was spearheaded by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2015, promised an improvement in living standards and social justice in the Middle East’s most populous nation. More than two years since the president assumed power, living standards have yet to see much improvement.
Regional Cooperation Series
This Policy Paper is part of The Middle East Institute’s Regional Cooperation Series. Throughout 2016, MEI will be releasing several policy papers by renowned scholars and experts exploring possibilities to foster regional cooperation across an array of sectors. The purpose is to highlight the myriad benefits and opportunities associated with regional cooperation, and the high costs of the continued business-as-usual model of competition and intense rivalry.
Summary
